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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The 2013 CAP reform was affected by a number of important factors: the participation of 
27 Member States in the negotiations, an unprecedented economic crisis, food price spikes 
on the global market, new concerns from the general public and a fundamental legitimacy 
crisis for a policy which will still represent a considerable share of the EU budget (EUR 
362.7 billion2 for the period 2014-2020), at a time when public finances are under extreme 
pressure. However crucial these aspects have been in determining the future design of the 
CAP, the extension of co-decision rules to agricultural and budgetary policies (granted by 
the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009) has arguably played the most decisive role in reshuffling the 
rules of the game. For the first time in the history of the CAP, which goes back to the 
origins of the EU, the institution directly representing the interests of the EU citizens took 
part – on an equal footing with the EU Ministers of Agriculture (the Council) – in the reform 
of the EU’s agricultural policy. 
There is only a slim body of literature exploring how changes introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty might affect the decision-making dynamics in agricultural policy at EU level. Most of 
these studies were published before the first main co-decision experience involving a 
significant CAP reform, which culminated in the political agreement reached during the final 
CAP trilogues in June and September 2013. This study of the impact of the EP’s co-decision 
role on the reform of the CAP is the first one to evaluate the political process which 
unfolded between 2010 and 2013. 
This study evaluates how the most recent CAP reform was affected by the enhanced role of 
the EP; assesses the extent to which maximum influence was exercised by the EP 
negotiators and provides insights to assist the EP in its approach to future reform 
negotiations. 
 
We use a (pragmatic) combination of several methodologies: semi-structured in-person 
interviews (34 actors consulted in total); a comprehensive amendment analysis (on the 
four basic CAP regulations); specific case studies on salient issues of the 2013 CAP reform. 
 
Chapters 4 to 7 present the main findings. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the EP’s internal dynamics, and the different stages of the EP 
internal decision-making.  
 
Co-decision appears to have had little impact on the composition of the COMAGRI.  The 
vast majority of COMAGRI members came from the EPP (around 38 %) and the S&D 
(around 25%); all the other groups represented less than 10% - the same as in the 
previous legislature. A study shows that 31% of COMAGRI’s full members had been 
members of farmers’ unions or cooperatives or had been farmers or owned a farm; and 
that 24 % of members of COMAGRI had held a ministerial or other public office in 
agriculture or had a special expertise in agriculture. There is no evidence that this is 
significantly different from before.  
 
                                                 
2  In 2011 constant prices: 277.8 bn for Pillar 1 and 84.9 bn for Pillar 2 (European Parliament (2013), European 
Council Conclusions on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 and the CAP, Note, Policy 
Department B). 
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COMAGRI was able to come to an agreement (in January 2013) which reflects its ability to 
overcome divisions within and between political groups. These divisions came more 
strongly to the fore under co-decision due to the increased responsibility linked to binding 
legislation and the related need to reach a coherent and common position within COMAGRI.  
 
When assessing the nature of COMAGRI's influence on the reform, we find that, generally 
speaking, COMAGRI was pushing for a lower level of reform than the EC, although this 
cannot be generalised to all policy issues. The status quo bias was clearest when 
considering the environmental component of the new CAP, which proved to be one of the 
most controversial areas of the reform. 
 
The increased legislative activity and workload linked to co-decision (the introduction of 
8 000 amendments) may be linked to the MEPs’ willingness to make a difference on this 
first CAP reform under co-decision but may also be linked to the technological facilitation 
provided by the AT4AM system for tabling amendments. 
 
Other parliamentary forums, such as the opinion-giving committees and the plenary, also 
played an important role in EP decision-making. Opinion-giving committees appeared to 
have had a marginal influence on the outcome, mainly due to the application of the default 
procedure (as opposed to the reinforced cooperation procedure). ENVI seems to have been 
the most active (the highest number of amendments introduced), while DEVE had the 
highest number of amendments adopted by COMAGRI. The relationship between COMAGRI 
and ENVI was tense throughout the process, not least because of ENVI’s natural 
predisposition to legislate on environmental issues, which were at the heart of this reform. 
This discussion raises the broader question of the routes and ways in which opinion-giving 
committees should be associated with high-profile dossiers such as the CAP.  
 
The differences between the plenary vote – and the adoption of the EP negotiating 
mandates on the four basic CAP regulations in March 2013 – and the COMAGRI vote two 
months earlier were relatively small. In the plenary vote, country cohesion was sometimes 
stronger than party cohesion, especially on strategic roll-call votes where some MEPs 
favoured national interests (for example on the CMO file).  
 
The application of Rules 70 and 70a to the CAP reform enabled the EP to enter negotiations 
with the Council on a strong footing by giving it the backing of the full Parliament. It also 
enabled the EP to still be on track for a first-reading agreement, which would have been 
impossible (given the timing imperative imposed by the MFF) without the new Rules. The 
latter may also be seen as an extra step in an already complex process, which may 
counteract the efficiency gains of a first-reading agreement. 
 
The increased responsibilities linked to co-decision were not matched with a substantial 
increase in EP in-house resources. Generally speaking, the ability of COMAGRI to deal with 
the political aspects (as opposed to technical aspects) of the CAP reform package does not 
seem to have been undermined by limited resources. While there seems to be an 
agreement that EP resources should be adapted to its new legislative functions, there is no 
agreement as to how precisely these resources should be enhanced, in particular to avoid a 
technocratic drift (i.e. a transfer of power from the MEPs to the experts). The discussion on 
resources also needs to be considered in the light of the nature of the EP, as a political 
institution, as opposed to the Council, which is more of an administrative body, and the 
vocation of the EC to provide EU-wide expertise and information.  
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Chapter 5 analyses the negotiating phase of the 2013 CAP reform process, 
between April and September 2013.  
 
A new working culture seems to have emerged as a result of co-decision, but not always 
successfully. Areas for improvement in the communication between the institutions exist 
and the understanding of their respective roles needs to be enhanced. Informal contacts 
between the respective negotiating teams are recognised as crucial to further develop this 
new interinstitutional working culture and to enable successful negotiations.  
 
Co-decision also intensified the contacts and relationship between non-institutional actors 
and the EP, which was sometimes criticised for being too open to the influence of certain 
specific actors or stakeholders. Co-decision reinforced the need for civil society actors and 
stakeholders to organise themselves at European level in order to influence a more 
complex and heterogeneous EU decision-making system. A key question here is whether 
the limited EP in-house resources and its reliance on external sources of expertise 
inevitably makes it more vulnerable to the influence of outside actors. 
 
The success of the Irish Presidency can be considered as an indication of how co-decision 
can work successfully. In particular, by investing heavily in personal relationships with EP 
negotiators and dealing with the most sensitive issues as a package, the Irish team 
integrated the new interinstitutional dynamics into their strategy, which effectively led to a 
political agreement on the four basic CAP reform acts.  
 
On the other hand, the episode of delegated acts may be seen as an illustration of where 
areas for improvement remain. Institutional arrangements should be put in place with 
regard to the future preparation of these acts. 
 
In terms of influence, the EP undoubtedly enjoyed new powers under co-decision. In the 
2013 CAP reform, more than half of its amendments on the most sensitive issues of CAP 
reform were incorporated into the final outcome.  
However, its limited technical resources, compared to the two other institutions, may have 
reduced its ability to negotiate on an equal footing with the Council and to propose viable 
alternatives to the EC’s proposals.  
The impact of the EC’s power is ambiguous: it has increased its role as facilitator and draws 
influence from its expertise (and the EP’s reliance on it). However, it also clearly had much 
less influence on issues where the EP and the Council were allies. Our amendment analysis 
indicates that the EP partnered more easily with the Council (they shared the same 
positions in the highest number of cases) and that it was also most successful when it 
partnered with the Council.  
 
Chapter 6 presents insights from key issues of the 2013 CAP reform: the 
management of the CAP reform calendar, the EP’s position on capping, the role of the EP in 
the evolution of the greening proposal, the impact of the simultaneous MFF negotiations on 
the CAP reform in general and the EP’s influence in particular, and the particular case of the 
CMO regulation and the related Article 43(3) issues3. 
                                                 
3  Article 43(3) TFEU excludes a short list of issues from co-decision: the measures relating to fixing prices, 
levies, aid and quantitative limitations are to be legislated upon separately via a Regulation of the Council.  
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The original reform calendar, i.e. the implementation of a new CAP by 1 January 2014, can 
be considered as ‘unrealistic’ given the parallel MFF negotiations and the natural duration of 
interinstitutional negotiations on a high-profile dossier such as the CAP. The internal EP 
process could have been slightly shorter (or more efficient) but the duration of the process 
also enabled the EP negotiators to build a good work environment and trust.  
The EP’s position on capping was ambiguous but also somewhat contradictory during the 
process. The EP influenced the decision on greening on specific issues.  Several of its 
amendments to the EC proposal were included in the final legislative agreement. Most of 
these amendments were supported by the Council. Compared to the Commission proposal, 
the EP wanted an extended list of farmers covered by  ‘green by definition’ and less areas 
to be included in EFAs; the EP wanted permanent grassland to be identified at the regional 
rather than individual level; the EP sided with the Commission against double funding; and 
wanted lower penalties for non-compliance with greening.  
The parallel MFF negotiations were an important constraint on co-decision, as they 
restricted the EP’s room for manoeuvre on a number of key issues and set the overall 
framework within which the EP and the Council could negotiate. However, the small 
achievements the EP managed to secure in the last trilogue meeting in September 2013 
have set a precedent and are indicative of the EP’s determination to ensure that co-decision 
rules are respected.  
Regarding the EP’s position on the CMO regulation and Article 43(3), the EP may have used 
the arguments of the economic and food crises as justification for a stronger regulation of 
agricultural markets and more support to European farmers. The CMO file was one of the 
most complex and controversial files of the full CAP reform package, because of the 
competition issues it raised and because of the ‘Article 43(3) issues’. The EP lost 
negotiations on most of the issues covered by Article 43(3) but this episode does not pre-
empt how they should be dealt with in the future. 
 
Chapter 7 presents an overall assessment of the EP’s performance in this first CAP 
reform under co-decision, and draws lessons for the future from this. 
Several people involved in the decision-making considered the fact that a political 
agreement was reached and a new CAP will enter into force on 1 January 2015 as a sign 
that ‘co-decision works’.  
This positive evaluation is also reflected in the ‘mark’ that the EP received from those who 
were interviewed for this study. On average, our interviewees gave a mark of 4.85 on a 
scale of 1-7 (with 7 being the top mark) for the EP’s performance in the CAP reform 
process; and the evaluation was relatively constant across representatives from different 
European institutions. Outsiders gave a less positive evaluation. 
The increase in accountability and transparency is a notable and positive evolution linked to 
co-decision, although this should not overshadow other issues revealed by the 2013 CAP 
reform process, for example the complexity of the four adopted regulations, which renders 
democratic scrutiny over the process more difficult. Importantly, the relative success of this 
co-decision experience should not be confused with policy change or reform, which some 
have argued became more difficult with the involvement of the EP as co-legislator.  
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Preliminary lessons from this first CAP reform under co-decision include (amongst others):  
 the increased participation of civil society;  
 a relatively good working environment within the EP negotiating team, and between 
other institutional teams (although improvements in the working culture need to be 
made);  
 A stronger compromise culture linked to the increased number of amendments. 
 
This first experience also showed that (amongst others):  
 adapting the internal institutional mechanisms to reflect the change in power is 
difficult and takes time. The EP is still less influential (especially on institutional issues 
such as Article 43(3) despite the formal increase in power); 
 individuals play an important role in the success of the negotiations (which makes the 
choice of these individuals decisive);  
 Unsurprisingly, preparation, communication and compromise are three key words to 
keep in mind for future CAP reform negotiations.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The history of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been largely characterised by 
incremental change, with more significant reform initiatives only being seen during the last 
two decades (1992 and 2003 reforms). In 2010, the EU re-opened the CAP for reform and 
after three years of interinstitutional negotiations, which took place in a context of 
economic turmoil and budget austerity, a final agreement on the future design of this policy 
was reached on 24 September 2013 and confirmed by the vote of the European Parliament 
(EP) in its plenary session of 20 November 2013. 
A number of important factors and determinants can be identified as having had a 
significant influence in this process: the participation of 27 Member States in the 
negotiations, an unprecedented economic crisis, food price spikes on the global market, 
new concerns from the general public and a fundamental legitimacy crisis for a policy which 
will still represent a considerable share of the EU budget (362.7 billion euros4 for the period 
2014-2020), at a time when public finances are under extreme pressure. However crucial 
these aspects have been in determining the future design of the CAP, the extension of co-
decision rules to agricultural and budgetary policies (granted by the Treaty of Lisbon in 
2009) has arguably played the most decisive role in reshuffling the rules of the game. For 
the first time in the history of the CAP, which goes back to the origins of the EU, the 
institution directly representing the interests of the EU citizens took part – on equal footing 
with the EU Ministers of Agriculture (the Council) – in the reform of the EU’s agricultural 
policy. 
There is only a slim body of literature exploring how changes introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty might affect the decision-making dynamics in agricultural policy at EU level, 
including Cunha and Swinbank (2011) and Swinnen and Knops (2012). Greer and Hind 
(2012) describe it as ‘relatively unchartered territory’. Most of these studies were published 
before the first main co-decision experience involving a significant CAP reform, which 
culminated in the political agreement reached in the final CAP trilogues in June and 
September 2013. The political process which unfolded between 2010 and 2013 is therefore 
the only case on which this study of the impact of the EP’s co-decision role on the reform of 
the CAP can be based. 
1.2 Aim 
The aim of the present study is to:  
 Evaluate how the most recent CAP reform was affected by the enhanced role of the 
EP. 
 Assess the extent to which maximum influence was exercised by the EP negotiators. 
 Provide detailed recommendations to assist the EP in its approach to future reform 
negotiations. 
Within the general objectives, more specific objectives aim to analyse and understand how 
                                                 
4  In 2011 constant prices: 277.8 bn for Pillar 1 and 84.9 bn for Pillar 2 (European Parliament (2013), European 
Council Conclusions on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 and the CAP, Note, Policy 
Department B). 
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co-decision has affected a series of factors and aspects of the process and how these 
impacts have affected the overall influence of the EP on the CAP reform outcome. These 
specific issues are grouped into four main areas: 
EP internal dynamics: 
 the dynamics and the work within the Committee on Agriculture and Rural 
Development (COMAGRI) (political divisions, internal votes, the workload related to 
the amendments, etc.); 
 the role of the new Articles 70 and 70a of the EP internal rules of procedure5, in order 
to facilitate the trilogue negotiations within the first reading; 
 the way the different national or sectoral interests were reflected in the reform 
agreement and the extent to which the EP helped reconcile the common interest with 
these more narrow intents; 
 how the internal dynamics of the functioning of the EP, e.g. the relationship between 
COMAGRI and the plenary or between COMAGRI and the opinion-giving committees, 
have been affected by co-decision and how these in turn have influenced the role of 
the EP. 
Interinstitutional dynamics: 
 how co-decision affected the interinstitutional balance and working culture between 
and within the three institutions; 
 how disagreements were resolved concerning the constitutional issues embodied in 
the battle over the distribution of powers between the institutions regarding the so-
called Article 43(3) TFEU issues and the choice between implementing and delegated 
acts within the Basic Acts. 
External factors6: 
 the impact of the parallel process of the MFF negotiations7 and the extent to which 
this eroded the EP’s influence on important aspects contained in the CAP legislative 
texts; 
 how other external factors, such as the side-effects of the food price spikes in 2007-
2008, or the prevailing economic conditions in the EU have affected this CAP reform 
in comparison to previous rounds; 
 how interest groups and lobbies have adapted their influence strategies to the new 
decision-making rules and how this, in turn, influenced the EP. 
Enhancers and constraints on the EP’s influence:  
 whether it is possible to identify particular instances where the influence of a single 
individual (e.g. Commissioner, COMAGRI Chair, lead rapporteurs, Presidency 
negotiators, etc.) was telling in determining part of the reform outcome; 
                                                 
5  The numbering of these new rules has recently changed to Articles 73 and 74 (for Rules 70 & 70a 
respectively). However, to avoid confusion, we will refer to these using their old numbering to be consistent 
with the way they were discussed during the 2013 CAP reform. 
6  We draw the reader’s attention here to the absence of the WTO in the list of external actors, as international 
trade negotiations played a marginal role in the 2013 CAP reform, compared to previous reform rounds where 
WTO agreements could be seen as the main driver of reform.  
7  Considering the inextricable character of the CAP reform and MFF negotiations, the latter can arguably also be 
described as an internal factor to the decision-making on the CAP. 
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 how the increased complexity involved in the process of trilogue negotiations affected 
not just the outcome but also the reform timetable; 
 whether pressure to reach a first-reading agreement within the 2009-2014 legislative 
term constrained the EP’s influence; 
 the extent to which differences in the technical capacities (including the asymmetries 
in the working culture experiences between the EU institutions) and administrative 
resources that could be deployed to support the negotiators of the respective 
institutions affected the EP’s ability to benefit fully from its newfound co-decision 
powers. 
1.3 Structure of the report 
The structure of the report reflects these different areas of analysis.  
Sections 2 and 3 provide a literature review and some background information on the 
timing, the procedure and the key actors of the 2013 CAP reform.  
Section 4 analyses the dynamics at play within the EP between the publication of the EC 
proposals on 12 October 2011 and the adoption of the EP negotiating mandate on 13 March 
2013. It discusses the internal dynamics within COMAGRI (its members, workload, 
resources and political divisions), the role of the opinion-giving committees (and especially 
the ENVI Committee) and the relationship between COMAGRI and the plenary (with a 
particular focus on the role played by Rules 70 and 70a of the EP internal rules of 
procedure). 
Section 5 analyses the way in which interinstitutional dynamics evolved under co-decision, 
in particular during the ‘negotiating phase’ between April 2013 and September 2013. It also 
identifies which coalitions were the most successful in changing or preserving the EC’s 
original proposals and how the working culture between the negotiators and their teams 
(but also with civil society actors) developed.  Finally, in this section we also look at specific 
illustrations of interinstitutional dynamics: the negotiations on the CAP reform delegated 
acts and the role played by the Irish Presidency (January-June 2013). 
Section 6 completes the analysis undertaken in previous sections by looking more closely at 
certain aspects of the 2013 CAP reform that merit further attention. In particular it 
discusses the EP’s responsibility in managing the reform calendar and its position on 
capping. It also analyses what impact the EP had on the evolution of the greening 
component of the reform and how the simultaneous MFF negotiations affected the process 
in general and the EP’s influence in particular. Finally it addresses the link between the 
economic and food crises and the EP’s positions on the CMO, including on the so-called 
‘Article 43(3) issues’.  
Finally, section 7 attempts to provide an overall assessment of the EP’s performance in this 
first CAP reform under co-decision, before proposing a few tentative lessons and 
recommendations for future reform rounds on the CAP.  
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2.  LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
2.1  Insights from literature 
There are several strands in economic and political science literature which are of great 
relevance to this study, in particular political economy studies and studies analysing co-
decision and the CAP. The political economy literature provides explanations for why 
governments do what they do regarding agricultural policies (see de Gorter & Swinnen 
(2002), Swinnen (2008) and Anderson, Rausser and Swinnen (2013) for reviews). 
Theoretical and empirical political economy studies show that a variety of factors (including 
changes in economic conditions; costs of collective action; policy costs in terms of 
budgetary outlays and market distortions; preferences of voters, politicians and interest 
groups; political institutions; etc.) need to be taken into account to understand agricultural 
policy outcomes. 
A series of studies have used these insights (and contributed their own) to analyse CAP 
reforms (see, for example, Runge and von Witzke (1987), Pokrivcak, de Gorter and 
Swinnen (2001), Pokrivcak, Crombez and Swinnen (2006), Cunha and Swinbank (2011) 
and various chapters in Swinnen (2008)). These studies provide useful insights into which 
‘broader’ factors (such as the budget, trade policy disciplines, the evolution of agricultural 
prices and incomes, etc.) need to be taken into account in political economy analyses to 
fully understand agricultural policy outcomes (and the dynamics behind them). 
A focal point of our study is the impact of changes in EU decision-making rules (and co-
decision specifically) on EU policies (and on the CAP specifically). Several studies have 
analysed the impact of changes in EU decision-making rules on EU policies, including 
Crombez (2008), who analyses the impact of the introduction of qualified majority voting 
(QMV) in the Council. Other studies have focused on the co-decision rules and how their 
introduction (or extension) has affected the distribution of powers between the three EU 
institutions, and how the EP has exploited this new distribution to increase its influence on 
legislation (Shackleton, 2000, Corbett et. al, 2003, Maurer, 2003).  
These studies focus typically on other sectors where the EP has been part of the decision-
making process for much longer (in some cases almost 20 years, i.e. since the entry into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty). For example, Burns, Rasmussen and Reh (2013) provide an 
extensive overview of the lessons that can be drawn from the EP’s co-decision experience. 
In particular, they document how the introduction of co-decision affected the extent to 
which the EU constitutes a political system, the character of this system and whether it has 
contributed to increasing its democratic legitimacy. Until recently, these analyses did not 
concern the CAP, which was decided under the consultation procedure until the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009). This materialised into the new Articles 43.2 and 43.3 
TFEU:   
43.2 The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee, shall establish the common organisation of agricultural markets 
provided for in Article 40(1) and the other provisions necessary for the pursuit 
of the objectives of the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries 
policy.  
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43.3 The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt measures on 
fixing prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations and on the fixing and 
allocation of fishing opportunities. 
Only measures relating to fixing prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations and on the 
fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities are exceptions to the co-decision procedure 
and are still legislated upon separately via a Regulation of the Council.  
Given the recent character of this institutional development, there are only a few studies 
which have discussed (or speculated on) the impact of co-decision on CAP reform. 
Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfennig (2012) argue that the parliamentarisation of the 
CAP followed a constitutional logic rather than a policy-seeking logic: the connection 
between decision-making rules and policy outcomes was unclear from the outset, and co-
decision could equally be seen as strengthening reform and as entrenching the status quo 
by giving it the legitimacy of EP-backed legislation. Greer and Hind (2012), on the other 
hand, suggest that this may result in a potentially broadened agricultural policy agenda. 
This point was shared by Roederer-Rynning (2003, 2010) who argued that the new rules 
would bring new people into COMAGRI, which would affect the power of vested interests 
and could make the CAP accountable to a wider constituency. However she, and others 
such as Swinnen and Knops (2012), also suggests that co-decision might slow down the 
pace of reform by placing new technical and political constraints on the Commission’s right 
of initiative. The extent to which co-decision may influence the outcome of the 2013 CAP 
reform depends crucially on the structure of relative preferences for reform (Crombez and 
Swinnen (2011); the introduction of co-decision reduces the prospects for CAP reform if the 
EP is seeking a lower level of reform than the Commission. Cunha and Swinbank (2011) 
make interesting predictions on the way the internal functioning of the EP may influence 
the EP’s influence in the process and in particular the relationship between COMAGRI and 
the plenary session.  
Greer and Hind (2012) discuss how co-decision would affect the interinstitutional balance 
and propose four scenarios: the conventional scenario where the EP acquires more power 
at the expense of the other institutions but is constrained by limited resources; the Council-
EP axis where the Council fills the void created by the lack of EP resources; the 
Commission-centric model where the Commission manages to extend its powers, and 
finally the status quo scenario where the changes in decision-making rules produced stasis, 
a more protracted decision-making process that made reform more difficult by reinforcing 
the status quo. In a recent article (December 2013), Greer concludes that the 2013 CAP 
reform confirms the highly resistant-to-change nature of the CAP and that agricultural 
interests are still influential enough to insulate the CAP against pressures for radical reform. 
He also suggests that the increased role of the EP reinforced the dominant ‘state-assisted’ 
conception of agricultural policy.  
This brief literature review demonstrates that studies have attempted to predict and 
speculate on the EP’s influence on agricultural policy based on conceptual models and 
lessons from other policy areas. Most of these studies were published before the first main 
co-decision experience involving a significant CAP reform, which culminated in the political 
agreement reached in the final CAP trilogues in June and September 2013.  
This is the first time the hypotheses have been tested against the valuable empirical 
evidence provided by the first CAP reform under co-decision, which took place between 
2010 and 2013. This study of the impact of the EP’s co-decision role on the reform of the 
CAP is the first one to evaluate this political process.   
We have used several of the hypotheses stemming from literature, as reviewed above, as 
input in the design of our analysis, and in preparing the interviews conducted for this study. 
The first CAP reform under the ordinary legislative procedure: a political economy perspective 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 25 
2.2  Methodological approach 
Given the tight deadline imposed on the study and our knowledge of ongoing research we 
could draw on, the chosen methodological approach is a (pragmatic) combination of several 
methodologies: 
 Semi-structured in-person interviews  
 Amendment analysis  
 Specific case studies on salient issues of the 2013 CAP reform 
2.2.1  Interviews 
For the interviews, we established a non-exhaustive list of key actors directly and indirectly 
involved in the preparation and negotiations of the 2013 CAP reform. Despite the time 
constraints and the limited availability of selected individuals, we were still able to interview 
a large number of key individuals (34 in total).  
We managed to achieve a fairly balanced share of experts from the EP (19, or 56 %) and 
from outside the EP (15, or 44 %). A more detailed breakdown of distribution is provided in 
Box 1.  
 
Box 1: Interview sample 
A total of 34 people were interviewed between 12 February 2014 and 2 April 2014, 
from the EP, the EC, the Council of Ministers and civil society. In particular: 
 19 actors from the EP, comprising leading members of COMAGRI (8), their 
advisers and assistants (6), and members of the EP staff (5) 
 7 actors from the EC working on the CAP, including members of the cabinet 
of Commissioner Ciolos, DG AGRI, and other DGs 
 4 actors from the Council of Ministers and the Presidency  
 4 civil society actors and external observers 
 
The interviews were prepared based on the methodological considerations outlined in 
Phellas et al (2011). The questionnaire was adapted to each interviewee based on the file 
and the institution/body he or she worked for. When the questionnaire could not be 
followed strictly speaking, for example in the case of time constraints, the same topics 
covered by the questionnaire were addressed to the largest extent possible. The questions 
were based on hypotheses drawn from literature and were aimed at investigating how co-
decision affected different aspects of the decision-making process (within the EP but also 
between the institutions), how the EP performed in its co-legislator mandate, how other 
external factors influenced the process in general and the EP in particular, and finally which 
specific lessons could be drawn from this first co-decision experience on the CAP.  
The interviews conducted for this study lasted between 30 minutes (for the shortest one) 
and 2 hours (for the longest one). Some people were interviewed in pairs, for example an 
MEP and his assistant/adviser or two collaborators working on the same file (5). Where in-
person interviews were not feasible (due to availability constraints), phone interviews were 
conducted instead (6). In a limited number of cases (6), the interview was carried out via 
e-mail (the questionnaire was sent and the answers were returned within an agreed 
deadline). Interviews were transcribed and returned to the interviewees for potential 
comments and corrections.  
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It is important to emphasise that the interviews were carried out based on the assurance 
that full anonymity would be guaranteed. This allowed the interviewees to be frank and 
open in their answers. For this reason, the identity of the interviewees will not be disclosed 
and their comments will be used for the purpose of this study only.  
Finally, when processing the interview results, we tried to provide a qualitative summary of 
views which were shared during the discussions but also some pieces of quantitative 
information on a few multiple choice questions, for which the response rate was above 
50 %8.  
2.2.2  Amendment analysis 
The amendment analysis undertaken for this study is based on the work of Ferto and 
Kovacs (2014) and investigates both the role the EP played during the trilogue negotiations 
and the EP internal decision-making process. Both institutional coalitions and success rates 
of EP amendments were analysed9.  
For the analysis of institutional coalitions, 93 key CAP policy issues in the 4 legislative 
proposals were identified and analysed: 43 cases in the regulation on Direct Payments 
(DP), 22 cases in the regulation on the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD), 21 cases in the regulation on the Common Market Organisation (CMO) and 7 
cases in the Horizontal Regulation (HZR) (see Annex 2). In each case, the respective 
positions of the three institutions that participated in the trilogue negotiations (EC, EP, 
Council) were identified. Their respective positions were then compared to see which 
institutions shared the same views on these key CAP policy issues. The objective of this 
analysis was twofold: to identify the coalition formulation patterns among the three 
institutions and to identify the winning coalitions, i.e. coalitions whose position was finally 
chosen and incorporated into the final agreement.  
Regarding the success rate of the EP amendments, successful amendments are defined as 
the changes proposed by the EP which were (at least partly) adopted and incorporated into 
the text of the final CAP regulations. The success rate represents the ratio of EP adopted 
amendments to the total number of amendments introduced. The dataset includes 
amendments on the four CAP proposals on Direct Payments, the EAFRD, the CMO and the 
HZR. Amendments in the dataset have been categorised partly following the methodology 
proposed by Kreppel (Kreppel 1999 and 2002). 
The success rate taken in isolation may not reveal much about the importance of the 
amendments that were adopted and hence the nature of the legislative influence. For this 
reason, the complete amendment analysis in Ferto and Kovacs (2014) also distinguishes 
between different types of amendments. We will draw on these findings where relevant and 
refer to the Ferto and Kovacs (2014) report for details. 
                                                 
8  In some cases, only part of the questionnaire could be addressed which means that not all interviewees 
answered all the questions. We account for this factor in the ‘response rates’ attached to the presentation of 
our interview results in the next sections of this study. Also, in our calculations, we counted as ‘one response’ 
the answers provided by two interviewees when they took part in the interview together and provided one joint 
contribution. 
9  These methodological considerations draw on Ferto and Kovacs (2014). 
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2.2.3  Case studies on specific reform elements 
Case studies on some of the most salient issues of the 2013 CAP reform have been carried 
out to further investigate areas for which the interviews and amendment analysis were not 
sufficient. Particular attention was given to:  
 The interinstitutional management of the reform calendar. 
 The position of the EP on capping. 
 The role of the EP in the evolution of the EC’s greening proposal (from its publication 
to the final political agreement and the corresponding delegated acts). 
 The impact of the simultaneous MFF negotiations on the CAP reform process itself but 
most importantly on the role of the EP. 
 The impact of economic considerations (including the food price spikes) on the EP’s 
position on market regulation (included in the CMO file). 
 The interinstitutional battle over Article 43(3) issues. 
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3.  THE 2013 CAP REFORM AT A GLANCE 
3.1  The decision-making procedure: timeline and key actors 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, most of the CAP-related issues 
have been decided using the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), previously called co-
decision. For purposes of clarity, the OLP will be referred to as co-decision 
throughout this study. Figure 1 provides a summary of the different stages of this 
procedure. In the case of the 2013 CAP reform, the agreement was reached in first reading.   
 
Figure 1: Co-decision at a glance - Legislative procedure  
Legal basis for the CAP: Art. 38 to 44 of the TFEU 
Decision-making: Governed by Article 43 of the TFEU 
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Although the informal consultations started earlier, as far back as 2008-2009, the official 
process lasted four years, from 2010 to 2014. Box 2 below provides a timeline of the key 
dates of this reform.  
In broad terms, the process can be split into different phases, during which various 
institutional and non-institutional actors played specific roles.  
Firstly, the ‘agenda-setting’ phase took place between April 2010 and October 2011 
(eighteen months) and culminated with the publication of the EC Communication in 
November 2010 and the legislative proposals in October 2011 on the four CAP regulations: 
Direct Payments (DP), Rural Development (EAFRD), Common Market Organisation 
(CMO)10, Horizontal Regulation (HZR). In addition to the public consultation which was 
organised during this phase (see Box 2), this period is also significant owing to the inter-
service consultation which took place between DG AGRI (which  initiated the proposals 
under the impetus of the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Dacian Ciolos) and the other DGs of the EC. In the 2013 CAP reform, DGs Environment 
(ENV), Climate Action (CLIMA) and Competition (COMP) are believed to have played a 
particularly important role in this internal procedure.  
Secondly, once the proposals were published, they went to the EP and the Council, the co-
legislators of the texts, for the ‘processing phase’ which took place from October 2011 to 
April 2013 (eighteen months). There are several important moments in this processing 
phase and we will mainly focus here on the EP internal procedure.  
 The first step for the EP was referring the legislative texts to a responsible 
committee11, based on the competences described in Annex VII of the EP internal 
Rules of Procedure12. This responsible committee is in charge of making legislative 
proposals to the plenary. On 25 October 2011, the EP designated COMAGRI as the 
committee responsible for the 2013 CAP reform package.  
 Besides the referral to the responsible committee, the EP also decided on how to 
associate other committees (the opinion-giving committees) with the 
decision-making process. Here, the EP leadership (Presidency or the Conference of 
Presidents in case of a dispute) had two main options: to concentrate leadership 
within the responsible committee (default procedure), or to allow for some degree 
of joint leadership between the opinion-giving and the responsible committees 
(reinforced cooperation procedure). In the case of the 2013 CAP reform package, 
the default procedure applied (where the leadership remains with the responsible 
committee). The EP specified different constellations13 of opinion-giving 
committees for each of the legislative proposals (see Table 6 in Chapter 4). 
                                                 
10  The new CAP regulation establishes a ‘Common Market Organisation’, thereby repealing the single Common 
Market Organisation (SCMO). The expression SCMO has been used, however, in the context of the 2013 CAP 
reform.  
11  Referral proposals are prepared by the Directorate-General for the Presidency in coordination with the 
secretariats of the stake committees, and announced in plenary by the Presidency.  In case of disagreement, 
referral decisions are forwarded to the Conference of the Presidents, which must make a decision within six 
weeks on the basis of a recommendation from the Conference of Committee Chairs, unless the original 
recommendation withstands (process described in Corbett et al. 2011, p. 153).  
12  These rules govern the internal functioning of the EP. Their numbering will change as of 1 July 2014. The 
numbering used throughout this study corresponds to the previous numbering, in place during the CAP reform 
process. The corresponding new numbers can be found under 
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sipade/rulesleg8/Rulesleg8.EN.pdf.  
13  Not all opinion-giving committees chose to draft opinion reports, and not all opinion-giving committees granted 
equal attention to all four legislative proposals. For example, the Environment Committee (ENVI) chose to 
focus only on two sets of legislative proposals, namely direct payments and rural development (see Tables 6 
& 7). 
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 The responsible committee – in this case COMAGRI – then proceeded with the 
designation (after negotiations between and within political groups) of the leading 
MEP(s) who would be in charge of presenting the first draft of a future EP position 
and leading the internal negotiations to bring the EP to a joint position. They are 
the rapporteurs and the shadow rapporteurs14. The political coordinators of 
each political group and the COMAGRI Chair play an important role in designating 
these actors. The full list of rapporteurships and shadow rapporteurships for the 
2013 CAP reform are provided in Table 7 in Section 4. 
 The rapporteurs have the mandate to draft amendments which will form the basis 
of the EP’s position (adopted in the plenary). These original amendments take the 
form of draft reports presented to the Committee and following which a deadline 
for amendments is set for the shadow rapporteurs and other members to 
introduce their amendments (including those from the opinion-giving committees). 
In the case of the 2013 CAP reform package, over 8 000 amendments were 
introduced by the deadline of July 2012.  
 Internal negotiations took place between the rapporteurs and the shadow 
rapporteurs, in the form of ‘shadow meetings’. These were aimed at evening out 
differences and finding compromises on the key legislative issues. The roles of the 
group coordinators and the COMAGRI Chair are also key here to make this internal 
process successful.  
 After 6 months of internal negotiations, a vote in COMAGRI took place on 23 and 
24 January 2013 on 279 compromise amendments. Two months later, and in 
accordance with Rules 70 and 70a of the EP internal rules of procedure (see 
Chapter 4), the texts adopted by COMAGRI were brought before the plenary for 
a vote, which took place on 13 March 2013, to adopt four negotiating mandates 
(on the four CAP reform regulations), based on which the EP was able to start 
negotiating with the Council. 
 
This brings the process to the third stage; the negotiating phase, which took place between 
April 2013 and June 2013.  
The negotiations between the two co-legislators were able to start based on the negotiating 
mandates of the EP and the Council of Agricultural Ministers, adopted on 13 March 
2013 and 25 March 2013 respectively. These negotiations took the form of what are called 
‘trilogue meetings’, where the EP, the Council and the EC attempt to come to an 
agreement on a joint version of the legislative texts. In the case of the 2013 CAP reform 
package, around 50 trilogue meetings took place, leading to a political agreement on 26 
June 2013 on the basic acts of the four regulations (in first reading). This phase will 
be detailed in Chapter 5. 
Although not formally involved in the co-decision per se, the role of the European Council 
should also be underlined here, as it drew up the framework for the CAP reform process 
and affected it in important ways. Its conclusions on the MFF reached in February 2013 
restricted the room for manoeuvre of both the EP and the Council in the negotiating phase. 
This will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
                                                 
14  The shadow rapporteurs are the lead MEPs of the other political groups (other than the political group of the 
rapporteur) who are in charge of following the designated file. As stated in Rule 192(4) of the EP internal rules 
of procedure: The political groups may designate a shadow rapporteur for each report to follow the progress of 
the relevant report and find compromises within the committee on behalf of the group. Their names shall be 
communicated to the committee Chair. The committee, on a proposal from the coordinators, may in particular 
decide to involve the shadow rapporteurs in seeking an agreement with the Council in ordinary legislative 
procedures.  
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Finally, an ultimate phase was started after the co-decision procedure: the adoption of the 
Delegated Acts, which is still ongoing. This has triggered an intense interinstitutional 
discussion on the interpretation of the political agreement, which was partly resolved by the 
approval of a first set of delegated acts in April 2014. 
 
Box 2: The timing of the 2013 CAP reform at a glance  
12 April 2010: The Commission launched a public debate on the CAP’s future, objectives, 
principles and contribution to the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy. The public debate stayed open for 
contributions until 11 June 2010 (a total of 5600 contributions were received).  
18 November 2010: Based on the outcome of the public consultation, the Commission 
presented a communication on ‘The CAP towards 2020’, which highlighted the key 
challenges and major policy issues regarding EU agriculture and rural areas and outlined 
the possible policy orientations and options for the future. The communication was aimed 
at launching the debate with the other institutions and with stakeholders.  
12 October 2011: The Commission presented a set of legal proposals on the CAP, which 
served as a starting point for the negotiations with the other institutions. 
23-24 January 2013: COMAGRI voted on the four CAP reform regulations. 
8 February 2013: The European Council reached an agreement on the MFF 2014-2020. 
13 March 2013: The EP adopted its negotiating mandates on the four CAP reform Basic 
Regulations. 
19 March 2013: The Council adopted its general approach on CAP reform. 
25 March 2013: The Council adopted its mandates on the four CAP reform regulations. 
11 April 2013: The interinstitutional negotiations started with the opening of the trilogue 
meetings on the four CAP reform regulations. 
27-28 May 2013: An informal Council was held in Dublin as part of the negotiations on 
the CAP reform package. 
26 June 2013: A political agreement on the reform of the CAP was reached between the 
Commission, the EP and the Council, under the Irish Presidency.  
20 November 2013: The European Parliament approved the four Basic Regulations in a 
plenary vote.   
16 December 2013: The Council formally adopted the four Basic Regulations for the 
reformed CAP as well as the Transition Rules for 2014.  
20 December 2013: The four Basic Regulations and the Transition Rules were published 
in the Official Journal. 
11 March 2014: The Commission adopted ten ‘Delegated Acts’ that clarify technical 
implementation details of the reform.  
7 April 2014: COMAGRI approved the Delegated Acts in its committee meeting of 7 April. 
The EP plenary did not object to these Delegated Acts in its last plenary session of the 
2009-2014 legislative term (14-17 April 2014). The Council accepted these acts on 14 April 
2014. 
Sources: European Commission website, www.capreform.eu, Matthews (2014). 
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3.2  The Commission proposal and the final outcome 
In October 2011, the EC published its legislative proposals on the future of the CAP, which 
were then amended by the EP and the Council. Boxes 3 and 4 provide a brief overview of 
the key elements of the CAP reform package as proposed by the EC and as adopted by the 
EP and the Council in 2013. 
 
Box 3: The 2013 CAP reform at a glance: key elements of the EC proposals 
On 12 October 2011, Commissioner Ciolos published his proposals for the future of the 
CAP 2014-2020. The rationale of these proposals can be summarised as a ‘fairer, greener 
and simpler CAP’. In particular, the proposals included the following main elements: 
A greening component: tying 30 % of direct payments to three environmental measures, 
in addition to the cross-compliance requirements. 
A stronger convergence of payments: ensuring that the levels of payments between 
and within MS move towards the EU average by 2019, and imposing a higher ceiling on the 
largest payments (capping). 
A reorganisation of the rural development funding: moving from 4 axes to a set of 
new priorities, to stimulate rural employment and entrepreneurship. Rural development 
funding is also put under the Common Strategic Framework, together with the cohesion 
and fisheries policies. 
New risk management tools and collective organisations: new ways for producers to 
manage risks linked to increased price volatility and to organise themselves in a more 
competitive and balanced food chain. 
New schemes to support small and young farmers: two additional payments to support 
small farms and encourage the establishment of new entrants. 
A simpler and more efficient CAP. 
Additional investment in research and innovation. 
Source: European Commission website, Legal proposals for the CAP after 2013. 
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Box 4: The 2013 CAP reform at a glance: key elements of the final outcome 
A greening component: up to 70 % of the Direct Payments envelope will be dedicated to 
the new Basic Payment Scheme, while 30 % of the available national envelope is linked to 
the provision of certain sustainable farming practices as a reward for the provision of 
environmental public goods (‘greening component’).  
A stronger convergence of payments:  
- Between Member States: MS where the average payment (in € per hectare) is 
currently below 90 % of the EU average will see a gradual increase in their envelope (by 
one third of the difference between their current rate and 90 % of the EU average). 
Moreover, there is the guarantee that every Member State will reach a minimum level by 
2019. 
- Within Member States: MS that maintain allocations based on historical references 
must move to more similar levels of the basic payment per hectare. They can choose to 
take a regional or national approach. Furthermore, they can choose to achieve a 
regional/national rate by 2019 or to ensure that those farms getting less than 90 % of 
the regional/national average rate see a gradual increase (by one third of the difference 
between their current rate and 90 % of the national/regional average). In addition, there 
will be a reduction in the payment for large farms above € 150 000 (‘degressivity’). 
This means that the basic payment will be reduced by at least 5 % for amounts above € 
150 000. The capping of payments at a higher level remains voluntary. A 
redistributive payment will also be granted for the first 30 hectares. Importantly, 
degressivity does not need to apply to Member States which apply the ‘redistributive 
payment’ under which at least 5 % of their national envelope is kept back for 
redistribution on the first hectares of all farms. 
Targeted support schemes: 
- Additional support for young farmers: the Basic Payment awarded to entrant young 
farmers will be topped up by an additional payment for a maximum period of five years. 
This measure is compulsory.  
-  Coupled aid for specific areas or types of farming for economic and/or social reasons. 
-  Support for ‘active farmers’: In order to avoid companies whose primary business 
activity is not agriculture claiming direct payments, a negative list of professional 
business activities which are excluded from receiving direct payments should be drawn 
up by the Member States.  
-  Support for small farmers: any farmer claiming support may decide to participate in 
the Small Farmers Scheme and thereby receive an annual payment fixed by the Member 
State, usually of between € 500 and € 1 250, regardless of the farm size. Participants 
will not be subject to cross-compliance controls and sanctions, and will be exempt from 
greening. The measure is optional for the Member States.  
-  Extension of the Single Area Payments Scheme (SAPS) in the EU-12 until 2020. 
Market regulation and risk management: 
-  The existing tools will be adjusted to create ‘safety nets’, to be used solely in the event 
of price crises or market disruption.  
-  End of quota regimes in the sugar and wine sectors: end of the sugar quota regime 
foreseen on 30 September 2017. End of wine planting rights at the end of 2015 (as 
foreseen in the 2006 wine reform) and introduction of a system of authorisations for new 
vine planting from 2016.  
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- Improved and new risk management mechanisms: the existing systems of public 
intervention and private storage aid are revised to be more responsive and more 
efficient, for example with technical adjustments for beef and dairy.  
-  New safeguard clauses introduced for all sectors to enable the Commission to take 
emergency measures to respond to general market disturbances. These actions will be 
financed by a crisis reserve financed by annually reducing direct payments. 
-  Enhanced role of Producer Organisations (POs) and inter-branch organisations to 
improve farmers’ negotiating positions in the food chain by allowing for a few 
derogations from EU competition law. Furthermore, the possibility for farmers to 
collectively negotiate contracts for the supply of olive oil, beef, cereals and certain other 
arable crops is foreseen under certain conditions and safeguards. 
Reorganisation of rural development support:  
-  Measures will no longer be classified at EU level into ‘axes’ with associated minimum 
spending requirements per axis. Instead, it will be up to Member States / regions to 
decide which measures they use (and how) in order to achieve targets set against six 
broad ‘priorities’ and their more detailed ‘focus areas’ (sub-priorities).  
- The six priorities will cover: (1) fostering knowledge transfer and innovation; (2) 
enhancing competitiveness of all types of agriculture and the sustainable management of 
forests; (3) promoting food chain organisation, including processing and marketing, and 
risk management; (4) restoring, preserving and enhancing ecosystems; (5) promoting 
resource efficiency and the transition to a low-carbon economy; and (6) promoting social 
inclusion, poverty reduction and economic development in rural areas.  
-  Rural development is now placed under a ‘Common Strategic Framework’ together 
with the cohesion and fisheries policies. 
Source: European Commission website, CAP Reform: an explanation of the main elements. 
European Parliament, The CAP After 2013, Factsheet.  
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4.  EP INTERNAL DYNAMICS 
To understand the EP’s role and influence in the 2013 CAP reform, EP internal dynamics 
need to be examined.  
In particular, we look at the different stages of the EP internal decision-making process. 
Given the role of COMAGRI as the committee responsible for the 2013 CAP reform package, 
we start by investigating the membership and modus operandi of COMAGRI. We also 
discuss the rapporteurship of the legislative package and the way in which the leading 
actors bridged internal divisions to reach a common position in January 2013.  
We also acknowledge the role of the other parliamentary forums in this process, namely 
the opinion-giving committees and the plenary. We assess their role and influence in 
building the EP negotiating mandates on the four CAP reform regulations. Finally, we 
provide a summary of conclusions. 
4.1  The role of COMAGRI  
EP committees feature prominently in discussions of EP influence in view of their pivotal 
role in the EP’s legislative work. EP committees have been described as ‘the legislative 
backbone’ of the EP (Westlake, 1994). They perform the bulk of the legislative work of the 
EP, including debating legislative proposals, assessing policy options and orientations, and 
drafting the EP’s position. In so doing, committees structure the development of specialised 
knowledge within the EP and the politics of coalition building. Consequently, the EP’s 
legislative influence rests in large part on the ability of its committees to deliver clear 
legislative positions (Roederer-Rynning, 2014).  
4.1.1  Membership composition of COMAGRI  
The decisions on the political composition of the committee rest with the Conference of 
Presidents and shall, as far as possible, reflect the ‘composition of the plenary’ (Rule 177 of 
the EP internal rules of procedure).  
COMAGRI was composed of 44 full members and 44 substitute members (2009 
composition15) to lead the work on the 2013 CAP reform legislative package.  
A key question in the context of this study is whether the committee membership has 
changed with the extension of co-decision to the CAP, something which political scientists 
had predicted.  
The vast majority of COMAGRI members come from the EPP (38.6%) and the S&D (25%), 
which is the same as in the previous legislature (see Table 1). All the other groups 
represent less than 10% of COMAGRI members.  There is an overrepresentation of the EPP 
and the ECR, two political groups which are traditionally perceived to be closer to farm 
constituencies and interests. The EPP and the ECR have, respectively, 38.6 % and 9.1 % of 
COMAGRI members (compared with 35.7 % and 7.5 % of their share in the plenary). 
Compared to the 6th legislature, the share of both parties rose from 46.2 % of COMAGRI’s 
                                                 
15  As stated in the European Parliament decision of 12 June 2013 on the numerical strength of the standing 
committees (2013/2671(RSO)). 
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members in the 6th legislature to 47.7 % in the 7th legislature, reflecting an increase in their 
representation in the plenary from 42,3% in the 6th legislature to 43,2% in the 7th 
legislature. 
There are different perceptions on the composition of COMAGRI’s membership. Some 
perceive COMAGRI to be still dominated by “farm interests”, others argue that COMAGRI 
members’ views have become increasingly heterogeneous and other interests, such as 
environmental concerns, are represented in the Committee. Partly these compositions 
reflect ‘selection by expertise or natural interest’, but of course the importance of farm 
issues for the political parties' constituencies also plays a role (Corbett et al. 2011). 
Outside analysts had speculated that the increase of power with co-decision would affect 
the COMAGRI membership by attracting more members from outside the “agricultural 
world” (e.g. with a background in consumer protection, environmental or energy issues). 
Based on her analysis of the background and expertise of COMAGRI members in the 7th 
legislature, Roederer-Rynning (2014) argues that 31% of COMAGRI’s full members had 
been members of farmers’ unions or cooperatives or had been farmers or owned a farm; 
and that 24 % of members of COMAGRI had held a ministerial or other public office in 
agriculture or had had an educational or occupational trajectory implying a clear and 
recognised expertise in agriculture.  
However, there is no evidence that the background or political links have significantly 
changed with co-decision.  Our interviews did not suggest such a change: all interviewees 
argued that the increase of power linked to co-decision had no or very little impact on the 
committee’s composition. Some substitute members from outside the farming community 
had been attracted to the committee but this had little impact since they did not hold the 
same legislative responsibilities. 
Several arguments for the consistency in COMAGRI composition were given: (a) the highly 
technical nature of the legislative dossiers handled by the committee, which creates a 
disincentive for non-specialist members; (b) although the CAP reform attracted a lot of 
public attention during major policy (reform) discussions, the committee’s work appears 
less attractive outside such periods/activities; (c)  while an increase in power for COMAGRI 
arguably made this committee more attractive, it did  not make the other committees less 
attractive; and (d) the interviewees were almost unanimous that the increase in legislative 
power in COMAGRI did not lead to a broadening of the policy agenda beyond agriculture. 
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Table 1: Party group representation in COMAGRI and in the plenary, 6th and 7th 
legislatures 
 
Political composition of COMAGRI, 6th and 7th legislatures 
6th legislature (2004-2009)* 
Party Group Plenary % COMAGRI % COMAGRI % 
  Roederer-Rynning, 
2014) 
(Volke 2013)  
EPP 288 36.7 34 37.4 31 34.1 
PES 217 27.6 23 25.3 23 25.3 
ALDE 100 12.7 8 8.8 9 9.9 
Greens/EFA 43 5.5 6 6.6 4 4.4 
UEN (later ECR) 44 5.6 8 8.8 5 5.5 
GUE/NGL 41 5.2 3 3.3 4 4.4 
IND/DEM/NA 52 6.6 9 9.9 15 16.5 
Total 785 100 91 100 91 100 
7th legislature (2009-2014)** 
EPP 273 35.7 34 38.6 34 38.6 
S&D 196 25.6 22 25 22 25 
ALDE 83 10.9 8 9.1 8 9.1 
Greens/EFA 57 7.5 6 6.9 6 6.9 
ECR 57 7.5 8 9.1 8 9.1 
GUE/NGL 35 4.6 2 2.3   
EFD 31 4.1 4 4.5   
NA 33 4.3 4 4.5   
Total    765  88   
Source: Author’s compilation, unless otherwise specified.   
* Outgoing parliament.  Data collected from http://www.europarl.europa.eu under entry ‘About Parliament’ => ‘In 
the past’ => ‘Composition’.  
** In the absence of available data on ‘Outgoing parliament’ data are collected from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu under entry ‘MEPs’ => ‘Search’ => ‘Advanced search’  
 
4.1.2  The rapporteurs 
To fully understand what took place inside the EP during the processing phase of the 2013 
CAP reform, we need to take the analysis one step further and look at the most influential 
MEPs and in particular the rapporteurs who were responsible for drafting the EP’s 
amendments to the EC’s proposals and managing the internal negotiations within 
COMAGRI.  
In all, twenty-one ‘rapporteurships’ were allocated (excluding the shadow rapporteurs): 
four in COMAGRI (see Table 2), and seventeen in the opinion-giving committees (see 
Table 7). 
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Table 2: Rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs for the ‘CAP after 2013’ legislative 
package  
  Direct payments CMO 
Rural 
development 
Horizontal regulation 
Rapporteur Luis Manuel 
Capoulas Santos 
(PT/S&D) 
Michel Dantin 
(FR/EPP) 
Luis Manuel 
Capoulas Santos 
(PT/S&D) 
Giovanni 
La Via (IT/EPP) 
Shadow 
rapporteurs 
Mairead 
McGuinness (EPP) 
Iratxe García Pérez 
(S&D) 
Elisabeth 
Köstinger (EPP) 
Michał Olejniczak 
Wojciech (S&D) 
George Lyon 
(ALDE) 
Britta Reimers 
(ALDE) 
Marit Paulsen 
(ALDE) 
George Lyon (ALDE) 
Martin Häusling 
(Greens/EFA) 
José Bové 
(Greens/EFA) 
Alyn Smith 
(Greens/EFA) 
Bas Eickhout 
(Greens/EFA) 
Janusz 
Wojciechowski 
(ECR) 
James Nicholson 
(ECR) 
James Nicholson 
(ECR) 
Julie Girling  (ECR) 
Patrick Le Hyaric 
(GUE/NGL) 
Alfreds Rubiks 
(GUE/NGL) 
Patrick Le Hyaric 
(GUE/NGL) 
Alfreds Rubiks 
(GUE/NGL) 
John Stuart 
Agnew (EFD) 
Giancarlo Scottà 
(EFD) 
Giancarlo Scottà 
(EFD) 
Giancarlo Scottà (EFD) 
Source: this table draws on Roederer-Rynning (2014). 
 
In COMAGRI, the rapporteurships were equally divided between the two largest groups. 
S&D obtained the reports on the direct payment regulation and the rural development 
regulation: Luis Manuel Capoulas Santos, PT, was appointed rapporteur on both matters. 
EPP obtained the reports on the horizontal regulation (Giovanni La Via, IT, was appointed 
rapporteur), and on the CMO regulation (Michel Dantin, FR, was appointed rapporteur). 
Taking the overall distribution of rapporteurships across COMAGRI and the opinion-giving 
committees, however, the balance was tilted in favour of EPP, which secured thirteen of the 
twenty-one rapporteurships (Roederer-Rynning, 2014).  
Generally speaking, the pattern of report allocation can be ascribed to varying mixes of 
expertise and resources available at committee level and the political importance of the 
legislative proposals for the party groups (Roederer-Rynning, 2014). From a procedural 
point of view, the allocation of reports also follows a particular point system, where the 
number of points is proportionate to the size of the political groups in the Parliament and 
where the number of points is correlated to the chances of securing the rapporteurship of 
the most strategic and high-level reports. 
In this light, and given the sizes of the EPP and S&D groups (265 and 184 MEPs 
respectively), almost 90 % of interviewees thought that the report allocation on the 2013 
CAP reform package was a ‘natural reflection of the political leadership within the EP’ (see 
Table 3). 
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Table 3: Interpretation of report allocation 
Choice of rapporteurs (all from two main political groups (S&D and 
EPP) and from the old Member States) 
(Response rate = 66 %) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. This is a natural reflection of the political leadership within the EP 89 % 
B. This is a conscious attempt to sideline smaller political groups from the 
process 
3 % 
C. This is a mistake: rapporteurs from more than two political groups and 
from new Member States would have helped the EP – as a whole – to speak 
with one strong voice 
8 % 
 
The S&D Group decided to put its share of the package, i.e. Direct Payments and Rural 
Development, into the hands of one single rapporteur: L-M Capoulas Santos (PT, S&D). The 
interviews are inconclusive on whether this was a good or a bad thing for the overall 
process and the influence of the EP in particular. Some interviewees argued that two 
reports were too much to handle for one rapporteur, not least because of physical 
limitations and the pressure imposed by an intense trilogue calendar. This may have 
undermined the overall credibility of the EP negotiating team in the trilogue negotiations. 
Others emphasised that having an overview of the issues relating to both direct payments 
and rural development ensured more consistencies between these two files, which are 
interdependent both in financial and political terms.  
In fact, some of these interviewees thought that all four reports should have been allocated 
to one single EP rapporteur to strengthen the institutional position of the EP in the trilogue 
negotiations: one Rapporteur for one Presidency negotiator and one EC negotiator (see 
Chapter 5). Other interviewees thought this idea would be catastrophic or even 
undemocratic, giving too much power to one single rapporteur who would not have 
represented the diversity of views expressed within the EP. 
Despite the divergences in interpretations on whether two reports should or shouldn’t have 
been placed in the hands of the same rapporteur, there was a general consensus amongst 
the interviewees that, under these circumstances, L.M. Capoulas Santos and his team still 
managed to handle the workload and effectively fulfil his role as leading rapporteur on the 
CAP reform package.  
 
Box 5: The draft reports in figures  
The rapporteurs introduced draft reports to amend the EC legislative proposals on the four 
CAP reform basic regulations. These took the form of 711 amendments – including 
amendments tabled to the recitals – which represents 8.3 % of the total number of 
amendments.  
Broken down file by file, 102 draft report amendments were tabled to the Direct Payment 
Regulation, 73 to the EAFRD, 434 to the CMO and 102 to the Horizontal Regulation. 78.6 % 
of the draft report amendments were adopted by COMAGRI and 77.5 % by the EP plenary 
in March 2013; they were therefore a part of the EP negotiation mandates. 46 % of the 
draft report amendments – either solely or in the form of a compromise amendment (see 
next section) – were finally incorporated into the final regulations.  
Source: this Box draws on the results of the amendment analysis undertaken by Ferto and Kovacs (2014). 
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After the publication of the rapporteurs’ draft reports, an important phase of internal 
negotiations took place within COMAGRI. The draft reports were opened to amendments 
from the shadow rapporteurs (and other members). These reflected the internal divisions 
and dynamics at play within the Committee that needed to be overcome to reach a joint 
position on the four CAP reform regulations. Efforts to build consensus around a common 
vision go back to a series of own-initiative reports adopted earlier in the process. 
4.1.3  Internal COMAGRI politics 
COMAGRI started from a proactive position, determined to make its mark on the CAP 
reform, but soon had to deal with difficult internal debates (Roederer-Rynning, 2014). 
Efforts to develop a common position had already begun in June 2010, a few months into 
the public consultation launched by the Commission (April 2010), almost six months before 
the Commission’s communication on the CAP towards 2020 (November 2010), and 
eighteen months before the publication of the Commission CAP reform proposals (October 
2011).  
These efforts materialised in a series of own-initiative reports, each adopted by large 
majorities: the Le Foll Report, the Lyon Report and the Bové initiative reports (see Figure 2 
for timing and titles). The content and timing of the Lyon report is particularly noteworthy. 
As shown in Figure 2, it was adopted in July 2010, a few months before the EC 
communication on the future of the CAP (November 2010). This means that the EP, 
through the Lyon report, was, in fact, the first European institution to take an official 
position on the CAP after 2013. In particular, it defined red lines and EP priorities – 
amongst which climate change featured prominently - for the future of Europe’s agriculture.  
In Chapter 5, we discuss whether these pre-defined red lines and priorities influenced the 
EC in the drafting of its own legislative proposals on CAP reform. 
After the publication of the EC communication, COMAGRI was increasingly confronted with 
internal differences in opinion. The Dess Report departed surprisingly from the line 
sketched out in previous COMAGRI reports. The initial version of the report stirred up a 
great deal of controversy and Dess eventually failed to receive the backing of his own 
group (EPP), of which he was political coordinator in COMAGRI. After a tortuous process 
(and numerous amendments16) the plenary adopted the report in June 2011 in what was 
referred to as ‘a Lyon-compatible version’ (Roederer-Rynning, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 1200 amendments in COMAGRI, later reduced to 60 compromise amendments. 
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Figure 2: CAP-related initiative reports - Timeline 
 
 
After the publication of the EC’s legislative proposals in October 2011, the three COMAGRI 
rapporteurs drafted 700 amendments by May-June 2012 (in their draft reports). Once their 
draft reports were open to the other members of the committee, COMAGRI was flooded by 
an avalanche of additional amendments, and had to deal with more than 8 000 
amendments17 by the deadline for tabling amendments in July 2012. At that time, some 
COMAGRI leaders openly expressed concern about the negative implications these internal 
complications could have for the credibility of the EP as a co-legislator (Roederer-Rynning, 
2014). There were indeed obvious differences in opinions between political groups, but also 
within the political groups.  
Indeed, even though the debate was mostly dominated by the two largest groups - the EPP 
and S&D groups – the latter were faced with internal national divisions (see Box 6 below), 
on the most sensitive issues of the CAP reform package, such as greening or capping.  
Both EPP and S&D are said to have proceeded to intense internal discussions and 
sometimes internal votes to agree on a common position before important votes (such as 
the January 2013 COMAGRI vote). The most salient division, with the highest impact on the 
final outcome, is believed to have been the split inside the S&D Group on greening.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17  This figure includes the draft report amendments and the additional amendments from other members. The 
number of amendments indicates both the substantive complexity of the Commission proposals and an intense 
lobbying by professional farm organisations, individual Member States and regions, the industry, NGOs, and 
institutional lobbyists. 
Dess Report on the CAP towards 2020: meeting the food, natural 
resources  and territorial challenges of the future  
23 June 2011 
Bové Report on fair revenues for farmers: A better functioning food 
supply chain in Europe  
07 September 2010 
Lyon Report  on the future of the Common Agricultural Policy after 
2013  
08 July 2010 
Le Foll Report on EU Agriculture and Climate Change 
17 December 2009 
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Box 6: Political divisions inside the political groups 
Opinions on redistributive issues differed between old and new members, large and small 
farmers, and different types of commodities, which cut across party group lines; in 
addition, there were diverging views about the proper balance between the market and 
public intervention, and between farm and non-farm interests. These issues were especially 
prominent in centre-to-right party groups, which privileged producer concerns, whereas 
centre-to-left party groups (in addition) had to deal with internal debates as to the proper 
balance between farm and non-farm interests.  
The European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) had to bridge a wide gulf 
between national preferences. For example, on the issue of capping, differences between 
its Czech and UK members on the one hand, and its Polish members on the other hand, 
were unbridgeable, and the ECR group adopted the strategy of ‘choosing not to choose’. 
The ECR made no secret of its strategy of tabling a wide range of amendments in order to 
keep all options open in the committee vote. For example, on the greening model proposed 
by the Commission (Article 29, direct payment regulation), ECR amendments aimed both at 
deleting the text proposed by the EC (amendments 1244 and 1245) and weakening it 
(amendments 1258 and 1259).  Similarly, regarding the EC proposals on the principle of 
crop diversification (same text, Article 29(1)(a), the ECR presented no fewer than five 
amendments (amendments 1279, 1283, 1295, 1303 and 1307) pointing in different 
directions.   
For the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the 
lines of cleavage often followed a north-south divide. The S&D group was torn between the 
contrary recommendations made by the ENVI Committee (via their own S&D opinion 
rapporteurs) and those made by COMAGRI. An internal vote took place in the group prior to 
the vote in COMAGRI, resulting in a large minority opposing the compromises forwarded by 
MEP Capoulas Santos (40 % against). In particular, the S&D group had sought to develop a 
line of compromise and win internal acceptance for this line. The S&D leadership was never 
quite successful in rallying the ‘Northern’ group, which sought a more favourable 
representation of environmental concerns and formed an internal coalition, the ‘Viking 
Group’, including British, Danish, Dutch, Swedish, and some German MEPs. In time, 
internal opposition led the S&D group to proceed to internal group votes on the COMAGRI 
proposals, which a Northern minority voted against. Some S&D MEPs holding minority 
views reported being marginalised during decisive group discussions and sometimes under 
pressure to abstain.  
The European People’s Party (EPP) was also known to encounter internal difficulties 
and proceeded to internal votes before crucial steps in the CAP reform process and on 
sensitive issues (for example on capping or greening). With 17 members out of 44 (38 % of 
COMAGRI), the EPP almost represents a majority on its own, which puts it in a particularly 
strong position and makes bridging internal divisions all the more essential (i.e. if it reaches 
high levels of internal consensus, it has almost already won).  
The groups that pushed for a more active reform agenda remained in a marginal position. 
The Green/EFA MEPs never became consensus-builders. Their strategy is sometimes 
described (even by environmental NGO activists) as an (idealistic) commitment to an 
oppositional line, which was risky given their minority position and the striving (of EP 
committees) for consensus. The Greens were typically close to the views expressed by the 
ENVI Committee. 
Source: Roederer-Rynning (2014). 
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Interestingly, and despite these strong divisions, when asked how co-decision impacted the 
internal dynamics of COMAGRI, 50 % of respondents thought that the need for consensus 
became stronger and that new coalitions became possible. Only 20 % considered that 
polarisation became stronger (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Impact of co-decision on political polarisation and political divisions 
inside COMAGRI 
Impact of co-decision on political polarisation and political 
divisions inside COMAGRI  
(Response rate = 52 %18) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. Political divisions and coalitions stayed the same 30 % 
B. Consensus became stronger and new coalitions became possible 50 % 
C. Polarisation became stronger 20 % 
 
This perceived need for stronger consensus-building may be explained by several factors.  
Firstly, unlike consultation, co-decision results in binding legislation which means that 
COMAGRI has to work towards coherent and viable legislative texts.  
Secondly, co-decision dramatically increased the workload of COMAGRI when compared to 
consultation, which forced consensus to become stronger. The best example of this is the 
tabling and processing of 8 000 amendments on the CAP reform package. It should be 
noted here that the increase in tabled amendments is not only linked to co-decision (and 
the related willingness of MEPs to make a difference), it can also be explained by a 
technological factor: the new computer-based platform ‘AT4AM’ greatly facilitates the 
introduction of amendments, which means that more amendments can be tabled in the 
same amount of time. This has arguably contributed to the recent boom in legislative 
activity (not only with regard to the CAP, but also in other policy areas). 
In any case, this large number of amendments forced COMAGRI to increase its consensus 
and consolidation efforts to bring these amendments down to a manageable number of 
compromises on which a vote would be possible. This need for compromise and consensus 
was certainly less strong under consultation, where there was more room to accommodate 
and include diverging opinions within the texts, given their non-binding character.  
Thirdly, the perception of having a common opponent in the two other institutions also 
encouraged COMAGRI to work towards a strong position. This is encompassed by the 
concept of institutional discipline, i.e. the MEPs’ loyalty towards their own institution. 
Eventually, and after a long process of consensus building and compromising in shadow 
meetings, a common position was adopted during a marathon voting session at the 
COMAGRI meeting of 23-24 January 2013.  
The vote in itself was a difficult and confusing experience19. After internal discussions as to 
the appropriateness of different voting methods (i.e. show of hands or electronic voting —
                                                 
18  This question has only been asked as such in the interviews carried out in the EP and with stakeholders (this is 
taken into account for the calculation of the response rate). However, other interviewees have also expressed 
their views on the new political dynamic within COMAGRI, as explained in the rest of the section. 
19  Voting by hand went very fast, it was hard to follow, and some observers claim that on some occasions, there 
were doubts as to whether the count was right. On one of the issues where multiple proposals were on the 
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roll-call voting is unavailable at committee level), it was decided that the COMAGRI vote 
would take place by show of hands, with electronic voting on compromise amendments; 
279 compromise amendments had been tabled by 15 December 2012, replacing a very 
significant number of original amendments (7932). The amendment analysis (Ferto and 
Kovacs, 2014) reveals that 93.9 % of all the compromise amendments were adopted by 
COMAGRI on 23-24 January 2013: 97.4 % of the compromise amendments on the DP 
Regulation, 94.7 % for the EAFRD Regulation, 92 % for the CMO Regulation and 100 % for 
the Horizontal Regulation. 
But sometimes the compromise amendments were not enough to be supported by a 
majority, and in some cases persisting disunity led political groups to table competing 
proposals (Roederer-Rynning, 2014). On greening, for example, the divisions were such 
that different positions were presented by the different political groups to the COMAGRI 
vote in January 2013, which ended up excluding and neutralising each other (this 
effectively meant keeping most of the EC’s original proposal – see section 6.3). A few 
issues remained contentious after the COMAGRI vote, either because no compromises could 
be found or because the majorities were thin. These are summarised in Box 7. 
Box 7: Pending issues after the COMAGRI vote 
Double funding of some farm activities, where competing models had had to be sorted 
out through separate voting on the original amendments underpinning the compromise 
models. 
The greening model proposed by COMAGRI, including provisions enabling farmers to 
be called automatically ‘green’. 
The penalty for non-compliance with the greening requirements, where a thin 
COMAGRI majority emerged in favour of reducing the penalty to the greening payment. 
Transparency on naming the beneficiaries of CAP payments, where several Member 
States in the Council insisted on the public disclosure of all beneficiaries (including 
Germany, where a national ruling compelled the government to do so). 
Cross-compliance requirements, where COMAGRI amendments deleted existing 
binding references to the protection of ground water against pollution, minimum soil 
cover, soil erosion, ban on hormones in meat, registration of animals, animal diseases, the 
pesticides directive, the water framework directive, the protection of wetlands and carbon 
rich soils, the birds and habitats directives. 
The extension of the sugar quota system beyond the proposed deadline of 2015. 
The proposal to recognise interbranch organisations. 
Source: Roederer-Rynning (2014). 
                                                                                                                                                            
table, one MEP changed his position in the process, leading to an inconclusive vote. While highlighting the 
fragility of the majorities built in COMAGRI, the effect was to annihilate the effort to boil down hundreds of 
amendments to two competing proposals. This forced MEPs to revert to voting on the original amendments, 
which the two competing compromise amendments had tried to eliminate. This caused a lot of confusion for 
MEPs, who were left without voting lists on highly technical amendments and had to take their cue from their 
respective group leaders. Parts of the British press described the event as testimony to the fact that MEPs 
commonly vote on issues they don’t understand (Roederer-Rynning, 2014). More generally, it should be noted 
here that MEPs rely on voting instructions, contained in ‘voting lists’ established by EP staff (from the 
Committees’ secretariats and political groups), to follow and proceed correctly with the votes. These voting 
lists therefore play a decisive role in determining the outcome of a voting session, but are sometimes very 
complex documents which may lead to some confusion.  
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4.1.4  COMAGRI: pro-status quo or pro-reform? 
After discussing different aspects of the COMAGRI internal dynamics and decision-making, 
it is important to analyse the nature of the Committee’s impact on the EC’s original 
legislative proposals (which materialised in the January 2013 COMAGRI vote). Did it 
reinforce the trend initiated by the EC or did it attempt to block it?  
The results of the interview process on this aspect could be summarised as follows. 
COMAGRI was not seen as having a particularly ‘reformist’ influence, if reform is 
understood as reinforcing the changes proposed by the EC or going beyond them20. Two 
explanations were put forward in the interviews. Firstly, the increase in legal responsibility 
and accountability linked to co-decision may explain why some members were more 
cautious in the changes they introduced. Secondly, the fact that farm interests are well 
represented in the Committee tends to support a more status-quo position.  
Despite this general assessment, many interviewees were cautious about putting labels on 
the influence of the committee; whether it was more status-quo oriented or whether it 
enabled the emergence of new ideas can only be fully understood on an issue-by-issue 
basis.  
When asked what kind of impact the increase of power in COMAGRI had on the policy, 
56 % argued that it moved the CAP further away from reform (and closer to the status 
quo) and 44 % argued that it enabled new values and new ideas to be reflected in the new 
CAP (see Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Impact of co-decision on policy content and the likelihood of reform 
Description of the CAP reform process 
(Response rate = 62 %) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. The increase of power in COMAGRI has moved the CAP further away 
from reform (and closer to policy status quo)  
56 % 
B. By giving more power to COMAGRI, new values and new ideas were 
represented and reflected in a new CAP 
44 % 
 
The examples below (based on the results of the COMAGRI vote in January 2013 and the 
amendment analysis of Ferto and Kovacs, 2014) give a more detailed picture of the 
influence of COMAGRI in amending the EC’s proposals. 
Direct Payments 
 On the Small Farmers’ Scheme, COMAGRI proposed an annual maximum amount of 
EUR 1500, a 50 % rise compared to the Commission’s initial position of EUR 1 000. 
However, COMAGRI was in favour of a voluntary approach on this scheme, whereas 
the Commission’s proposal was compulsory. 
 COMAGRI’s position on the Young Farmers Scheme was in favour of a compulsory 
system.  
                                                 
20  Bearing in mind that the original legislative proposals act as a constraint, by setting the overall framework in 
which COMAGRI could operate. 
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 COMAGRI proposed that the definition of ’active farmer’ should not be defined at EU 
level but by the Member States. Additionally, COMAGRI proposed extending the list of 
entities to be excluded from being DP beneficiaries. 
 COMAGRI extended the EC proposal on granting voluntary coupled support; both the 
percentage of the national ceiling and the scope of eligible products were increased by 
COMAGRI.  
 COMAGRI increased the inter-pillar budgetary transfers: from P1 to P2. COMAGRI 
proposed 5 % more compared to the EC proposal (10 %). 
 COMAGRI introduced a new type of scheme as a complementary (additional) payment 
for the first hectares (the redistributive payment).  
 COMAGRI rejected part of the EC’s proposal on greening requirements, but 
maintained the proposed structure. COMAGRI proposed increasing the lower threshold 
for crop diversification (to 10 and 30 hectares) and Ecological Focus Areas (to 10 
hectares).  
 COMAGRI proposed a more gradual adjustment of direct payment levels between the 
Member States (external convergence), with the application of lower percentages to 
close the gap for Member States between the EU average and their below-the-EU-
average payment levels. 
 COMAGRI proposed that all the payment entitlements activated in 2019 in a Member 
State or in a region should approximate to or reach a uniform unit value (instead of 
having a uniform unit value for payment entitlements by 2019). COMAGRI also 
introduced the opportunity for Member States to limit farmers’ individual losses. 
 COMAGRI did not go as far as the EC in changing the SAPS to the SPS. The 
Commission proposed that the SAPS should expire at the end of 2013, while 
COMAGRI proposed to extend it until the end of 2020. 
CMO 
 COMAGRI reinforced financial assistance for associations of producer organisations. 
COMAGRI tabled a maximum of 5 % in terms of the value of the marketed products, 
an increase compared to the Commission’s original proposal of 4.6 %.  
 COMAGRI obtained the postponement of the end of the sugar quota regime. The EC 
proposed to end the system by 30 September 2015, while COMAGRI intended to 
extend this period until the end of the 2019-2020 marketing year. This was also the 
case regarding the expiry of wine planting rights, where COMAGRI tabled an 
extension of the current system until 2029-2030. 
 COMAGRI obtained the introduction of general provisions on contractual relations and 
negotiations, based on what had already been achieved in the milk sector. 
 COMAGRI obtained the introduction of exceptions to competition rules in times of 
crisis. 
EAFRD 
 COMAGRI increased the amount of support and extended the period of support 
eligibility for mountain LFAs, afforestation, agroforestry systems and animal welfare 
payment measures. 
 COMAGRI urged the Commission to provide details of the mandatory bio-physical 
criteria and the corresponding threshold values to be applied for future delimitations 
of LFAs.  
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 COMAGRI introduced the possibility of ‘double funding’ on greening provisions, 
meaning that a farmer could be supported twice for the same environmental 
measures, once under the greening component of Pillar 1 and a second time under 
the corresponding ‘equivalent’ measure under Pillar 2. 
 
Horizontal Regulation 
 COMAGRI rejected the EC proposal to grant full transparency regarding CAP 
beneficiaries (i.e. via online publication of information on these beneficiaries).  
 COMAGRI deleted some of the cross-compliance requirements that the EC proposed. 
 COMAGRI held the position that greening penalties should not exceed greening 
payments, i.e. a reduction in the basic payment should not be possible. 
 COMAGRI restricted the EC position regarding the number of paying agencies: only 
the constitutional arrangements of the Member State can justify whether more than 
one paying agency is accredited in a Member State.  
This picture was somewhat confirmed by the interviews. The most generally expressed 
opinion in the interviews was that COMAGRI was pushing for a lower level of reform than 
the EC in its common position adopted in January 2013. In summary, on key issues (e.g. 
deadlines for reform, greening requirements, flexibility in exceptions to decoupling, etc.), 
COMAGRI preferred to have a lower level of (or a slower) reform, compared to the EC 
proposals.  
This status quo bias was clearest when considering the environmental component of the 
reform discussions (for a full discussion on the EP’s influence on the greening, see section 
6.3). 
4.2  The role of opinion-giving committees21  
In building its position, COMAGRI also had to take into account the (non-binding) opinions 
of other committees which were associated with the EP internal decision-making process. 
4.2.1  A marginal influence? 
Besides the referral to the ‘responsible committee’ (in this case the designation of 
COMAGRI on 25 October 2011), the EP also has to decide on how to associate other 
committees with the decision-making. Here, the EP leadership (the Presidency, or the 
Conference of Presidents in the case of a dispute) has two main options: to concentrate 
leadership within the responsible committee (default procedure); or to allow for some 
degree of joint leadership between the opinion-giving and the responsible committees 
(reinforced cooperation procedure). The latter option has materialised through a series of 
incremental, informal adjustments, triggered by recurrent disputes between committees, 
and finally formalised in Rule 50 of the EP internal rules of procedure and known as the 
‘procedure with associated committee’. This rule is applied when the EP considers that the 
matter falls almost equally within the competence of two or more committees, or that 
different parts of the matter fall within the competence of two or more committees22.  
                                                 
21  This section draws heavily on Roederer-Rynning (2014). 
22  The role of opinion-giving committees under the two procedures can be summed up using the distinction 
between ‘policy-influencing’ and ‘policy-making’ actors (Roederer-Rynning, 2014). In the default procedure, 
opinion-giving committees have more of a control function than a policy-making function: they cannot make or 
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In the case of the 2013 CAP reform package, the default procedure was applied (where the 
leadership remains with the responsible committee and the opinion-giving committee fulfils 
a ‘control’ function). The EP specified different constellations23 of opinion-giving committees 
for each of the legislative proposals (Table 6). For ENVI, a special arrangement was 
foreseen (also as compensation for ENVI losing the battle on joint leadership); the ENVI 
rapporteur was allowed to be involved in the COMAGRI shadows’ meetings, where ENVI-
related topics were addressed (Roederer-Rynning, 2014).   
 
Table 6: Committee referral and opinion-giving committees for the 2013 CAP 
reform legislative package 
Legislative proposal Responsible Committee 
Opinion-giving 
Committee 
Direct Payments COMAGRI 
DEVE, ENVI, EMPL, 
BUDG, CONT, REGI 
CMO COMAGRI DEVE, EMPL, BUDG, REGI 
Rural Development COMAGRI 
DEVE, ENVI, EMPL,BUDG, 
CONT, REGI 
Horizontal Regulation COMAGRI 
DEVE, BUDG, CONT, 
REGI 
Source: Roederer-Rynning (2014). 
Note: As announced in the plenary session of 25 October 2011. In practice, neither ENVI nor EMPL chose to 
deliver an opinion on the horizontal proposal.  
 
Table 7:  Rapporteurs and opinion-rapporteurs regarding the ‘CAP after 2013’ 
legislative package 
 Direct Payments CMO Rural Development Horizontal 
Regulation 
COMAGRI 
rapporteur 
Luis Manuel 
CAPOULAS SANTOS 
PT/S&D 
Michel DANTIN 
FR/EPP 
Luis Manuel CAPOULAS SANTOS 
PT/S&D 
Giovanni LA 
VIA 
IT/EPP 
DEVE opinion 
rapporteur 
Birgit SCHNIEBER-
JASTRAM 
DE/EPP 
Birgit SCHNIEBER-
JASTRAM 
DE/EPP 
Birgit SCHNIEBER-JASTRAM 
DE/EPP 
Birgit 
SCHNIEBER-
JASTRAM 
DE/EPP 
ENVI opinion 
rapporteur 
Dan JØRGENSEN 
DK/S&D 
 Karin KADENBACH 
AT/S&D 
 
BUDG opinion 
rapporteur 
Giovanni LA VIA 
IT/EPP 
Giovanni LA VIA 
IT/EPP 
Giovanni LA VIA IT/EPP Georgios 
PAPASTAMKOS 
GR/EPP 
                                                                                                                                                            
even influence policy in the sense of substituting their policy formulations for those proposed by either the 
Commission or the responsible committee, or even modifying or rejecting them. By contrast, opinion-giving 
committees have policy-making powers under the reinforced cooperation procedure insofar as they can modify 
and / or reject the Commission proposals on parts of the text.  
23  Not all opinion-giving committees chose to draft opinion reports, and not all opinion-giving committees granted 
equal attention to all four legislative proposals. For example, the Environment Committee chose to focus only 
on two sets of legislative proposals, namely direct payments and rural development (see Tables 6 & 7). 
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CONT opinion 
rapporteur 
Monika HOHLMEIER 
DE/EPP 
 Tamás DEUTSCH 
HU/EPP 
Iliana 
IVANOVA 
BG/EPP 
REGI opinion 
rapporteur 
Catherine GRÈZE 
FR/Greens-EFA 
Younous OMARJEE 
FR/GUE-NGL 
Elisabeth 
SCHROEDTER 
                         DE/Greens-EFA 
Giommaria 
UGGIAS 
IT/ALDE 
Source: Roederer-Rynning (2014). 
 
ENVI’s rather modest role under the default procedure is surprising in view of the prominence 
of ‘greening’ in the legislative proposals (Roederer-Rynning, 2003). 
One could apply a similar line of reasoning to the Budgets Committee. Considering the critical 
role it played in negotiating the financial envelopes for such programmes for the period 2007-
2013 (Corbett et al. 2011) and given the financial implications of CAP legislation, the Budgets 
Committee might have been expected to play a more prominent role in the EP work on CAP 
reform legislation (Roederer-Rynning, 2014). 
Despite the limited influence the opinion-giving committees enjoy under the default 
procedure, to what extent did they manage to influence the content of the EP position on the 
CAP? 
During our interview process, ENVI almost always came up as the most influential. DEVE, for 
example, was believed to have been influential on the export refund measures in the CMO 
regulation.  
The amendment analysis (Ferto and Kovacs, 2014) revealed that by tabling 33.6 % of all the 
opinion-giving committees’ amendments, ENVI was indeed the most ‘active’ committee, but 
that DEVE had the highest amendment success rate (13.2 % of all DEVE amendments were 
adopted in the final regulations, compared to 3.35 % for ENVI). However, these results 
should be treated with caution, as 76 % of them were amendments which had a minor 
connection to the most sensitive CAP policy issues. These amendments contained references 
to developing or third countries, development cooperation or agreements in light of the CAP 
reform (Ferto and Kovacs, 2014).   
Overall, the interview results reveal a broad consensus that opinion-giving committees had a 
marginal influence, despite their strong interest in the process. This limited influence is 
confirmed by the results of the amendment analysis: opinion-giving committees tabled 533 
amendments to the CAP regulation, which represents 6.2 % of the total number of 
amendments. Only 10 % of the amendments tabled by the opinion-giving committees were 
adopted by COMAGRI and the EP plenary (Ferto and Kovacs, 2014).  
Nevertheless, despite its relatively small influence, the ENVI Committee managed to draw 
significant attention to the process, mainly in the light of its difficult relationship with 
COMAGRI. 
4.2.2  The relationship between COMAGRI and ENVI 
The fight for legislative power between COMAGRI and ENVI has always been fierce given the 
agro-environmental nature of many issues handled by both committees. Many interviewees 
highlighted the tension between COMAGRI and ENVI in this CAP reform process, not so much 
because of co-decision but rather because of the ‘greening’ component of the EC proposals. 
It seems that the COMAGRI-ENVI dispute started with the referral decision to designate 
COMAGRI as the responsible committee. Our interviews and the findings of Roederer-Rynning 
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(2014) suggest that ENVI disputed this decision. COMAGRI was also in conflict with ENVI, 
which claimed joint leadership with COMAGRI on the legislative package on the basis of Rule 
50 of the EP internal rules of procedure. ENVI’s challenge was discussed at the level of both 
the committees and their secretariats, as well as at the level of the party groups, but ENVI 
did not succeed in securing joint leadership of the CAP reform package (Roederer-Rynning, 
2014).  
The agreement to allow the ENVI rapporteur (Dan Jørgensen) to take part in some of the 
COMAGRI shadow meetings (see above) proved inconsequential in practice, as the 
participation of the ENVI rapporteur in the COMAGRI shadows meetings was internally 
contested within COMAGRI (some members were vehemently opposed to this arrangement) 
and did not have any policy impact on the emerging position of COMAGRI (Roederer-
Rynning, 2014).  
This legislative dispute over such an important policy package raises a more fundamental 
question as to whether the opinion-giving committees – and ENVI in particular – should have 
a stronger influence on agricultural policy outcomes in the future.  
Not surprisingly the interviewees had different opinions on this, often reflecting their 
positions and preferences. Those who agreed with the prominent role played by COMAGRI 
emphasised that a more formal involvement of opinion-giving committees would create an 
administrative nightmare. They also underlined that these committees can already influence 
policy outcomes via the plenary route; they do not need an additional channel of influence. 
Interestingly, it is precisely the fact that ENVI did not manage to significantly influence the 
plenary outcome that was interpreted by other interviewees as a sign of dysfunction and a 
motive for a stronger involvement of the opinion-giving committees earlier on in the process.  
Indeed, those who were unhappy with the outcome and way of proceeding stressed that ‘the 
avenues for influencing the negotiating strategy for the opinion-giving committees were 
functioning in an unsatisfactory way’ and that ‘their positions were not properly represented 
in the negotiating position and the plenary vote’ (referring here to the ‘institutional sidelining’ 
of ENVI).   
We discuss below in further detail the dynamics at play leading to the plenary voting of March 
2013. 
4.3  The impact of the plenary voting  
4.3.1  Rules 70 and 70a: facilitator or constraint? 
To fully understand the link between COMAGRI and the plenary, and before analysing the 
plenary voting per se, one needs to take into account the amendment of Rule 70 and the 
creation of Rule 70a of the EP internal rules of procedure. These rules define parts of the 
process between the committee and plenary voting, the conditions required for the opening 
of interinstitutional negotiations, and the way in which the latter should take place.    
The official rationale behind these rules is to increase transparency and accountability of 
legislative processes and interinstitutional negotiations (for example, by specifying the 
composition of the negotiating teams). However, some observers would also argue that the 
origins of Rule 70 and 70a are linked to the time constraints imposed on the MFF-related 
files. In this context, Rule 70 was amended and Rule 70a was created in November 2012 to 
allow the EP to enter into negotiations with the Council based on a ‘negotiating mandate’ 
(rather than a full and final position on the regulations for which the MFF figures would be 
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necessary)24. This negotiating mandate is to be derived from the vote on compromise 
amendments at committee level and may receive, if the Committee decides so, the blessing 
of the full Parliament (the plenary). 
In the case of the 2013 CAP reform, the application of these rules may therefore have been 
due to the EP undertaking not to formally adopt the four CAP reform regulations before 
knowing the final figures on the future MFF (2014-2020). This commitment inevitably 
imposed a time imperative on the EP, as waiting for the MFF figures would have delayed 
the start of the negotiations with the Council. In other words, a first-reading agreement 
would have been virtually impossible if Rules 70 and 70a had not applied.  
In particular, Rule 70 sets out the procedures to be followed for negotiations with the 
Council and the EC when compromise amendments are adopted at committee level, and 
Rule 70a governs the opening of negotiations (Matthews, 2013 d). In the case of the 2013 
CAP reform package, Rule 70 applied. It reads as follows (in abbreviated form25): 
1. Negotiations with the other institutions aimed at reaching an agreement in the course 
of a legislative procedure shall be conducted having regard to the Code of Conduct laid 
down by the Conference of Presidents. 
2. Such negotiations shall not be entered into prior to the adoption by the committee 
responsible …. of a decision on the opening of negotiations. That decision shall 
determine the mandate and the composition of the negotiating team… The mandate 
shall consist of a report adopted in committee and tabled for later consideration by 
Parliament … (...). 
3. The negotiating team shall be led by the rapporteur and presided over by the Chair of 
the committee responsible or by a Vice-Chair designated by the Chair. It shall comprise 
at least the shadow rapporteurs from each political group.  
As explained by Matthews (2013 d), there is some confusion over the role of the EP plenary 
in approving a committee’s mandate. The Rule states that the report of the committee shall 
be ‘tabled for later consideration by Parliament’ but does not specifically state what action 
Parliament should take. This was a controversial topic during the amending of Rule 70 and 
the deliberations of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs which drafted the rule change.  
Neither does there seem to be a consensus on the role and usefulness of this rule. Some 
interviewees argued that the application of this rule had two advantages: it certainly 
provided the EP with the flexibility of being able to reach a first-reading agreement (as 
explained above) and greater legitimacy in its negotiating mandate via adoption by the full 
Parliament, rather than the committee only. The presence of the Chair at all the trilogue 
meetings (see Chapter 5) was also seen as a positive feature of Rules 70 and 70a.  
Other interviewees thought the effect of this rule represented an extra step ‘in an already 
highly complex process’. As also pointed out by Matthews (2013 d), involvement of the 
plenary may risk making the procedure too cumbersome and would counteract the 
efficiency and speed that are the advantages of a first-reading agreement.  
                                                 
24  As explained by one of our interviewees, ‘the main impetus for the change in the EP rules of procedure largely 
came from the leaders of the political groups wanting increased control over the progress of the sectoral 
dossiers which stemmed from the MFF, while also providing some kind of ‘fast-track negotiating authority’ to 
facilitate first-reading agreements on time-dependent policy areas tied to the MFF negotiation and the end of 
the financial perspective’. It should also be noted here that the application of these Rules is by no means 
automatic – it depends on a decision taken by the relevant committee. 
25  This summary of Rule 70 is provided by Matthews (2013). 
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Others feared that the decision-making power would be removed from the hands of the 
committees to the advantage of the plenary.  
Finally, Rules 70 and 70a also give the plenary the opportunity to challenge the position 
taken at committee level, with changes possibly emanating from committees which were 
not associated (or not to a sufficient extent) with the decision-making process at COMAGRI 
level. We assess below the extent to which this was the case in adopting the EP negotiating 
mandate on the four CAP reform regulations.  
4.3.2  Differences between COMAGRI and plenary votes 
The period between the COMAGRI vote in January 2013 and the plenary vote in March 
2013 was very intense in terms of civil society mobilisation and actions to influence the 
plenary vote. For example, a civil society platform on environmental issues organised 
several actions to put pressure on all MEPs, including: an open letter signed by more than 
276 civil society organisations across Europe; an e-action in 8 countries, allegedly 
attracting 86 000 supporters and generating more than 1.2 million e-mails to their MEPs. 
Green activists endeavoured to transfer to agriculture the ‘fisheries strategy’ of lobbying 
ahead of a crucial plenary vote, which, in the case of the reform of the fisheries policy, 
brought home an unexpectedly large victory in the plenary vote of 6 February 2013 in 
favour of a ban on overfishing26 (Roederer-Rynning, 2014). 
A rather high number of additional amendments were tabled between the COMAGRI vote of 
January and the plenary vote. A week before the vote in plenary, MEPs faced the prospect 
of having to vote on 1055 amendments, including the 783 amendments automatically 
tabled on behalf of the committee as a result of the COMAGRI vote of January, and 272 
additional amendments tabled by political groups or groups of at least forty MEPs, as 
indicated in Table 8 (Roederer-Rynning, 2014).  
The results of the plenary vote of 13 March 2013 differed from one dossier to another. 
Regarding the votes on the overall proposals for a decision, larger majorities were secured 
on the Rural Development dossier (556 for, 95 against). There was a larger opposition in 
the case of the Horizontal Regulation (472 for, 172 against) and Direct Payments (427 for, 
224 against). The CMO Regulation was the most contested (375 for, 277 against) 
(Roederer-Rynning, 2014). A further discussion on the particular case of the CMO is 
provided in section 6.5 and in Box 8 below. 
The amendment analysis (Ferto and Kovacs, 2014) reveals that 96.4 % of the COMAGRI 
adopted amendments were supported by the EP plenary. For the Direct Payment 
Regulation, this figure is 89.2 %, for the CMO 99.8 %, for EAFRD 98 % and for the 
Horizontal Regulation 90.5 %. Hence, the vast majority of the outcome of the COMAGRI 
vote in January 2013 was confirmed in the plenary vote.  
 
 
                                                 
26  In plenary, the EP not only established clear red lines about overfishing, it also adopted additional measures 
strengthening the ban compared to those proposed by the EP committee (http://cfp-
reformwatch.eu/2013/02/parliament-adopts-cfp-reform-position-with-strong-majority).  
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Table 8: Amendments tabled to the committee report on the CAP after 2013 reform, plenary vote of 13 March 201327 
 (1) 
Committee 
Amendments (Am) 
automatically tabled 
in plenary 
(2) 
Additional Am tabled 
in plenary by political 
groups or > 40 MEPs* 
(2a) 
Number of 
(2) Am 
adopted 
(2b) 
Number of (2)  Am 
rejected 
(6) 
RCV 
Direct payments 
regulation 
98 88 (90 %) 4 66 63 
Horizontal 
regulation 
194 22 (11 %) 3 18 34 
Rural 
development 
142 36 (25 %) 10 22 30 
CMO 349 126 (36 %) 3 86 108 
Total 783 272 20 192 235 
 Source: this table draws on Roederer-Rynning (2014). 
 
 
RCV – roll-call votes: votes taken on important or sensitive issues, at the request of at least 40 Members (Rule 167, EP internal rules of procedure). 
Around one third of all EP votes are ‘roll-call votes’. Unlike the vote by ‘show of hands’ or the standard electronic vote, these votes are recorded and can 
be attributed to each individual member. For this reason, roll-call votes have provided a useful data set for analyses of voting behaviour within the EP or 
cohesion within the political groups. Groups of MEPs call roll-call votes for a variety of reasons (see Corbett et al., 2000, for a discussion). If roll-call 
votes in the EP are called for strategic reasons, then the MEPs’ behaviour may be quite different in roll-call votes than in other votes. However, as 
stressed by Hix, Noury and Roland (2006) and many others, regardless of the strategic reasons for calling a roll-call vote, it is reasonable to assume that 
roll-call votes are used for the more important decisions (Olper, 2014). 
 
                                                 
27  A more complete version of this table is provided in Roederer-Rynning (2014). 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 56 
However, different interpretations of the changes between the COMAGRI and plenary votes 
emerged from the interviews. Almost 40 % of the respondents believed that the changes 
were ‘insignificant’ (or marginal), while 50 % believed that the changes were significant 
enough to demonstrate that the plenary mattered (see Table 9).  
 
Table 9:  Differences between the COMAGRI vote in January 2013 and the plenary 
vote in March 2013 
Differences between the COMAGRI vote in January 2013 and the 
plenary vote in March 2013 
(Response rate = 66 %) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. Are insignificant and the plenary just endorsed the COMAGRI vote  39 % 
B. Are significant enough to demonstrate that the EP is a ‘Working 
Parliament’ and that the plenary matters 
50 % 
C. Reflect the individual preferences of some MEPs, who voted differently 
in COMAGRI and the plenary to defend certain national interests 
11 % 
 
One reason why the plenary ‘mattered’, i.e. made a difference, is linked to the impact of 
MEPs voting to defend specific national or regional interests, in particular on issues for 
which roll-call votes were organised28. This is consistent with the findings of Votewatch 
(2013), which show that some national delegations (in particular the French and the 
Scandinavians) voted according to national lines on agricultural issues, independently of 
their political group. According to Votewatch, agriculture remains the only area where 
voting cohesion along transnational party lines has not increased in the 2009-2014 
parliamentary term. Studies show that issues involving substantial cross-country 
redistribution (like the CAP), tend to increase the propensity of MEPs to vote along national 
lines (Faas, 2003; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006). 
 
This is also what comes out of the specific analysis carried out by Olper (2014) on the 
plenary voting on the CMO. By looking at the 83 roll-call votes which were organised on 
this file, Olper (2014) shows that country cohesion was more often respected than party 
cohesion, in particular for large countries like Spain, Italy and France29. A further discussion 
on the voting behaviour of political groups and MEPs on the CMO is provided in Box 8. 
 
Box 8: MEPs and Group voting behaviour on CMO at 2013 March plenary 
In his analysis of the voting behaviour of MEPs on the CMO (based on the 83 roll-call votes 
which were organised on this file), Olper (2014) finds the following results:  
Out of 83 amendments for which a roll-call vote was organised, 31 (37 %) were put 
forward by COMAGRI, 22 (27 %) by groups of more than 40 MEPs, 14 (17 %) by ALDE, 7 
(8 %) by GUE/NGL, 5 (6 %) by ECR and finally 4 (5 %) by the Greens/EFA. The 31 
COMAGRI amendments were adopted with a success rate of 97 %, which means that only 
one RCV did not find a majority in the EP plenary vote. This is not surprising; when an 
amendment finds a majority at committee level, it has a high probability of finding the 
same majority at plenary level. 
                                                 
28  As explained above, roll-call votes are recorded and publicly available, which means that MEPs may have 
wanted to vote differently on some of these issues for electoral reasons. 
29  Olper (2014) also finds that Germany forms an exception to this rule, with a very low level of country cohesion 
on the CMO. 
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In terms of roll-call vote requests, the most active group was the Greens/EFA, 
accounting for 55 % of all requests, followed by the ECR (19 %) and the EPP (17 %). 
In terms of issues covered by the roll-call votes, 73 % of them related to Part I of the 
Regulation (introductory provisions) and Part II (internal market). The remaining votes 
were organised on Part III (17 % of total votes, on trade with third countries), Part IV 
(6 %, on competition rules) and Part V (5 %, on general provisions). 
In terms of majorities formed on the roll-call votes, the voting pattern on the CMO seems 
to disregard the a priori propensity of political groups to form majorities along the left-right 
dimension (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006). In fact, on this file, the Greens voted more 
frequently with the EPP than with the more ideologically close GUE/NGL. On the right-hand 
side of the political spectrum, the EFD voted more frequently with the EPP and even with 
the S&D than with the ideologically closer ECR. Overall, the most frequent winning coalition 
was the EPP and S&D getting together to form a majority. Finally, the analysis showed that 
coalitions formed by right-wing parties are more frequent than coalitions formed by left-
wing parties, suggesting that agricultural interests may tend to be more frequently 
represented by centre-right parties. 
Source: Olper (2014) 
 
In our view, and based on the discussions carried on during the interview process, the best 
way to summarise the various interpretations would be to say that the changes introduced 
by the plenary were relatively minor but nevertheless significant, and in some cases 
decisive for the EP’s negotiating mandate. For example, the plenary vote led to the 
following changes compared to the COMAGRI position:  
 Definitively banning provisions for double-funding. 
 Reinstating part of the Commission’s greening model to partially replace or modify 
less constraining COMAGRI provisions on ‘automatically green’ farmers. 
 Partly reintegrating cross-compliance requirements30.  
From an environmentalist perspective, the plenary vote on the CAP reform was not 
comparable to the green landslide which had materialised, one month earlier, in the 
plenary vote on the fisheries reform (and which some actors were hoping to witness).  
An important question to raise in this context is whether one should expect changes to 
occur at all at plenary level. Some interviewees argued that changes are indicative of a 
dysfunction in the EP internal decision-making process, while others claimed the exact 
opposite. In particular, one group tended to underline that a working parliament should 
specifically rely on the work of the specialised committees without questioning it at plenary 
level. This implies that if significant changes occur in the plenary, it means that the 
committee has not done a good job of reflecting the majority of the full Parliament.  
Another group of interviewees took the exact opposite view, arguing that the plenary 
should have had a much stronger role in changing important aspects of the COMAGRI vote 
taken in January 2013. From an environmental point of view, some actors had hoped that 
the plenary would re-balance the outcome to reflect other (non-farm) interests represented 
in the EP. This view was shared to some extent by certain civil society actors, who felt that 
they had a slightly bigger influence on the plenary vote, given that COMAGRI seemed, in 
their view, to be insulated against non-farm interests. The actors’ view on this procedural 
                                                 
30  But it failed to reintegrate compliance with: the Water Framework Directive — lost with 9 votes only; 
Protection of Wetlands and Carbon Rich Soils; and, unexpectedly, the Birds and Habitats Directive. The plenary 
initially supported additional support for the High Nature Value programme, but this was voted down after an 
electronic check, just as had happened in COMAGRI in January (Roederer-Rynning, 2014). 
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issue may have been influenced by the substantive outcome. If COMAGRI had produced a 
more environmentally-friendly report, those calling for a more active role for the plenary 
might have reversed their view, had the plenary then weakened the report. 
4.4  The crucial issue of EP resources 
To finalise this chapter on EP internal dynamics, it is important to address the issue of in-
house resources and expertise that were available to the MEPs in analysing the EC 
proposals, constructing an alternative, and designing their negotiating mandates on the 
four CAP reform regulations. Box 9 provides a brief overview of the EP internal resources. 
Box 9: EP resources available in the context of the 2013 CAP reform 
The following main staff and expertise resources can be identified: 
The Members themselves, with their respective backgrounds: some MEPs have been/are 
farmers, have advised their government on agricultural issues or have been agricultural 
ministers themselves. This is the case, for example, of the COMAGRI Chair, Paolo de 
Castro, who was Minister for Agriculture and Forestry in Italy (1998-2000 and 2006-2008), 
and Luis-Manuel Capoulas Santos, CAP reform rapporteur, who was Minister for Agriculture 
and Fisheries in Portugal (1998-2002) (see section 4.1.1). 
Members’ assistants and advisers: each MEP can rely on one or several assistants to 
follow the legislative work of the committees he/she sits on. Each political group also 
allocates one or two (or more) political advisers for each parliamentary committee. 
Together (advisers and assistants), they advise and assist the Members in their legislative 
duties, whether it be in preparing the grounds for tabling amendments, assisting in the 
drafting of reports, coordinating the shadow meetings, etc. 
The COMAGRI secretariat: the committee relies on non-political permanent staff to 
advise the members, prepare the legislative work, organise the trilogue negotiations and 
technical meetings, process and follow up on outcomes of trilogue meetings, take part in 
the discussion on delegated acts, etc. In the case of the 2013 CAP reform package, each of 
the four regulations was followed by one (or two, in the case of Direct Payments) 
permanent staff members. 
Policy Department B on Structural and Cohesion Policies: the EP has its own (small) 
department for research, divided into policy areas. Policy Department B conducts research 
(amongst other things) on agricultural issues to support the EP as a whole in its legislative 
work. It produces various types of material, including notes, studies and ex-post 
assessments, either internally or externally, via the subcontracting of external experts, as 
in the case of the present report. It also organises workshops and technical briefings on 
issues relevant to the legislative work of the EP. In the context of the 2013 CAP reform, 
Policy Department B has provided a considerable number of notes and studies (see Annex 
5). 
The EP Library could provide MEPs with briefing notes and bibliographies.  
 
The interviewees were almost unanimous in saying that the currently available resources 
were insufficient to appropriately support the new legislative competencies of MEPs, both in 
quantitative and qualitative terms. 
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In particular, the resource-related problems that were identified31 concern: the number of 
staff in general, administrative support, difficulty in carrying out evidence-based scrutiny of 
the legislative proposals, the availability of specific expertise and knowledge regarding 
certain files, and the lack of experience in working with the different parliamentary bodies. 
In quantitative terms, there was no agreement on whether a simple increase in the 
resources available would be sufficient to improve the ability of the EP to co-legislate on 
such high-profile and technical dossiers. Nor was there a clear consensus on what an 
optimal resource level would be in an ideal setting.  
Nevertheless, many recognised that the resources that the EP could rely on were very 
limited and put under strong pressure during the process. As an illustration, one could 
mention the sole assistant that L.M. Capoulas Santos was able to rely on (on top of three 
permanent staff within the COMAGRI Secretariat and the support provided by a couple of 
staff in Policy Department B) to draft his two reports, or Mr Dantin’s parliamentary 
assistant and the EP’s policy advisor who processed over 2 000 amendments on the CMO 
file.  
In qualitative terms, there was a broad agreement that COMAGRI members lacked 
technical expertise to deal with the sheer amount and the complexity of the legislation, 
although this did not seem to have affected its overall ability to reach a strong political 
position (as opposed to its ability to deal with some of the most technical issues). A few 
specific points were raised by the interviewees in this context:  
 COMAGRI is certainly able to deal with the political dimension of the legislation and 
agree on broad political decisions, whereas it is sometimes insufficiently prepared and 
ill-equipped to deal with technical issues.32 
 The inability of COMAGRI to conduct, independently, an evidence-based scrutiny of 
legislative proposals, or impact assessments of certain policy scenarios, before 
embarking on the drafting of reports or the tabling of amendments, was seen by 
some interviewees as a constraint.  The availability of specific expertise would help 
COMAGRI test different policy scenarios on the table and create a strong alternative 
vision. 
But interviewees often expressed caution. Solving the EP ‘resource problem’ may risk 
transferring power from the COMAGRI members to the experts, which would run 
completely contrary to the purpose of co-decision: bringing citizens and their 
representatives into the debate. If our MEPs are not able to deal with the details of EU 
legislation, this may call into question the skills of our representatives, but also, more 
fundamentally, it raises the issue of the complexity of EU legislation and the power that 
‘experts’ have over it.  
                                                 
31  It should also be noted that other factors not related to resources were also identified as having restricted and 
further complicated the work of the EP, namely linguistic and procedural constraints. Language plays a crucial 
role in negotiations and had an impact on the members’ involvement (or lack thereof) in the CAP reform 
process. As pointed out by one interviewee, ‘even the best interpretation services cannot substitute for the 
ability of MEPs to freely communicate with each other’. The inability or the difficulty to communicate affects 
motivation and participation in the negotiations, which inevitably has an impact on the dynamics within 
COMAGRI and, ultimately, on the policy outcome. Procedural constraints were identified as well, for example 
the fact that all the official translations of all amendments need to be circulated before they can be discussed 
in COMAGRI, or the difficulty of finding timeslots for the shadow meetings, which all contributed to the 
complexity and length of the internal process that took place between October 2011 and January 2013. 
32  With the exception of the CMO file, where there seems to be an agreement that COMAGRI (and the rapporteur 
in particular) was capable both in political and technical terms. 
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Finally, the issue of EP resources also needs to be addressed from an interinstitutional point 
of view. Can a co-legislator be in full possession of its powers if it doesn’t have sufficient in-
house, independent expertise?  
Two important questions need to be raised here. The first is whether the EP has the 
vocation to match the Council’s capabilities, given the inherently political nature of the EP, 
as compared to the more administrative nature of the Council. As a political institution, the 
EP does not have the same purpose as the Council, which has a more administrative role 
when it comes to the implementation of the adopted legislation. The EP’s political nature 
and its ability to focus on the political issues may also represent an advantage for the 
process as a whole: the EP may be seen as having a wider overview of all the big issues at 
stake, rather than going into all the technical details of each measure. The discussion on 
the resources available to the EP therefore needs to take into account these differences and 
the advantages that different institutional functions bring to the decision-making process 
and the policy outcome.  
The second is whether it is optimal from an institutional perspective for the EP to rely to an 
important extent on information provided by the EC. The issue relates both to the possible 
strategic use of information in the ultimate bargaining and to the need to avoid duplicating 
work. In this context, some interviewees argued that the EC did not always provide the EP 
with the timely and necessary evidence that it required (e.g. particular policy simulations to 
test certain alternative scenarios) or that the information provided was biased towards the 
defence of the EC’s own policy agenda (see Chapter 5).  
4.5 Summary and conclusions 
The analysis presented above yields several conclusions on the internal EP dynamics.  
 Co-decision appears to have had little impact on the composition of the COMAGRI.  
The vast majority of COMAGRI members came from the EPP (around 38 %) and the 
S&D (around 25%); all the other groups represented less than 10% - the same as in 
the previous legislature. A study shows that 31% of COMAGRI’s full members had 
been members of farmers’ unions or cooperatives or had been farmers or owned a 
farm; and that 24 % of members of COMAGRI had held a ministerial or other public 
office in agriculture or had a special expertise in agriculture. There is no evidence that 
this is significantly different from before.  Our interviews also confirmed that the 
increase of power linked to co-decision had no or very little impact on the 
committee’s composition.  
 The allocation of rapporteurships within COMAGRI reflected the political majority 
within the Committee (and the full plenary). The concentration of two reports in the 
hands of one rapporteur was a controversial move: on the one hand it overburdened 
one of the key EP actors of this reform, but on the other hand it provided him with an 
overview of overlapping issues between the direct payments and rural development 
regulations, which was important for ensuring legislative consistency.   
 The debate within the EP was largely dominated by the two largest groups (EPP and 
S&D): EPP controlled the Budgets Committee and COMAGRI through interlocking 
rapporteurships and S&D had control over the ENVI Committee through the 
committee’s rapporteurships, as shown in Table 7.  
 The political groups had to face important internal divisions throughout the process. 
Divisions along national lines, and between new and old Member States, within the 
groups further complicated the internal decision-making process within the EP. These 
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internal divisions came more strongly to the fore under co-decision due to the 
increased responsibility linked to binding legislation and the need to reach a coherent 
and common position within COMAGRI.  
 The increased workload associated with co-decision (and the 8 000 amendments) 
brought about a greater degree of consensus. While more space could be provided 
under consultation to accommodate diverging policy options in the same text, co-
decision forced political groups to reach a coherent, common position. The fact that 
COMAGRI was able to come to an agreement in January 2013 was due to a large 
extent to it being able to overcome divisions within and between political groups and 
whittle close to 8 000 amendments down to 279 compromise amendments.  
 When assessing the nature of COMAGRI's influence on the reform, we find that, 
generally speaking, COMAGRI was pushing for a lower level of reform than the EC, 
even if this cannot be generalised to all policy issues. The status quo bias was clearest 
when considering the environmental component of the new CAP, which proved to be 
one of the most controversial areas of the reform. 
 This increased workload – which reflects greater legislative activity - may be linked to 
the MEPs’ willingness to make a difference on this first CAP reform under co-decision, 
but is also linked to the technological facilitation provided by the AT4AM system for 
tabling amendments. 
 The opinion-giving committees had a marginal influence (mainly due to the 
application of the default procedure – see above). ENVI was the most active (the 
highest number of amendments introduced), while DEVE had the highest number of 
amendments adopted by COMAGRI. The relationship between COMAGRI and ENVI 
was tense throughout the processing phase, not least because of ENVI’s natural 
predisposition to legislate on environmental issues, which were at the heart of this 
reform. The practical arrangement to allow the ENVI rapporteur to take part in the 
COMAGRI shadow meetings did not have a significant impact on the final outcome.  
 The differences brought about by the plenary votes were small but decisive, although 
insufficient for some actors (mainly environmental), who were hoping to see a similar 
reversal to the one that took place during the fisheries policy reform. The issue of 
whether plenary should or should not question the committee’s position is a matter of 
interpretation. Some argued that the plenary should have a  more important role, 
while others underlined the fact that a working parliament should rely on the work of 
the relevant specialised committee. 
 In the plenary vote, country cohesion was sometimes stronger than party cohesion, 
especially in strategic roll-call votes where some MEPs favoured national interests (for 
example on the CMO file). Generally speaking, agriculture remains the only area 
where party cohesion has not increased since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, 
and where country cohesion remains strong. 
 Rules 70 and 70a enabled the EP to enter into negotiations with the Council on a 
strong footing by giving it the backing of the full Parliament. It also enabled the EP to 
remain on track for a first-reading agreement, which would have been impossible 
(given the timing imperative imposed by the MFF) without the new Rules. The 
application of this rule was also described as an extra step in an already complex 
process, which may counteract the efficiency gains of a first-reading agreement. 
 The increased workload and responsibility linked to co-decision also shed light on the 
limited expertise and resources available to COMAGRI to handle the full scope of the 
legislation, especially for the most technical parts of the texts. The ability of COMAGRI 
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to deal with the political aspects of the CAP reform package was not undermined by 
these resource limitations. While there seems to be an agreement that EP resources 
should be adapted to its new legislative functions, there is no agreement as to how 
precisely these resources should be enhanced. The discussion on resources also needs 
to be considered in the light of the nature of the EP, as a political institution, as 
opposed to the Council, which is more of an administrative body, and the vocation of 
the EC to provide EU-wide expertise and information.  
The first CAP reform under the ordinary legislative procedure: a political economy perspective 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 63 
5.  THE EP AND THE TRILOGUE NEGOTIATIONS 
Once the respective negotiating mandates of the EP and the Council were adopted in March 
2013 (see Table 10 and Annex 2 for an overview), the co-legislators started negotiating 
towards the adoption of a joint version of the CAP reform regulations. 
In this section, we analyse the way in which interinstitutional dynamics evolved under co-
decision, in particular during the ‘negotiating phase’ between April 2013 and September 
2013 (see Box 2). We analyse how the working culture between all actors involved in the 
reform developed: the key negotiators, their teams and civil society actors.  We assess the 
relative influence of the EP vis-à-vis the two other institutions and determine which 
coalitions were the most successful in changing or preserving the EC’s original proposals.  
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Table 10: Table summarising the key institutional positions - Part I33 
File/Issue Commission Council EP Final Regulation 
DP Financial 
discipline 
Shall apply only to  
payments over € 5 000 
Shall apply only to payments 
over € 2 000 
EP shared EC position Shall apply only to payments over € 
2 000 
DP Active 
farmers 
MS must draw up a 
mandatory negative list 
of non-agricultural 
entities to be excluded 
from DP 
MSs should draw up this list on 
a voluntary basis 
EP shared  EC position Mandatory list excluding certain 
types of activities from DP 
DP Capping & 
degressivity 
Compulsory capping (at € 
300 000) and 
degressivity (at € 150 
000) 
Voluntary capping & 
degressivity 
EP shared EC position Mandatory reduction of at least 5 % 
for payments above € 150 000 + 
voluntary to go beyond 
DP flexibility 
between 
pillars 
Up to 10 % of P1 to P2, 
5 % from P2 to P1 (for a 
selection of MSs34) 
Up to 15 % of P1 to P2, and up 
to 25 % from P2 to P1 (for a 
selection of MSs) and up to 
15 % for others 
Up to 15 % from P1 to P2, 
and 10 % from P2 to P1 (for a 
selection of MSs) 
Up to 15 % of P1 to P2, and up to 
25 % from P2 to P1 (for a selection 
of MSs) and 15 % for others 
DP Internal 
convergence 
Uniform unit value for 
payment entitlements by 
2019 
Same as EC + increase by 1/3 
for payments whose unit value 
in 2014 is lower than 90 % of 
the national or regional unit 
value 
Same as EC but with 
possibility of deviating by 
20 % from this value + 2019 
levels cannot exceed 2014 
levels by more than 30 % 
Farmers below 90 % of national 
average get an increase of at least 
1/3 of the difference between the 
current payment and the 90 % rate. 
All farmers receive at least 60 % of 
the national or regional average. 
MSs may limit individual losses up 
to 30 % 
                                                 
33  Source: Ferto and Kovacs (2014). For more details, see Annex 2. 
34  Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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File/Issue Commission Council EP Final Regulation 
DP External 
convergence 
MSs with DP below 90 % 
of the average should 
close 1/3 of the gap by 
2020 
MSs with DPs below average  
should close gap with 90 % of 
EU average by one third by 
2020. All MSs should reach at 
least EUR 196/ha 
No MSs should receive less 
than 65 % of the EU average. 
In MSs with DPs below 70 % 
of the EU average, that 
shortfall shall be reduced by 
30 % (etc.) 
All MSs shall attain a level of at 
least EUR 196 per ha in 2020 
 
Table 10: Table summarising the key institutional positions - Part I (continued) 
File/Issue Commission Council EP Final Regulation 
DP Crop 
diversification 
3 crops above 3 
hectares: no crop 
should cover more than 
70 % of the land and 
none of the three crops 
shall cover less than 
5 %. 
2 crops in areas of 10-30 
hectares; above 30 hectares, at 
least 3 crops. No crop should 
cover more than 75 % of the 
arable land, with the two main 
crops together accounting for 
less than 95 % 
2 crops in areas of 10-30 
hectares + no crop should cover 
more than 80 % of land; above 
30 hectares, at least 3 crops + 
main crop should not cover more 
than 75 % + two main crops 
accounting for less than 95 % 
Arable land under 10 hectares is 
exempted from measure; 2 
crops on farm land of 10-30 
hectares. 3 crops shall be 
cultivated above 30 hectares. 
No crop shall cover more than 
75 % of arable land + two main 
crops together should cover less 
than 95 % 
DP Permanent 
pasture 
Applied at farm level & 
permanent pasture not 
part of permanent 
grassland 
Applied at national, regional or 
sub-regional level & permanent 
pasture not part of permanent 
grassland 
Applied at national, regional or 
sub-regional level & permanent 
pasture is part of permanent 
grassland 
Applied at national, regional or 
sub-regional level & permanent 
pasture is part of permanent 
grassland 
DP EFAs EFAs on at least 7 % of 
the farmland 
EFAs shall cover at least 5 % of 
the farmland above 15 hectares, 
rising to 7 % from 2018 
EFAs on 3 % of the farmland – 
where arable land covers more 
than 10 hectares –, increasing 
up to 5 % from 2016 and up to 
7 % from 2018 
EFAs shall cover 5 % where the 
arable land of a holding covers 
more than 15 hectares. The 
threshold of 5 % shall be 
increased to 7 % 
DP Young 
farmers 
Compulsory with up to 
2 % of national ceiling 
Voluntary with up to 2 % of 
national ceiling 
Compulsory with 2 % of national 
ceiling 
Compulsory with up to 2 % of 
national ceiling 
DP Voluntary 
coupled 
support 
Up to 10 % for SAPS & 
5 % for others; short 
list of products 
Up to 7 %; up to 12 % for SAPS 
and MSs applying more than 5 % 
between 2010-2013; more than 
12 % for MSs applying more than 
Up to 15 % of national ceiling; 
short list of products; 
8 % of annual national ceiling + 
2 % for protein crops; or 13 % 
plus 2 % for protein crops in 
case of SAPS; short list of 
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10 % between 2010-2013; 
Annex I products; 
products. 
DP Small 
farmers 
scheme 
Mandatory between € 
500 and € 1 000 
Voluntary between € 500 and € 
1 000 
Voluntary, minimum € 500 up to 
€ 1500 
Voluntary lump sum payment 
no lower than € 500 and no 
higher than € 1 250 
EAFRD Double 
funding 
Payments for 
requirements going 
beyond greening – No 
double funding 
Explicitly allowing double funding Opt-outs for P2 measures that 
go towards fulfilment of greening 
– no double funding 
Payments for requirements 
going beyond greening + MSs 
ensure that there is no double 
funding between P2 and P1 
EAFRD Ring-
fencing of env. 
payments 
N/a 0 % of RD budget initially, 25 % 
of RD budget for climate change 
in the Luxembourg compromise 
proposal 
Initially, 25 % of RD budget for 
climate change; 30 % for climate 
change and other env. measures 
in the Lux. compromise proposal 
30 % for climate change & other 
environmental measures 
 
Table 10: Table summarising the key institutional positions – Part II 
File/Issue Commission Council EP Final Regulation 
CMO Export refunds Used to safeguard the EU’s 
participation in international 
trade, not only serving as a 
crisis management 
instrument No maximum 
budget ceiling defined. 
Shared EC’s position Export refunds as a 
crisis management 
instrument and budget 
heading should be set 
at zero 
Export refunds as a crisis 
management instrument and budget 
heading should be set at zero 
CMO Public 
intervention 
Only for a specific list of 
products (see Annex) 
Shared EC’s position EC’s list + durum wheat 
and sorghum 
EC’s list + durum wheat 
CMO Producers’ 
organisations (POs) 
All POs must be recognised 
+ cannot hold a dominant 
position 
POs may be recognised 
(not mandatory) + can 
hold a dominant market 
position 
All POs must be 
recognised + can hold a 
dominant position 
POs may be recognised by MSs (not 
mandatory) + can hold a dominant 
market position 
CMO Sugar quotas Until 2015 Until 2017 Until end of 2019/2020 Until 2017 
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marketing year 
CMO Wine planting 
rights (WPR) 
Transitional regime until 
31.12.2015 (end of WPR) 
with possibility for MSs to 
extend up to 31.12.2018; 
no new system thereafter 
Transitional regime until 
31.12.2018 (end of WPR); 
setting up a new wine 
authorisation system from 
1.1.2019 to 31.12.2024 
Transitional regime 
Until end of 2029/2030 
marketing year 
Transitional regime until 31.12.2015 
(end of WPR); setting up of a new 
wine authorisation system from 
1.1.2016 to 31.12.2030  
HZR Double funding RD measures cannot be 
funded by other budget 
Agri measures may be 
financed twice 
Shared EC’s position No double funding possible 
HZR Penalties for 
non-compliance with 
greening 
Unlimited reductions in 
basic payment possible as a 
result of sanctions 
Limited reduction of basic 
payment – up to 25 % 
possible 
No reductions in basic 
payment (max. 
sanction = greening 
payment) 
Limited reduction of basic payment 
possible, whereby the limit is 0 % in 
the first two years, 20 % in the third 
year, 25 % from the fourth year  
HZR Transparency Publication of beneficiaries 
but threshold – equal to the 
amount of SFS – under  
which no application  
Publication of beneficiaries 
but threshold – equal to 
the amount of SFS - under 
which no application  
Publication of 
beneficiaries – no  
threshold 
Publication of beneficiaries, but 
threshold under which no application 
equal to the amount of the SFS or € 
1 250 if SFS not applied in the MS 
HZR Cross-compliance Integration of water 
framework and pesticide 
directive, GAEC 7 
Deletion of water 
framework and pesticide 
directive, GAEC 7 
Deletion of water 
framework and 
pesticide directive, 
GAEC 7 
Deletion of water framework and 
pesticide directive, GAEC 7  
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5.1  From dialogue to trilogue 
To fully understand the role of the EP in the 2013 CAP reform and the way the introduction 
of co-decision influenced interinstitutional dynamics, the working relationship between the 
negotiating teams and their staff also needs to be analysed.  
As foreseen under the rules of co-decision, the Council and Parliament have to interact 
sequentially, reacting to each other’s legislative proposals in turn, in order to agree 
legislation: these interactions take place in ‘trilogue meetings’, which were instituted to 
provide a means whereby the respective bodies could find compromises informally 
(Ragonnaud, 2013). The EC also takes part in these meetings and its formal role is to 
facilitate the agreement between the EP and the Council.  
In the 2013 CAP reform, the trilogue phase followed a particularly intense calendar: around 
50 meetings took place between April 2013 and September 2013. 
As defined in Rule 70(3) of the EP internal rules of procedure, the EP negotiating team is 
composed of: the committee Chair, the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs. The 
negotiating team is led by the rapporteur and presided over by the Chair of the committee 
responsible or by a Vice-Chair designated by the Chair. It comprises, as a minimum, the 
shadow rapporteurs from each political group. The Council negotiating team is composed of 
the Presidency, assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council. The individual MSs are 
represented via the Presidency and do not take part in the negotiation per se. The 
Commission acts as facilitator in the process: the negotiator on the CAP reform was one of 
the DG AGRI Deputy Directors-General, sometimes assisted by one of the Commissioner’s 
cabinet members. 
Given the long-standing working culture between the EC and the Council (due to their 40-
year experience of CAP reform), there were legitimate questions as to how the third player 
would fit into the game and what role it would play in the trilogue meetings. 
The long-standing working relationship between the EC and the Council has been forged by 
years of negotiating and learning-by-doing - exactly what was missing from this first co-
decision experience – but also by the fact that the EC is itself present at the meetings of 
the Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA), which means that the institutions are used to 
working together on a weekly basis35. 
The interviews revealed different appreciations and descriptions of this new working culture 
in the making. Co-decision significantly increased the level of contacts between the EP and 
the EC. The Commissioner visited every MS and directly contacted the key members of 
COMAGRI. The EC also made a conscious effort, according to some interviewees, to share 
information with both institutions and to offer opportunities for technical meetings on the 
proposals to the MEPs and their assistants.  
On the positive side, there was consensus on the constructive atmosphere within the EP 
negotiating team but also between the different technical staff of each institution 
                                                 
35  The SCA is composed of senior agriculture officials from the Member States (most of whom are based in 
Brussels) and from the Commission. It meets most Mondays, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/council-
configurations/agriculture-and-fisheries. 
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responsible for each file36. The personal and informal contacts amongst these teams were 
seen as crucial for the success of the negotiation as a whole.  
However, some of the old working culture remained, and there was more interaction 
between the EC and Council teams than with the EP. A couple of additional points were 
alluded to during the interviews in this context. 
Firstly, some interviewees underlined the need to take into account the differences in 
institutional nature between the Council and the EP when considering the way they 
interacted with each other and the way they prepared for this reform. The Council is more 
administrative in nature than the EP, which is inherently political. Member States have the 
responsibility to adopt legislation but also to ensure that it is possible to implement it on 
the ground, which means that a careful analysis and impact assessment of each proposed 
measure needs to be carried out.  
Secondly, the composition of the negotiation teams and the role of the respective 
negotiators were also alluded to by many interviewees. In particular, some interviewees, 
both within and outside the EP, expressed concerns about the difference in the political 
levels of the negotiators. In practice, the rapporteur is not faced with negotiating 
counterparts of the same level; neither the Commissioner nor the Ministers take part in the 
trilogues. This essentially means that whilst rapporteurs have a clear mandate to take 
political decisions37, some of the negotiating civil servants on the other side of the table 
have to revert back to a higher political level for approval. One interviewee believed that it 
was precisely because all negotiators were at the same level in the June trilogue meeting in 
Luxembourg38 that negotiations were able to move fast and a deal was reached on that 
occasion.  
5.1.1  Co-decision and the Council: the success of the Irish Presidency 
Interviewees identified several changes in the EP-Council dynamic linked to co-decision. In 
particular: 
 A reality check on the part of both institutions: the Council was no longer alone in the 
decision-making process and the EP came to realise that ‘when the Council says no, it 
is really saying no’, as expressed by one interviewee. 
 The constraints imposed by the internal functioning of the Special Committee on 
Agriculture (SCA): once a compromise is reached within the SCA on certain issues, 
the Council is very reluctant to re-open these issues for discussion with the EP, which 
puts an overall constraint on the EP-Council relationship. 
 The Council’s refusal to compromise on issues which have been pronounced upon by 
the European Council, which undermines the overall negotiation process with the EP. 
This was seen as one of the biggest constraints on the working relationships and 
negotiations between the EP and the Council (see Chapter 6). 
                                                 
36  As an illustration, one could note the particular approach developed at technical level on the CMO file: the 
respective staff responsible from each institution formed a small technical working group to go through the 
important issues before the trilogue meetings and process the trilogue decisions afterwards.  
37  Although another aspect which was mentioned in this context was the sometimes difficult coordination 
between the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs during these trilogue meetings. 
38  A trilogue meeting was held in Luxembourg in parallel to the Farm Council of 24-25 June 2013. There had been 
a lot of internal debates within COMAGRI as to whether the EP should go there and ‘follow the Council’s 
requests’. COMAGRI Chair Paolo de Castro ultimately managed to convince his committee to accept the 
Council’s invitation to negotiate in Luxembourg. The political agreement on the CAP reform package was 
reached at the end of this trilogue. 
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 The intensification of contacts between the COMAGRI secretariat and the Council 
secretariat, and the EP’s reliance on the expertise of the Council’s national experts for 
certain technical issues. The contacts between MEPs and permanent representations 
were also enhanced. 
 
In this discussion of a new working culture emerging between the three institutions, and in 
particular between the EP and the Council, there is one particularly noteworthy example 
which should be mentioned: the success of the Irish Presidency - also described as a 
triumph by Matthews (2013) - in reaching a political agreement on all four CAP reform 
regulations on 26 June 2013. 
From the early stages, the Irish Presidency was informally chosen as the one which would 
close the deal on CAP reform. Other MSs and the other institutions had placed great hopes 
in the Irish. When they took over the Presidency in January 2013, they set themselves two 
goals: reaching a common position within the Council by March-April 2013 and a deal with 
the EP in June 2013. At that stage, many thought it would be impossible. This perception 
changed, however, when the EP adopted its plenary mandate in March 2013; the prospects 
of a political agreement in June then became more realistic. How did they manage to make 
this happen?  
Firstly, conscious of the role and impact of co-decision, they invested heavily in developing 
the personal relationship between the Irish Presidency team and the EP negotiating team in 
the very early stages of the process (as far back as 2011). One illustration of this effort 
was the informal Council in Dublin to which all rapporteurs were invited. 
Secondly, once the negotiations were launched, they organised a set of informal meetings 
with only 6 people in the room: the Irish Presidency team (Simon Coveney), the COMAGRI 
chair (Paolo De Castro), the lead EC negotiator (Joao Pacheco), the relevant Council 
Working Group Chair, the relevant rapporteur and one of the Deputy Directors-General of 
DG AGRI. In these meetings (9-10 in total), they tackled the most important political issues 
at the end. By the time they got to the Council in June, they were down to a very small 
number of issues to resolve, namely capping and degressivity. From a negotiating strategy 
point of view, they applied the same logic to the trilogue meetings where the most 
important issues were parked together until May 2013, so that trilogue meetings could 
continue on other more detailed aspects. All these issues were then ultimately dealt with as 
a ‘package’ at the very end. 
Thirdly, they relied on a very skilful Minister of Agriculture, whom many interviewees have 
praised for his political leadership and personal commitment to the process.  
The working method of Minister Simon Coveney (a former MEP) and his team, namely to 
engage, at an early stage, both formally and informally, with the EP negotiating team was 
seen by many interviewees as decisive in reaching an agreement in June 2013. Here, the 
important role played by Paolo de Castro was also often alluded to in the interviews. Some 
gave de Castro credit for the way he managed to bring everyone to a final agreement and 
for the role he played behind the scenes in the final rounds of the negotiations. 
5.1.2  Co-decision and dynamics within the EC 
Co-decision affected the contacts between the EC and the EP, but also to some extent the 
dynamics within the EC.  
One particularly relevant question here is the extent to which co-decision has affected the 
EC in drafting its original proposals. The interview results on this aspect are inconclusive. 
Many interviewees within the EP thought that the knowledge that co-decision would apply 
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this time round did influence the initial proposals towards something that would be (more) 
acceptable for the EP. Others, however, believed that only the Lyon report had been taken 
into account to a marginal extent in the drafting of the proposals, underlining that the 
preparatory phase of the EC proposals (through the public consultation organised by the 
Commissioner) took stock of the EP’s resolutions, alongside many other contributions.  
A second dimension which needs to be considered is the participation of other DGs in the 
decision-making process, and whether it was affected by co-decision. Here, the results of 
the interviews provide a slightly clearer picture. The involvement of DG Environment, for 
example, was unprecedented compared to previous reforms.  However, this evolution may 
be due to the nature of the reform (the greening) and the budgetary pressure (using part 
of the CAP’s budget as ‘environmental budget’) than to co-decision per se.  
DG COMP was also recognised as having had a significant influence on the process, in 
particular with regard to the competition issues raised by the CMO file. In reaction to the 
EP’s amendments to the CMO regulation, DG COMP wrote a note on Mr Dantin’s report, 
arguing that some of his proposals threatened the completion of Article 39 TFEU (which 
defines the objectives of the CAP). In this particular case, it was clearly the involvement of 
the EP (and its particular positions on the CMO) that triggered a stronger involvement of 
DG COMP.  
A third aspect which was raised in this context was the difference in relations between the 
EP and the Commissioner’s Cabinet, and between the EP and DG AGRI. Many contacts took 
place directly between the EP and the Cabinet (and their respective staff), bypassing in 
some cases DG AGRI. Explanations for this can be found in the political nature of both 
bodies. The Cabinet may have been a more natural interlocutor for the EP and easier to 
convince than DG AGRI. At a technical level, the EP staff explained that having direct 
contacts with the Cabinet was sometimes useful when it took too long to get the 
information from DG AGRI. 
Finally, the issue of communication and information exchange often came up in discussions 
on the new EP-EC relationship. Some interviewees argued that, quite naturally, as the 
institution proposing the legislation, the EC had an agenda to pursue and to follow, which 
may have interfered with its supposedly ‘neutral’ and ‘open’ expertise support towards the 
EP. However, the interviews were inconclusive on this aspect: some actors underlined the 
availability, transparency and openness of the EC in providing relevant information and 
argued that the EC was helpful. In the opinion of one of the interviewees, it was actually 
the EC that actively tried to help the EP, which did not take the necessary steps to fully 
engage with the EC. 
5.1.3  Impact of co-decision on civil society and stakeholders 
One notable feature of the 2013 CAP reform was the early engagement and participation of 
civil society in the construction of the EC’s legislative proposals. On 12 April 2010, the EC 
launched a public debate on the future of the CAP, which stayed open as a public 
consultation until June 2010 (a total of 5 600 contributions were received) and was 
concluded by a broad conference in July 2010. This was certainly a new approach to 
reforming the CAP, as the Commissioners for Agriculture have had the reputation of being 
closer to farm interests, compared to other civil society actors and stakeholders (Cuhna and 
Swinbank, 2011). 
It is unclear whether this move was thought of in anticipation of co-decision, although 
some interviewees have underlined the genuine willingness of Commissioner Ciolos to open 
up the debate to the European public. It is also unclear to what extent the participation of 
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civil society in 2010 made a decisive contribution towards the EC legislative proposals, 
although it is acknowledged that they provided additional support for the Commissioner’s 
proposal on greening, for example. 
The interview results revealed a few different ways in which co-decision affected the 
participation and influence of civil society actors in the decision-making process. 
Firstly, co-decision intensified the relationship between MEPs and outside actors, whether 
from the farm community, the agri-food industry or environmental NGOs. Quite logically, 
‘lobbying’ in the EP increased alongside the increase in legislative power. A key question 
here is whether the limited EP in-house resources and its reliance on external sources of 
expertise inevitably makes it more vulnerable to the influence of these external actors.  
Secondly, some interviewees noted that co-decision forced civil society to organise itself at 
European level; it forced civil society actors to structure their messages via a broad 
European platform, rather than trying to influence the institutional actors in a dispersed 
manner. In the light of co-decision’s ultimate objective, i.e. more democratic accountability 
and more citizen representation, this is an important development. The ‘broadening of 
interests’ which some observers were expecting to see in COMAGRI or the plenary, might 
have actually happened via the emergence of a European civil society. 
However, it is unclear to what extent this organisation at European level influenced 
decision-makers, since the decision-makers themselves were now more numerous and 
heterogeneous under co-decision. 
Thirdly, there seems to be a difference in the civil society actors’ perception of their own 
influence. Environmental actors, for example, seem to believe they only had a very 
marginal influence on the process and regret the dominance of farm interests in the 
debate. However, this perception of the dominance of farm interests is not shared by all 
observers. One interviewee suggested that farm organisations had less influence this time 
round than on previous reforms. 
5.1.4  Delegated and implementing acts 
The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty also had an impact beyond the negotiations on the 
CAP reform basic acts, by making the distinction between delegated and implementing 
acts. With both, the legislator delegates to the Commission the power to adopt acts 
amending non-essential elements of a legislative act. For example, delegated or 
implementing acts may specify certain technical details, or they may consist of a 
subsequent amendment to certain elements of a legislative act. The legislator can therefore 
concentrate on policy direction and objectives without entering into overly technical 
debates. However, it is also acknowledged that delegation is sometimes ‘a case of 
entrusting politically delicate tasks to the executive’ (European Parliament, 2008).  
There are however fundamental differences between delegated and implementing acts. The 
EP may reject delegated acts (but it cannot amend them). On the contrary, concerning 
implementing acts, the European Parliament is excluded from their adoption. Therefore, the 
choice between delegated and implementing acts represents a crucial decision.   
Delegation is subject to many conditions; for example, it may only apply to non-essential 
aspects of the act. Defining what is ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ in a piece of legislation is 
naturally a very political decision (European Parliament, 2008). The decisions about what 
should be dealt with in delegated or implementing acts are taken during the trilogue 
meetings on the basic acts. 
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The interviews which were carried out for the purpose of this study took place at the same 
time as the discussions on the first set of CAP reform delegated acts. The latter were often 
alluded to as a concrete illustration of where the interinstitutional working culture still 
needs to be improved. The interview results can be summarised along two lines. 
Firstly, a general sense of miscomprehension: some MEPs claimed that the EC was trying to 
include technical provisions which did not respect the political agreement, and threatened 
to reject these acts. In a press release on 5 February 2014, the COMAGRI Chairman, Paolo 
de Castro, called upon on the Commission (and Commissioner Ciolos in particular) to ‘bear 
in mind that all delegated acts must be based on and strictly adhere to what was achieved 
with such difficulty during the CAP reform negotiations. (…). This Agriculture committee will 
not accept any delegated act which goes beyond the legislative texts as approved by the 
Parliament and the Council last year’. The Green members of COMAGRI have accused the 
EPP of using the delegated acts as a further way of diluting the greening provisions (a 
detailed discussion on this point will be provided in section 6.3).   
Secondly, a crucial question to address in this context is whether an increase in delegated 
acts is a desirable way forward for the EP and for the process as a whole. With the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the introduction of delegated acts has given the EP 
more powers than for implementing acts. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
behind the formal definition of these acts, institutional and practical arrangements have 
been put in place to define how the EP should fulfil its mandate, e.g. who should take part 
in technical meetings on these acts, how exactly they should intervene, etc. This lack of 
practical arrangements may have contributed to the difficulties encountered during the 
discussions on delegated acts. 
The interviews were inconclusive as to whether the increasing importance of delegated acts 
undermines the overall process of co-decision, or whether it facilitates it (by removing from 
the basic acts technical provisions which would prolong and further complicate the decision-
making process). Nor was there a strong consensus on what should be the way forward for 
the EP: include more in the basic acts (with the risk of dramatically prolonging the 
procedure) to retain full co-decision powers over the legislation, or delegate more but be 
better prepared to deal with this secondary legislation.  
More fundamentally, if delegation becomes too widely used as a means to overcome 
difficult issues, it could pose a threat to the very legitimacy of the decision-making process 
as a whole: it must not become an instrument of co-decision. It must remain exceptional 
and only be resorted to in order to tackle very technical problems that should not be 
addressed in the basic act (European Parliament, 2008). Ultimately, it must help the EP 
focus on its essential tasks, not diminish its legislative powers. 
5.2  Outcome and influence of the EP in CAP reform 
The entry of the EP as a new player into the decision-making process naturally meant a 
reshuffle of the rules of the game, with new coalition opportunities and interinstitutional 
transfers of power. Has the new role of the EP increased or reduced the role of the EC and 
the Council? Has the EP become an independent actor or simply an extension of the Council 
(in terms of interests) and of the Commission (in terms of expertise)? With which 
institution did the EP partner the most and the most successfully?  
In this section we discuss how much concrete influence the EP gained with co-decision, vis-
à-vis the two other institutions. The outcome of the trilogue negotiations and the respective 
institutional positions are briefly presented in Table 10; a more detailed overview is 
provided in Annex 2.  
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5.2.1  Ex-post perceptions 
Based on earlier studies, including Crombez et al (2013), we asked the interviewees to 
describe the changes of power between the institutions linked to the introduction of co-
decision. In particular, we asked them to identify which one of the scenarios developed in 
Greer and Hind (2012) best represented the actual negotiations and the inter-institutional 
dynamics under the 2013 CAP reform: 
a) The conventional scenario: the EP acquired more power at the expense of the other 
institutions but it was constrained by limited resources. 
b) The Council-EP axis: the Council filled the void created by the limited resources of 
the EP, drawing on the substantial administrative capabilities of Member States. 
c) The Commission-centric model: the Commission managed to extend its powers, 
both formally and informally (the Commission increased its influence by using its 
expertise and resources to facilitate an agreement between the EP and the Council 
that delivered an outcome shaped more closely to its preferences). 
d) The status quo scenario: the changes in decision-making rules produced stasis, a 
more protracted decision-making process that made reform more difficult by 
reinforcing the status quo. 
The dominant view was that the EP had more influence than in the past but that it was 
limited by its resources; 42 % of the respondents thought that the dominant evolution to 
be highlighted was the increase in the EP’s power, i.e. the conventional scenario, option 
(a). However, 30 % did not agree and believed that the other institutions gained power; 
17 % perceived the reality of interinstitutional dynamics to be more in line with scenario 
(b) and another 12 % underlined the potential increase of power for the EC as a result of 
co-decision in scenario (c) (see Table 11). However, a quarter (25 %) said that none of 
these scenarios described the evolution well. 
 
Table 11: Impact of co-decision on the EU institutional triangle 
Balance of power between the three institutions involved 
in the CAP reform 
(Response rate = 83 %) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. The conventional scenario 42 % 
B. The Council-EP axis 17 % 
C. The Commission-centric model 12 % 
D. The status quo scenario 4 % 
E. None of the above 25 % 
 
We also asked the interviewees to describe the role of the EP vis-à-vis the other 
institutions: over three quarters (79 %) of respondents replied that they evaluated the EP 
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as a ‘Working Parliament’ as opposed to an ‘Antechamber to the Council’39 (21 %) (see 
Table 12). 
 
Table 12: Role of the EP in the CAP reform 
Role of the EP in the CAP reform 
(Response rate = 59 %) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. A rubber-stamp institution endorsing the EC positions 0% 
B. An antechamber to the Council 21 % 
C. A working Parliament (able to amend and produce its own legislation) 79 % 
 
Many interviewees highlighted the fact that, undeniably, the entry of the EP now made it 
impossible for the EC and the Council to seal a deal on their own, which means that they 
have arguably lost a share of their previous decision-making prerogatives. Individual MSs 
also lost power given the new negotiation structure: the Presidency is the only body 
representing all the MSs in the trilogue meetings with the EP, which means that national 
delegations have delegated some power to the Presidency and must trust that the latter 
has understood and will defend their interests. 
5.2.2  Amendment analysis 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the analysis of the EP’s amendments (Ferto and 
Kovacs, 2014). For the four CAP regulations, 44 % of the total number of EP amendments 
in the negotiations mandate were accepted in the final outcome. The highest acceptance 
ratios were observed in the case of the EAFRD (47 %) and CMO (47 %) Regulations, 
followed by the Direct Payments Regulation (40 %). The lowest figure was seen in the case 
of the Horizontal Regulation (37 %)40.   
In sum, 51.2 % of all EP agricultural policy amendments41 were accepted. Broken down file 
by file, the EP managed to obtain higher acceptance rates in the case of the EAFRD (57 %) 
and CMO (55 %) regulations. The figures for Direct Payments (49 %) and the Horizontal 
Regulation (40 %) are lower.  
As for EP CAP reform amendments42, 55.96 % of all the amendments of this type were 
accepted. The highest acceptance rates were in the case of the EAFRD Regulation 
(65.71 %), followed by the Horizontal Regulation (60 %), the CMO (52.38 %) and finally 
the Direct Payment Regulation (48.83 %).  
                                                 
39  A Working Parliament is understood as a Parliament able to produce, amend and adopt binding legislation. An 
antechamber to the Council is understood here as a second chamber echoing the views expressed in the first 
chamber (the Council). 
40  When compromise amendments are extracted, the results are even more striking: if compromise amendments 
are extracted, the numbers are more significant: 59.2 % of the total amendments in the EP negotiation 
mandate are incorporated into the final regulations, 60.2 % for DP, 73 % for EAFRD, 41.4 % for HR and 
57.1 % for CMO (Ferto and Kovacs, 2014). 
41  Agricultural policy amendments are considered in this analysis as amendments which go beyond ‘institutional’ 
or ‘clarification aspects’ and touch upon important policy aspects (Ferto and Kovacs, 2014). 
42  CAP reform amendments are defined here as amendments tabled to the new CAP reform items such as 
greening, the young farmers’ scheme, the small farmers’ scheme, etc., and also when the EP’s position 
represents a step back from the Commission proposal (Ferto and Kovacs, 2014). 
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With these rates of acceptance, it could legitimately be argued that the EP became a real 
co-legislator with the Council, and that it touched on important aspects of the policy. In 
other words, with over 50 % of the changes proposed by the EP ultimately accepted in the 
final outcome, we can safely consider the EP to be a real decision-maker.  
A comparison of the EP’s legislative influence under co-decision with its influence under 
consultation also suggests a significant increase in the EP’s power, but the results need to 
be interpreted with caution since such comparison is obviously incomplete. 
Ferto and Kovacs (2014) compare EP amendment success rates under co-decision with 
those under consultation for four CAP regulations between 2004 and 200843. When the total 
number of amendments is considered (over 8 000 in the case of the 2013 CAP reform), the 
ratio of successfully adopted EP amendments in the final regulations is only slightly higher 
(10.4 %) under co-decision than under consultation (9.7 %). This may be explained by the 
sharp increase in the number of amendments under co-decision compared to consultation, 
rather than a limited increase in legislative influence.  
However, the EP’s position vis-à-vis the Council seems significantly more influential under 
co-decision: 59.2 % of the amendments adopted by the EP plenary were taken on board by 
the Council, compared to 29.1 % under consultation. The EP is also more powerful in 
putting through its draft report amendments, which had an adoption rate of 59.3 % under 
co-decision, compared to 23.3 % under consultation.  
5.2.3  Analysis of winning coalitions 
Another way of measuring the EP’s influence in the process is to look at the ‘winning 
coalitions’ at play during the CAP reform negotiations (Ferto and Kovacs (2014). Winning 
coalitions are defined as institutional coalitions whose common position is finally stipulated 
in the final regulation. In other words, we look at whether the EP was more often in the 
winning institutional partnership or not44.  
The position of the EP was the same as that of the EC in 20.4 % of cases, and that of the 
Council in 22.6 % of cases. In fact, the most frequent coalition was the Commission-Council 
coalition, with 43 % of cases on all the CAP policy issues observed. In 14 % of the cases  
no coalitions were formed, which means that the three institutions took three different 
positions ahead of the trilogue negotiations.  
Via its amendments, the EP managed to influence the final policy outcome in 65.6 % of all 
observed cases (as part of an institutional coalition, solely or in a compromise form). In 
coalition with the Council, the EP managed to get its position through in 21.5 % of cases, 
and together with the Commission in 5.4 % of cases. The EP alone – without any coalitions 
– was successful in 24.7 % of observed cases.   
When analysing the winning coalitions file by file, the results show that the EP was most 
successful in the case of the CMO and the Horizontal Regulation (both 71.4 %), followed by 
the EAFRD (63.6 %) and the Direct Payment Regulation (62.8 %).  
                                                 
43  Proposal for a Council Regulation on the financing of the common agricultural policy; COM(2004)0489; 
 Proposal for a Council Regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD); COM(2004)0490; Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a common organisation 
of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products; COM(2006)0822; Proposal 
for a Council Regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common 
agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers; COM(2008)0306. 
44  The results presented in this section draw on Ferto and Kovacs (2014). 
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When compared to the Council, the following conclusions can be drawn: the Council 
managed to get its position through – either in coalition, in a compromise form or alone – 
in 57 % of the observed cases, which is lower than the EP’s relevant figure (65.6 %). The 
Council managed to win alone in 16.1 % of all observed cases, compared to 24.7 % for the 
EP. 
Finally, the results of the analysis carried out by Ferto and Kovacs (2014) also reveal that 
(amongst other things):  
 The EP-Council coalitions have by far the highest success rate (95.2 % adoption rate). 
It clearly reflects the co-decision: if the two co-legislators agree, there is only a minor 
chance that other factors will be able to influence this agreement. In particular, the 
EP-Council coalition was successful, for example, in making the Small Farmers’ 
Scheme and the redistributive payments voluntary for Member States, in defining the 
hectare thresholds for crop diversification and in defining the percentages for inter-
pillar transfers from P1 to P2. 
 In coalition with the EC, the EP and the Council have almost equal weight, as the 
success rate of the Commission-EP coalition (26.3 %) is close to the Commission-
Council figure (32.5 %). The EP-EC coalition was successful, amongst other things, in 
setting the threshold for financial discipline, in making the Young Farmers’ Scheme 
mandatory for Member States and also in making degressivity compulsory for 
Member States. 
In summary, the EP is more often engaged in winning coalitions than the Council (in 
65.6 % of cases for the EP, compared to 57 % for the Council). Hence, even if the most 
frequent coalition is the Commission-Council coalition (in 43 % of all cases), the most 
successful partnership seems to have been the EP-Council coalition, which wins in 95.2 % 
of all cases.  
The results of the interviews were less conclusive on the way the EP partnered with the 
other institutions. In fact, most interviewees highlighted the case-by-case nature of these 
coalitions and the difficulty of drawing general conclusions. As one interviewee explained, 
‘the EP rarely struck out on its own and imposed its own view (if the two other institutions 
were against it, for example). However, when the EP’s views were in line with those of one 
of the two other institutions, it could be decisive; there were sometimes tipping points 
where the EP’s position was indeed crucial.’ 
5.2.4  A nuanced interpretation 
The perception of the increase or decrease of power was also different depending on the 
interviewee’s respective institution or organisation. In particular, a few additional findings 
give a more nuanced picture of the interinstitutional situation during the negotiating phase: 
 The EP may have equal powers with the Council, but sometimes failed to express an 
independent vision, removed from the interests defended by MSs, which were 
represented within the Council. Some interviewees thought there was some truth in 
the EP being an ‘antechamber to the Council’ or in the ‘EP-Council’ axis, underlining 
the closeness between the national delegations and their corresponding MEPs on a 
number of issues. In this sense, the increase in the EP’s power may not necessarily 
mean a decrease in the Council’s power, if both echo similar views and positions. The 
interinstitutional dynamics varied on a case-by-case basis.  
 The evolution of the EC’s power also seems to be ambiguous and was subject to 
different interpretations in the interviews: some thought the EC increased its power 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 78 
by strengthening its role as facilitator, or simply because the EP was highly dependent 
on its technical expertise, which still gave the EC the upper hand on a number of 
issues. Others argued that, given the internal divisions within the EP and the Council, 
the EC eventually managed to bring the policy closer to its preferences. 
 
The empirical evidence from the different methodologies clearly suggests that the EP did 
become more influential. However, the growth in influence was constrained by other 
factors, such as the EP’s dependence on the EC’s resources for technical expertise and its 
tendency to somewhat echo the positions expressed within the Council, rather than 
defending a third, alternative vision. Some of these factors are discussed in more detail in 
the case studies in Chapter 6. 
A second conclusion is that, overall, the EP is believed to have pushed for less reform than 
the EC, but maybe in some cases for a greater level of reform than the Council would have 
wished for, and in other cases supported or reinforced the EC’s positions. As in Chapter 4’s 
discussion of the influence of COMAGRI, the nature of the EP’s influence in comparison to 
the Council and the EC is best assessed on an issue-by-issue basis.   
The following concrete examples were alluded to in the interviews to illustrate the nature or 
the specificity of the EP’s influence: 
 On the CMO: some interviewees recognised the important influence of the EP on this 
file, underlining the number of ‘new’ ideas introduced by the EP, in particular in terms 
of collective organisations of producers. Other interviewees, however, described the 
influence of the EP on this file as the most conservative, ‘reverting to instruments of 
the past’. Notably, the EP managed to postpone the end of the sugar quotas until 
2017.  
 On direct payments: the EP’s position was described as being ‘concerned by the 
practicability and economic relevance of the regulation’ or as being a ‘watering down’ 
influence on greening45 (although not all interviewees shared this view), or even a re-
nationalising influence, with regard to the increased flexibility given to MSs for 
implementation. The Young Farmers’ Scheme was often cited as an area where the 
EP’s influence was decisive: the EP managed to impose the mandatory character of 
the scheme in the face of opposition from the Council, which wanted to keep it 
voluntary. The EP also managed to increase the number of eligible hectares from 25 
to 90. As regards the Small Farmers’ Scheme, the EP also had a notable influence: 
the Council wanted to cap the lump sum at EUR 1 000, while the EP proposed EUR 1 
500. The final outcome ended up being a compromise between the two: EUR 1 250.  
 On rural development: the EP’s influence was described as consensual but decisive 
with regard to the elimination of double funding and the ring-fencing of agri-
environmental spending. 
 On the Horizontal Regulation: the EP supported the efforts of the EC on 
strengthening the accountability of the paying agencies. The EP also supported the EC 
on a number of other issues aimed at strengthening the control systems (certification, 
possibility of suspending monthly payments, etc.). Finally, the EP added some 
elements to the Farm Advisory System (e.g. competitiveness, entrepreneurship) and 
cross-compliance (e.g. early warning system). 
                                                 
45  The expression "watering down" has been used by a number of CAP-reform observers who compared the input 
of the EP to the nature of the original proposals put forward by the EC. The idea of "watering down" mainly 
comes from the increased flexibility suggested by the EP compared to the binding and compulsory character of 
the original proposals. A thorough discussion on the EP’s influence on greening is provided in section 6.3.  
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5.3  Summary and conclusions  
A few key findings have emerged from this chapter. In particular: 
 A new working culture is emerging, but not always successfully. Areas for 
improvement in the communication between the institutions exist and the 
understanding of their respective roles needs to be enhanced. Informal contacts 
between the respective negotiating teams are recognised as crucial to further develop 
this new interinstitutional working culture and to enable successful negotiations.  
 The success of the Irish Presidency can be considered as an indication of how co-
decision can work in practice. In particular, by investing heavily in personal 
relationships with EP negotiators and dealing with the most sensitive issues as a 
package, the Irish team integrated the new interinstitutional dynamics into their 
strategy, which effectively led to a political agreement on the four basic CAP reform 
acts. 
 The episode of delegated acts is worth mentioning as an illustration of where areas 
for improvement remain, although the repeated threats of some MEPs to reject the 
delegated acts have yielded some legislative results. Institutional arrangements 
should be put in place with regard to the future preparation of delegated acts, 
specifying who the EP negotiators should be, and what their role and mandate should 
be. 
 Co-decision intensified the contacts and relationship between civil society and the EP, 
which was sometimes criticised for being too open to the influence of certain actors. 
Co-decision also forced civil society actors to organise themselves at European level in 
order to influence a more complex and heterogeneous EU decision-making system. 
 The EP is clearly now enjoying powers that it never had before. Its influence on the 
policy went beyond recitals or clarifications: more than half of all its amendments on 
the most sensitive issues of CAP reform were finally incorporated into the final 
outcome. This would tend to confirm that the ‘conventional scenario’ is the most 
suitable to describe the reality of the 2013 CAP reform outcome.  
 The EP may have more powers today and may be a ‘working parliament’ on political 
issues, but it was faced with difficulties on the most technical issues. Its lack of 
technical resources, compared to the two other institutions, may have reduced its 
ability to negotiate on an equal footing with the Council and to propose viable 
alternatives to the EC’s proposals. The EP may be constrained by a lack of resources 
but it is unclear whether a mere increase in in-house technical expertise would be the 
right solution, given the inherently political nature of the EP compared to the two 
other institutions. 
 The comparison of the amendment success rates under consultation and co-decision 
reveals that the formal increase in power has materialised into legislative terms. 
Despite the informal routes that could be used by MEPs under consultation to 
influence policy outcomes, the EP is indisputably more powerful under co-decision: it 
is more powerful in imposing its views vis-à-vis the Council and in putting through its 
draft report amendments. However, other factors need to be taken into account when 
assessing its increase in power. 
 When the amendment success rates of each file are compared, the EP seems to have 
been the most successful on the CMO file. This relative success should be considered 
in the light of the EP’s failure to impose its views on the Article 43(3) issues, which 
will be discussed in section 6.5. 
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 The EP may formally have equal powers with the Council, but sometimes failed to 
express an independent vision, removed from the interests represented within the 
Council. Some interviewees thought there was some truth in the EP being an 
‘antechamber to the Council’ or in the ‘EP-Council’ axis, underlining the closeness 
between the Council national delegations and their corresponding MEPs on a number 
of issues. In this sense, the increase in the EP’s power may not necessarily mean a 
decrease in the Council’s power, if both share or echo similar views and positions. 
Finally, if the final result is ‘less reform’ compared to what was proposed by the EC, it 
could also be argued that the impact of co-decision was to favour inertia rather than 
policy change. The EP introduced amendments reversing some of the EC proposals: 
over 60 % of these were integrated into the final outcome. 
 The evolution of the EC’s power is ambiguous: it may have increased its role as 
facilitator and it may still have an upper hand linked to its expertise (and the EP’s 
reliance on it). It may also use the divisions within the other institutions to bring the 
policy closer to its preferences. However, it also loses power when the EP and the 
Council are allied.  
 The EP partnered more easily with the Council (they shared the highest number of 
cases) and it was also the most successful when it partnered with the Council. 
However, interinstitutional dynamics and coalitions varied on a case-by-case basis. 
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6.  EP INFLUENCE ON SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE 
REFORM 
To complete the analysis carried out above, in this section we focus on crucial elements of 
the 2013 CAP reform which merit further attention. First, we look at the interinstitutional 
management of the CAP reform calendar and the EP’s responsibility in this regard, and then 
at the EP’s position on capping, given the political sensitivity and the prominence of this 
issue in the debate. We then attempt to assess to what extent the EP influenced the 
greening proposals. Next, we evaluate the impact of the simultaneous MFF negotiations on 
the process in general and the EP’s influence in particular, and finally, we try to analyse 
how the food and economic crises may have affected the EP’s positions on market 
regulation (via the CMO file). In this particular case, we also discuss the important 
interinstitutional battle over the so-called ‘Article 43(3)’ issues. 
6.1  Reform calendar 
One issue which certainly triggered a lot of discussion and differences in interpretation 
between the institutions is the overall CAP reform calendar. When the EC published its 
communication in November 2010, it was foreseen that a new CAP would be implemented 
on 1 January 2014. Just under a year later – in October 2011 – the EC published its 
legislative proposals. At that stage, the final texts would have had to be adopted and 
published in the Official Journal by March 2013 (for the payment claims to be introduced on 
time and the new CAP to be implemented by 1 January 2014). It quickly became apparent 
that this timeline was unrealistic. The only regulation which eventually made it through on 
time was the new CMO, which effectively entered into force on 1 January 2014. All the 
other new regulations will enter into force on 1 January 2015, which meant that it was 
necessary to design and implement ‘transitional measures’ to make a bridge between the 
old and the new CAP. In this light, it would be difficult not to consider the CAP reform as 
having suffered ‘delays’; the results of the interviews, however, show a more nuanced 
picture. 
The results of the interviews tend to confirm this perception that the reform calendar 
initially proposed by the EC was unrealistic (58 % of respondents chose this description, as 
shown in Table 13).  
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Table 13: Interpretation of the CAP reform timetable 
Interpretation of CAP reform timetable 
(Response rate = 62 %) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. The delays were inevitable and the original reform calendar unrealistic 58 % 
B. The delays were part of the EP negotiation strategy   0 % 
C. The delays were part of the negotiation strategy of the EC or the 
Council 
11 % 
D. The delays were worth it and enabled the negotiators to come to a 
better agreement 
17 % 
E. The delays were a symptom of an ineffective and lengthy process that 
needs significant revision 
14 % 
 
Therefore, a legitimate question would be: can we really speak of delays when the original 
schedule was allegedly known to be unrealistic?  
Some interviewees thought that rather than being too long, the process was in fact too 
short and suffered from many timing imperatives, including the pressure to reach a first-
reading agreement and the timing constraint imposed by the simultaneous MFF 
negotiations and the EP’s refusal to adopt the final regulations before the final figures for 
the CAP budget were known (a thorough discussion on this point is provided later in this 
section). The negotiating phase itself – from April to September 2013 - was almost 
unanimously considered as intense, which was a good thing for some interviewees and a 
bad thing for others. ‘Short timing focuses the mind’ as one interviewee pointed out, but it 
also rushes some of the last drafting phases and may put one or other of the players in a 
‘take it or leave it’ position.  
These factors aside, some interviewees still believed there would have been ways to use 
the available time, if not better, maybe in a more efficient way. For example, one period 
which was alluded to in this context was the time between the publication of the legislative 
proposals (which, according to some, arrived too late on the table) and the adoption of a 
COMAGRI position in January 2013, with a particular emphasis on the report drafting 
phase. On the other hand, the drafting of the report was also described as a crucial phase 
‘to take the political temperature of the house’ and, consequently, as a period that should 
not be rushed. In the same vein, one interviewee underlined the fact that the duration of 
the process enabled the negotiators to build a good working environment and trust 
amongst the key actors, which was essential for the subsequent negotiations with the 
Council. 
Another important timing element is that the EP reached a common position before the 
Council; this was recognised by some interviewees as a considerable achievement given 
the number of amendments and the internal divisions in the EP (see Chapter 4).  
Finally, the most fundamental issue in the management of the CAP reform calendar was the 
link to the simultaneous MFF negotiations. Given the agreement by both the EP and the 
Council that CAP reform could not proceed without an MFF decision, both the Council and 
the EP produced their positions in March 2013 (after the MFF conclusions of February 
2013). When one takes this link into account, there was arguably no delay, and certainly 
not from the EP’s side. Even if it had been ready to adopt its positions beforehand, there 
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would have been no point. Whether the link with the MFF delayed the start of the trilogue 
negotiations is another issue, which is discussed in Section 6.4.  
In this context, relatively little ‘finger-pointing’ emerged from the interviews as to where 
the responsibility lies for the delay in the CAP implementation. Most interviewees 
underlined the constructive spirit of the negotiators in trying to reach an agreement within 
a reasonable deadline. The changes introduced by the EP to its rules of procedure to still 
make a first-reading agreement possible are also an indication that there was no intention 
to further delay the process. 
The reform was so complex that one would always have wished for more time, but we do 
not know whether this would have changed the results or led to a better agreement.  
6.2  Capping 
Apart from greening, capping can arguably be considered as one of the most contentious 
political issues of the reform. Table 10 and Annex 2 provide the complete details of the 
respective institutional positions on capping, and what ended up in the final outcome. 
The EC’s original proposal was to impose a mandatory maximum ceiling of EUR 300 000, 
with degressivity starting at EUR 150 000. The EP had expressed itself in favour of capping 
in numerous reports, while the Council vehemently opposed it. Matthews (2012e) provides 
a comprehensive overview of the arguments against and in favour of the measure.   
The support of the EP may have been an additional incentive for the EC to propose capping 
in the first place, as they could legitimately expect the EP’s support on this difficult 
proposal.  
Some observers expected that, given the highly political measure of this proposal, the EP 
would want to take a strong position on it, as a way of demonstrating its new co-legislator’s 
powers. However, the European Council’s conclusions of February 2013 put a new spin on 
the story, by adding the word ‘voluntary’ to the capping proposal. Although the EP could, in 
theory, have ignored this wording, the Council (and some forces within the EP against 
capping) then had the backing of the Heads of State, which essentially killed the mandatory 
character of the capping proposal.  
Ultimately, the outcome ended up being closer to the Council’s preferences, with the EP 
‘not putting up much of a fight’, as one interviewee argued. The compromise solution in the 
final outcome was to introduce a compulsory degressivity (a 5 % reduction in the payments 
for individual farms above EUR 150 000), but voluntary capping of payments at EUR 300 
000. 
Not surprisingly, depending on their political (and national) allegiances, MEPs have 
interpreted this result as a victory or as a complete failure. 
6.3  Greening46 
At the start of the CAP reform process in 2010, one of the key issues on the table was the 
need to make environmental management and the delivery of public goods a more integral 
part of agricultural support, to address the environmental challenges facing the EU. This 
was considered vital if the CAP was to have legitimacy in the longer term (Hart et al, 2010; 
Matthews, 2013). In particular, in the light of the long uncertainty over the total CAP 
                                                 
46  This section draws on the analysis carried out in Hart (2014). 
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budget, avoiding a sharp reduction in the level of the budget was, for many, contingent 
upon genuine greening measures.  
In relation to greening, the proposals represented a significant change in the architecture of 
Pillar 1. The EC proposed that all Member States would have to tie 30 % of their direct 
payments envelope to three agricultural practices beneficial to climate change and the 
environment (greening practices) which would be compulsory for all farms.  
 General requirements: Organic farms were considered ‘green by definition’ and 
therefore would automatically receive the ‘green’ payment and farmers within Natura 
2000 areas would need to comply with the greening measures (crop diversification, 
permanent grassland and EFA) unless they are incompatible with the practices 
required on the particular site.  
 Crop diversification: 3 different crops to be grown on arable land over 3 hectares, 
with none of the three crops covering less than 5 per cent of the arable land and the 
main one not exceeding 70%. 
 Permanent grassland: Maintenance of 95 % of the area of permanent grassland on 
the holding as declared in 2014. 
 Ecological Focus Areas (EFAs): 7% of the holding (excluding permanent 
grassland) to be managed as EFAs, which comprise one or more of the following 
elements: land left fallow; terraces; landscape features, e.g. hedges; ponds; ditches; 
trees in a line, in a group or isolated; field margins; buffer strips – with no production 
on them; areas afforested with funding from EAFRD. 
 
However, as explained in Hart (2014), the proposals provided no detail on how these 
measures might work in practice or what their impact was likely to be environmentally. The 
impact assessment that accompanied the proposals (European Commission, 2011b) 
contained little information on the likely environmental impacts of the measures, and, in 
addition, was prepared on the basis of measures proposed in the 2010 Commission 
communication, not those that were eventually included in the legislative proposals47. In 
terms of the content of the measures, the EC retained the power to define the detail 
through delegated acts, which left a lot of questions unanswered about precisely what 
would be required under the greening measures and how they would operate.  
The Commissioner’s greening proposal was met with widespread criticism from the majority 
of actors from the outset; reactions to the greening proposals were almost universally 
negative (Anon, 2011b), with few stakeholders feeling that they constituted a cost-effective 
way of bringing about a substantial improvement in the environmental management of the 
EU’s agricultural land. For most environmental organisations, the proposals to green Pillar 1 
were already a second-best option, and it was felt that the proposed measures needed 
strengthening if they were to increasingly reward environmental public goods (Hart, 2014). 
Others saw them as undermining Europe’s ability to contribute to ensuring food security 
(for example, by requiring land to be taken out of production for the Ecological Focus Area 
requirement), threatening income support payments to farmers and thereby their 
livelihoods, and increasing the complexity of the CAP (Hart and Baldock, 2011; Matthews, 
2013).  
                                                 
47  For example, in the 2010 communication the Commission had proposed crop rotation rather than crop 
diversification, as well as soil cover, which was not included in the final legislative proposals. 
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The proposals were equally poorly received by the EP and the Council. As the negotiations 
started, calls for increased flexibility, both by those who wanted to strengthen the 
proposals’ ability to achieve environmental benefits and by those who saw it as a way of 
reducing their impact and give farmers more flexibility, led to a long list of exemptions 
being introduced.  
The relevant question to address in the context of this study is how much of the changes in 
the greening measures lies within the EP’s responsibility.  
To answer this question, Hart (2014) takes a chronological approach, looking at Capoulas 
Santos’ draft report48, the results of the COMAGRI vote in January 2013 and the results of 
the plenary vote in March 2013, and comparing the negotiating mandates from the EP and 
the Council with the final outcome (see Annex 3).  
Within the EP, a strong concern was voiced by a majority of MEPs regarding the lack of 
simplification in the proposed regulations and the suggested conflict between the EFAs and 
food security objectives. It was within this context that Capoulas Santos started drafting his 
report in view of developing the EP’s negotiating position.  
As already explained in Chapter 4, building a strong position within the EP was not an easy 
task, given the divisions between but also within the political groups. Capoulas Santos’ 
challenge was therefore to navigate between the different views within his own party, but 
also between political parties and stakeholders, to develop his report.  
In particular, during this period, views started to coalesce around a few key alternative 
options, identified in Hart (2014). Firstly, the idea of a menu approach to the greening 
measures gained traction. This involved extending the list of greening options and allowing 
Member States or farmers the flexibility to decide which to implement. Secondly, there 
were calls for a much wider group of farmers to be considered as ‘green by definition’ and 
therefore automatically eligible to receive the green payment. Finally, it was suggested that 
penalties for non-compliance with greening should not impinge on the basic payment.  
The S&D group was split on the greening issue (as already mentioned in Chapter 4), 
between those leaning towards the ‘menu approach’, which was also defended by the 
Council, and others who rejected the idea of a menu because they felt this would weaken 
the greening concept. In his draft report, Capoulas-Santos ended up supporting the EC’s 
structure, rather than supporting the menu approach (although it had gained many 
supporters within the EP), as it would have put the EP in direct opposition to the EC from 
the very beginning. But the report proposed several changes to the greening measures, in 
the name of simplification and reducing bureaucracy, including:  
 General requirements: A broadening of the categories of farmers deemed to be 
"green by definition" to include farms which are ‘environmentally certified’ or those 
which are in agri-environmental schemes (AES) and undertaking similar actions as 
those required under green direct payments. Furthermore, the report proposed to 
break the link between compliance with the green direct payments and receipt of the 
basic payment, which essentially makes greening voluntary, with unspent funds 
transferred to the agri-environment-climate measure under Pillar 2. However, in line 
with the EC proposal, the report proposed that double funding should not be 
permitted and that Pillar 2 environment payments should clearly be additional to 
those received for Pillar 1 greening. 
                                                 
48  Due to length constraints, we have not addressed here a preliminary phase in the EP’s approach to greening, 
i.e. the Lyon and Dess initiative reports. 
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 Crop diversification: The threshold for growing three crops should be raised to 20 
hectares, with farms between 5 and 20 hectares only required to have two crops. In 
addition, farms with more than 80% of the holding under permanent grassland or 
permanent crops and an arable area under 50 hectares should be exempted from the 
measure altogether. 
 EFA: A new measure for permanent crops was proposed, rather than them being 
included within the EFA requirements, as well as an increase in the threshold that 
should apply to the EFA measure (to 20 hectares). In addition, EFAs should be 
implemented regionally, under the argument that farms would only need to allocate 
5% of their cropped area as EFA if they worked together to create ‘continuous, 
adjacent EFAs’.   
The introduction of Capoulas Santos' draft report was then followed by a period of intense 
activity within the EP and COMAGRI in particular, with political parties tabling thousands of 
amendments and developing compromise amendments, which would be put to a vote in  
COMAGRI in January 2013. In this vote, the following important changes to the report of 
Capoulas-Santos were agreed upon:  
 Double funding should be permitted, i.e. payments for the same activities could be 
received under Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. 
 Additional exemptions of farmers that are “green by definition”: an amendment was 
approved to state that the entirety of the holding would be exempt from the 
greening requirements, not just the area under an agri-environmental agreement, 
farmed organically or designated as Natura 2000. 
 Additional exemptions to the crop diversification and EFA measures for those 
farmers on holdings where more than 75% of their land was permanent grassland 
and where the remaining land did not exceed 50 hectares. 
When it came to the plenary vote in March 2013 and the finalisation of the EP’s negotiating 
mandate, attention focused primarily on the two contentious issues of double funding and 
the extent of the ‘green by definition’ exemption. A roll-call vote was held on both issues.  
In contrast to the position of COMAGRI, the plenary approved the amendment to prevent 
double funding49 by a significant majority (379 in favour, 285 against and 7 abstentions).  
On the ‘green by definition’ issue (Article 29), a large number of amendments were tabled, 
but the intensely political nature of the debate led to political parties voting against one 
another with the result that none of the amendments were passed. As a result, the content 
of this greening measure remained unchanged compared to the COMAGRI position, as did 
the separation of the penalty for non-compliance with the greening requirements from the 
basic payment. 
The final negotiating mandate agreed by the EP (see Annex 3) differed from the 
Commission’s proposals in the following:  
 General requirements: The list of farmers considered ‘green by definition’ was 
extended to farms comprising at least 75% permanent grassland and the penalty for 
non-compliance to the greening measures was set at 30% of the greening 
component. Pillar 2 agri-environment conditions were set to go beyond greening 
measures and double funding should not be allowed. 
                                                 
49  The rule was set within the rural development regulation and the amendment stated very clearly that 
payments for actions funded under the agri-environment-climate measure must go beyond those under both 
cross-compliance and the green direct payment. 
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 Crop diversification: Arable areas under 10 hectares should be exempted from crop 
diversification measures.  Farms with arable areas of 10 to 30 hectares should plant 
at least two crops a year and those over 30 hectares must have at least 3 crops. 
Further, the maximum area sown to a single crop should be 80% (for arable areas 10 
to 30 hectares) and 75% (for arable areas of more than 30 hectares). For arable 
areas of more than 30 hectares, the maximum area sown to a two crops should be 
95%.  
 Permanent grassland: The ratio of permanent grassland/pasture (in 2014) to total 
UAA (reference area) should be maintained and should be applied at national, 
regional or sub-regional level. 5% conversion of the reference area should be 
permitted except for carbon rich soils, wetlands and semi-natural grasslands and 
pastures.  
 EFA: EFA should cover 3% (excluding permanent pasture and permanent crops) in 
2014, rising to 5% from 2016. EFA should only apply to eligible areas of more than 10 
hectares and production should be permitted, but without the use of fertilisers and 
pesticides.  
 
A month before the adoption of the EP’s plenary mandate, Heads of State, as part of the 
negotiations on the MFF (see below), inserted the following text in their conclusions: ‘the 
requirement to have an ecological focus area on each agricultural holding will be 
implemented in ways that do not require the land in question to be taken out of 
production(…)’. This had serious ramifications for the eventual content of the EFA measure.  
The Council also introduced amendments to the EC’s greening proposal in its ‘General 
Approach’ adopted in March 2013. On most measures, the Council went further than the EP 
in wanting less restrictions, but in a few cases also proposed more restrictions on the 
environmental measures. The Council differed from the EC and EP proposals in the 
following:  
 General requirements: The list of farmers considered ‘green by definition’ was 
extended compared to the mandate of both EC and EP. Farms with at least 75% of 
land enrolled in a nationally or regionally-certified environment scheme and farms 
with more than 75% covered by grassland or cultivated with leguminous crops should 
be exempted from greening measures. Similarly to the EP, the Council proposed a 
penalty for non-compliance. The proposed penalty was higher than in the EP 
proposal: loss of the 30% greening component plus 25% extra penalty (i.e. 37.5% of 
overall entitlement lost). Furthermore, greening requirements should not be included 
in the Pillar 2 baseline. Member States should have ‘clearly defined flexibility on the 
choice of equivalent greening measures’ and in contrast to the EC and the EP 
proposal, double funding was permitted in the Council proposal. 
 Crop diversification: Similarly to the EP, the Council proposed that arable areas 
under 10 hectares should be exempted from crop diversification measures. In 
addition, the Council proposed that some specific farms should be exempted. Farms 
with arable areas of 10 to 30 hectares should plant at least two crops a year and 
those over 30 hectares must have at least 3 crops. Furthermore, the maximum area 
sown to a single crop should be 75%. For arable areas of more than 30 hectares, the 
maximum area sown to a two crops should be 95%.  
 Permanent grassland: Farmers must maintain the area of permanent grassland as 
declared in 2014. Member States can choose not to apply this requirement if in 2012 
the ratio of permanent grass to total UAA has not decreased or decreased by less 
than 5% in relation to reference ratio (as set under current regulations).  
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 EFA: 'Ecological Focus Areas' (EFAs) are set to cover 5% (excluding permanent 
grassland) in 2015, rising to 7% from 2018 pending review. This is higher than what 
the EP proposed, but lower than in the EC proposal. Up to half of the EFA requirement 
may be met by pooling commitments among groups of farmers. Furthermore, this 
measure should only apply to eligible areas of more than 15 hectares, which is higher 
than in the EP proposal. In addition, the Council proposed that some farms would be 
exempted from the EFA requirement. Finally, the Council also proposed a longer list of 
elements that could be included in the EFA.  
Hence, on most issues, both the EP and the Council proposed less stringent environmental 
requirements than the EC, but the Council (and Heads of State) went further than the EP in 
differing from the Commission proposals.  
These positions reflected the fact that many Member States and MEPs were concerned 
about the cost implications of the Commission proposals and few wanted to defend them. 
Furthermore, those who wanted very stringent environmental requirements to be included 
in the CAP (stakeholders, Member States or MEPs) may have not strongly defended the 
Commission's original proposals because they were already sceptical at the start on 
whether these would deliver genuine and significant environmental benefits. Later in the 
process, more specifically after the MFF negotiations, the political equilibrium changed even 
further. Once the greening proposals had succeeded in the sense of protecting the CAP 
budget from more serious cuts than had been feared in the MFF negotiations, opposition 
against stringent greening requirements grew even stronger. As a result, several changes 
proposed by the EP and Council were included in the final legislative agreement, which 
included the following:  
 General requirements: List of farmers considered ‘green by definition’ is only 
slightly extended as compared to the EC proposal: organic farms and those 
participating in the small farmers scheme are exempted. Farmers within Natura 2000 
areas or river basins covered by the water framework Directive (WFD) only need to 
comply with some greening measures. The penalty for non-compliance is the loss of 
the 30% greening component plus 25% extra penalty but phased in over time. This is 
in line with the proposal of the Council. Finally, it was decided that Pillar 2 agricultural 
land management payments must go beyond the greening requirements to avoid 
double funding, which is in line with the EC and EP proposal.  
 Crop diversification: Arable areas under 10 ha are exempted from crop 
diversification measures. In addition, some specific farms are exempted. Farms with 
arable areas of 10 to 30 hectares should plant at least two crops a year and those 
over 30 hectares must have at least 3 crops. Furthermore, the maximum area sown 
to a single crop should be 75%. For arable areas of more than 30 hectares, the 
maximum area sown to a two crops should be 95%. This is in line with the proposals 
of the EP (size thresholds) and the Council (size thresholds, percentages and 
exemptions).  
 Permanent grassland: Two types of obligations apply under this measure: (1)  
Farmers must not convert or plough permanent grassland in areas designated by 
Member States as being environmentally sensitive; (2) Member States have to ensure 
that the ratio of the land under permanent grassland does not decrease by more than 
5% at national, regional or subregional level (to be decided by member states) 
compared to the situation in 2015. This is line with what both Council and EP 
proposed.  
 EFA: 'Ecological Focus Areas' (EFAs) are set to cover 5% (excluding permanent 
grassland) in 2015, rising to 7% from 2018 and subject to review in 2017. Up to half 
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of EFA requirement may be met at the regional level by pooling commitments among 
groups of farmers and Member States would need to designate the areas and the 
obligations for farmers participating. The measure only applies to eligible areas of 
more than 15 hectares. In addition, some farms are exempted from the EFA 
requirements. In addition, Member States where over 50% of the land area is 
covered by forests, may choose not to apply the greening measures in Areas of 
Natural Constraint. Finally, the list of elements included in the EFA requirement has 
increased substantially. Overall, these points are in line with the proposal of the 
Council, but importantly it follows the EP proposal in removing permanent crops from 
the eligible land. 
6.4  MFF negotiations50 
The 2013 CAP reform process – and the EP’s influence on it – cannot be fully understood 
without taking into account the negotiations on the MFF 2014-2020, which began in June 
2011 with the EC’s first proposal on the budgetary ceilings for the coming period.  
 
Table 14: CAP budget allocation 2014-2020, in constant 2011 prices  
Main CAP instruments Budget allocation 
Total CAP budget 2014-2020  EUR 362.7 bn 
Pillar 1 – direct payments and market expenditure EUR 277.8 bn 
Pillar 2 – rural development EUR 84.9 bn  
Reserve for crisis in the agricultural sector (outside the MFF) EUR 2.8 bn 
Sources: European Parliament, the CAP after 2013, Factsheet Council Regulation No 1311/2013 of 2 December 
2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020. European Commission website: 
Multiannual financial framework 2014-2020 and the financing of the CAP. 
 
The link between CAP reforms and the EU budget has always been strong, but was made 
even stronger by a new set of policy priorities (the EU 2020 Strategy) and the wide-ranging 
fiscal austerity in Europe. In the context of the 2013 CAP reform, three important linkages 
between the two processes can be established (Matthews, 2014).  
Firstly, much of the impetus for the 2013 CAP reform was framed by the need to create a 
narrative to legitimise and defend the share of the CAP budget in the 2014-2020 MFF51. 
Secondly, another linkage was created in the negotiation phase of the CAP reform. 
Although the EP and the Council could, in theory, have negotiated on all the policy content 
of the CAP reform package without knowing the budget figures, politically, this was 
impossible. As such, the negotiations on the future of the CAP depended on those taking 
place on the future EU budget. The tight schedule of the final negotiating phase can be 
partly explained by this linkage: the EP plenary mandate and the Council general approach 
                                                 
50  This section draws on the analysis carried out in Matthews (2014). 
51  The fact that the CAP budget could not be taken for granted had been underlined by a leaked draft of an earlier 
Commission response to the budget review, which suggested that ‘[Future reform of the CAP] must stimulate a 
further significant reduction in the overall share of the EU budget devoted to agriculture, freeing up spending 
for new EU priorities’. The draft can be downloaded from the website of Le Groupe PAC 2013, 
http://www.pouruneautrepac.eu/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/draft-document-reforming-the-budget-oct-
2009.pdf-0. 
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were adopted following the European Council conclusions on the MFF in February 2013. A 
brief chronology of the two parallel negotiations is provided in Table 15 below. 
 
Table 15: The MFF and CAP reform negotiations – Chronology 2011-2013 
CAP reform negotiations MFF negotiations 
12 October 2011: EC legislative proposals on 
CAP reform  
8 June 2011: EP adopts the SURE report 
outlining its views on the next MFF52 
20 June 2011: EC MFF proposal 
23-24 January 2013: COMAGRI adopts its 
position on the CAP reform package 
13 June 2012: EP resolution on EC MFF proposal 
and 19 June 2012: Danish Presidency first draft 
of MFF negotiating box 
13 March 2013: EP adopts its negotiating 
mandate on the four regulations  
8 February 2013: European Council conclusions 
on the MFF 
19 March 2013: Council adopts its general 
position on CAP reform 
13 March 2013: EP adopts resolution 
responding to the European Council conclusions 
on the MFF 
11 April 2013: Launch of interinstitutional 
negotiations and trilogue meetings between 
the EP, the Council and the EC 
13 May 2013: informal MFF trilogues begin 
3 July 2013: EP adopts mandate to conclude 
MFF negotiations 
26-27 June 2013: Political agreement 
reached on the four CAP regulations  
23 September 2013: Council adapts its MFF 
mandate 
20 November 2013: EP approves the four 
CAP regulations  
19 November 2013: EP gives consent to MFF 
regulation 
16 December 2013: Council adopts the four 
CAP regulations 
2 December 2013: Council approves the MFF 
regulation 
Source: Matthews (2014) 
A third linkage was that the European Council’s conclusions on the MFF explicitly introduced 
a number of elements which the EP maintained should be decided under co-decision (see 
Box 10). This third linkage is particularly important to put the EP’s role and influence in the 
2013 CAP reform process into perspective. The Council’s ‘negotiating box’ and the 
European Council’s conclusions have been criticised for ‘hijacking’ certain CAP policy issues 
from the hands of the EP and the Agricultural Council. Did the inclusion of CAP-related 
issues in the MFF dossier weaken the EP’s influence on those particular issues?  
 
  
                                                 
52  SURE stands for ‘Special Committee on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Resources for a Sustainable European 
Union after 2013’. 
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Box 10: The negotiating box 
A contentious issue in this CAP reform process was the inclusion in the MFF negotiating box 
(under the responsibility of the General Affairs Council) of issues which would ultimately be 
incorporated into the new CAP regulations (to be decided by co-decision between the 
Parliament and the Council in its formation as the Agriculture Council). The MFF Regulation 
is adopted by the Council by unanimity after having obtained the consent of the European 
Parliament (the Parliament may approve or reject the Council’s position, but not adopt 
amendments). The sector-specific legal acts are subject to the ordinary legislative 
procedure (co-decision) which means that the Council and the EP decide together, and that 
the Council decides by qualified majority.  
The General Affairs Council had its first opportunity to debate the MFF ceiling for Heading 2 
Sustainable Growth: Natural Resources (which includes the CAP) at its April 2012 meeting. 
The Danish Presidency circulated a draft text for that section of the MFF negotiating box 
which covered the following issues (Council of the European Union, 2012c):   
 The overall level of commitment appropriations for Heading 2, as well as the ceiling for 
the sub-headings for market-related expenditure and direct payments (no figures are 
included at this stage) 
 Level and model for redistribution of direct support – details of the possible 
convergence model across Member States 
 Capping of support to large farms 
 The method for financial discipline 
 Other elements relating to Pillar I  
 Greening (EFAs in particular) 
 Flexibility between pillars 
 Principles for distribution of rural development support 
 Co-financing rates for rural development support   
These CAP-related issues remained as part of the text in successive drafts of the 
negotiating box up to the European Council conclusions on the MFF in February 2013. For a 
full overview of these issues – also called the ‘square bracket issues’ – and the 
comparison of the respective negotiating mandates, see Annex 4. 
The strategy of the Irish Presidency was to keep all these issues until the end, in order to 
agree on them as a package. This finally occurred during the trilogue meeting in September 
2013 under the Lithuanian Presidency.   
Source: Matthews (2014) 
 
The first linkage, between the direction chosen for this CAP reform and its role in 
maintaining the CAP’s share in the overall MFF, is an important issue for analysis, but lies 
outside the scope of this report as it does not concern the role of co-decision. Thus, this 
section focuses on the other two important ways in which the negotiations on the MFF 
affected the CAP reform negotiations in general, and the EP in particular: in determining 
the timing and in reducing the negotiators’ room for manoeuvre on certain specific 
elements.  
COMAGRI negotiators had claimed from the outset that the EP would only adopt its final 
position on CAP reform once the MFF ceilings had been decided, thereby formalising the 
link between the timing of the CAP reform negotiations and the MFF final agreement.  
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There is a view that this linkage may have delayed the start of the CAP reform trilogue 
negotiations53.   
Table 16: Impact of the EU budget, MFF negotiations, negotiating box  
Impact of the EU budget, MFF negotiations, negotiating box 
(Response rate = 73 %) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. The MFF negotiations pushed the EP to move faster on CAP reform 5 % 
B. The MFF negotiations slowed down the whole process 40 % 
C. The MFF negotiations dictated the content of the CAP reform and 
restricted the EP’s room for manoeuvre (e.g. via the European 
Council’s budget negotiating box) 
55 % 
When asked what impact the MFF negotiations had on the CAP reform, 40 % of 
respondents replied that they had slowed down the process and 55 % agreed that the MFF 
negotiations restricted the EP’s room for manoeuvre (at least on some elements of the 
reform), as shown in Table 16.   
While this seems to suggest that most found that this weakened the EP, the interview 
results are inconclusive as to whether this link actually strengthened or weakened the EP’s 
negotiating strategy. Some interviewees argued that once the figures were given, the EP 
had its back against the wall and was in a weaker position to refuse any deal that was on 
the table. Another argument is that, whilst a strong focus and emphasis was being put on 
the budgetary aspects, a lot of attention was removed from the actual policy content of the 
reform. On the other hand, some interviewees argued that the EP’s refusal to negotiate 
before the figures were known actually strengthened its strategy by giving it a more 
credible and consistent stance as co-legislator (the EP had indeed expressed in numerous 
reports its position in favour of a strong budget for the CAP).  
What is clearer is that the EP’s insistence that no serious CAP negotiations should begin 
until the budget figures were known worked in favour of those preferring a status quo 
position on the reform proposals, but to the disadvantage of those who sought a more 
radical change in the orientation of the CAP, for example, environmental groups seeking a 
greater focus on environmental public goods (Matthews, 2014). Once the MFF was adopted 
by the European Council and its overall size and ceilings accepted by the Parliament in 
early 2013, the threat of a budget cut no longer played a role in determining the outcome. 
Farm groups and status quo-minded Member States and MEPs could then focus their 
energy on weakening the ambition of the greening proposals by demanding much more 
flexibility without having to worry that this could lead to a further reduction in the CAP 
budget (Matthews, 2012a, 2012b). Environmental groups and reform-minded Member 
States and MEPS, on the other hand, had to argue their position without being able to wield 
the threat that the budget could be reduced if their proposals were not accepted. In fact, 
status quo-minded actors attempted to turn the argument around to suggest that the scale 
of the greening envisaged necessitated an even larger CAP budget.   
The third area of linkage, beyond the reform calendar, is whether the CAP-related issues 
included in the MFF agreement weakened the EP’s, but also the Council’s, negotiating 
                                                 
53  Although, as discussed above, there is no agreement as to how much time an earlier MFF agreement would 
have saved, given the other constraints the EP and the Council were under in finalising their respective 
positions. 
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position. Three questions are important here (Matthews, 2014). First, is there a meaningful 
distinction between the budgetary and the legislative aspects of the MFF agreement? 
Secondly, should the Council (and the European Council) refrain from pronouncing on 
legislative issues in their MFF deliberations? Thirdly, if the Council (and the European 
Council) does address legislative issues in its MFF deliberations, what is the status of its 
conclusions on legislative aspects when the Council and Parliament negotiate on the final 
legislation? 
At a formal level, the distinction between MFF budgetary and legislative aspects seems 
rather clear. Article 312 TFEU provides that the Council shall adopt a regulation laying down 
the MFF, specifically the amounts of the annual ceilings on commitment appropriations by 
category of expenditure and of the annual ceiling on payment appropriations. Thus, the 
budgetary aspects of the MFF are very limited, confined to setting annual ceilings at EU 
level for the MFF as a whole and for its major headings. All other matters belong formally to 
legislation adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure where the Parliament has equal 
status as co-legislator with the Council. 
However, at political level, such a distinction is much less clear. Given that the MFF is 
intended to reflect the political priorities of the Union, such fundamental decisions may 
require political support at the highest level, i.e. among the Heads of State. In the same 
way, it is hardly conceivable that MSs would agree to the overall ceilings without knowing 
the specific allocations they would receive under directly allocated programmes (such as 
cohesion funds, and the CAP Pillar 1 & 2 spending). In this light, the inclusion of CAP-
related sensitive issues in the Council’s negotiating box and the European Council’s MFF 
conclusions makes sense, from a political perspective. The important question is what 
status these conclusions should have in the subsequent CAP reform negotiations between 
the Council and the EP. In the negotiations just concluded, wherever the MFF conclusions 
had expressed a red line or an indication, the Council took the view that it had zero 
flexibility, thereby putting the EP in an impossible negotiation position. Many interviewees 
acknowledged the difficulty this had created for both the EP and the Council, describing the 
intervention of Heads of State in the legislative process on CAP reform as ‘pollution’, 
‘political reality’, or even ‘the biggest constraint on the EP’s influence’. As indicated in Table 
16, 55 % of respondents believed that the MFF negotiations dictated the content of (or at 
least some parts of) the CAP reform. At the end of the day, Heads of State showed that 
they could overrule their respective agricultural ministers and also to some extent the 
leading MEPs negotiating on the CAP54. 
This perceived ‘hijacking’ by Heads of State of certain key elements of the CAP reform led 
to what some interviewees described as a ‘take it or leave it deal’ from the Irish Presidency 
on the square bracket issues (in the Luxembourg trilogue meeting of June 2013). The 
Presidency made an offer to accept a minimum level of mandatory degressivity on large 
payments, in return for the Parliament’s agreement to take all other MFF issues off the 
table. In the event, the MFF issues were shelved until finally concluded under the 
Lithuanian Presidency, after the Council adopted a new mandate with concessions to the 
Parliament’s position on the issues of degressivity of large payments, the legislative 
treatment of the rural development allocations by Member State and higher co-financing 
rates for less developed regions, outermost regions and smaller Aegean islands.  
This was a noteworthy achievement of the EP in this context. Despite the pressure imposed 
by the MFF and the need to close the deal, the EP negotiators managed to win small 
                                                 
54  As one interviewee pointed out, MEPs have strong electoral ties with their national parties, which also 
inevitably put them in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the heads of national governments. 
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concessions from the Council on some of these square bracket issues. As the EP press 
release welcoming the agreement noted: ‘For Parliament, the key issue in this final 
negotiating phase was to ensure that policy content which should be legislated under co-
decision is not determined solely by heads of state’ (EP, COMAGRI press release, 2013e). 
Despite this achievement, many interviewees thought the EP could have been much 
tougher on this issue and achieved more.  
This is obviously an important issue for future negotiations, as it sets a precedent. The 
Presidency logic is that, because the MFF conclusions are adopted by unanimity by the 
European Council, they deserve to be ‘privileged’ in trilogue discussions. If this were the 
case, there would be an incentive for MSs which might fear that they may be outvoted on 
an issue in the regular Council to raise the issue at the level of the European Council, where 
adoption by unanimity could help them to strengthen their negotiating position on that 
issue. Arguably, this might explain the inclusion of some very specific conclusions on CAP 
issues in the February 2013 European Council conclusions (Matthews, 2014). Although, 
politically speaking, it may be very difficult for Parliament to unravel those aspects of the 
MFF which have obvious and direct financial implications for the Member States, on all 
other issues there is no reason why the EP’s role as co-legislator should not be fully 
respected. 
6.5  Market regulation  
The 2013 CAP reform negotiations took place just after the food price spikes of 2007-08 
and the milk crisis of 2009-10, which all took place in a context of economic turmoil in 
Europe. These events inevitably had an impact on the EC in drafting its own proposals, and 
we discuss here to what extent they may have had an impact on the EP when formulating 
its amendments and when negotiating on the CMO. 
 
Box 11: The main elements of the new CMO regulation 
The political agreement reached in the June agreement on the CMO can be summarised in two 
main principles: first, it confirms the market orientation of agriculture while increasing the 
bargaining power of farmers in the supply chain, and contributes towards a further market 
orientation of agriculture and farmer activities, in a context of increasing international pressure 
and competition; second, it preserves a minimum intervention safety net to protect farmers 
from the growing uncertainty and instability of the market. Concerning the last point, the 
instruments put forward in the CMO will work together with the direct payments of Pillar I and 
the instruments of risk management incorporated in the new Pillar II.   
With the objective of increasing market efficiency and to reinforce the role of farmers in the 
agri-food chain, the new regulation gives a central role to producers’ organisations (POs) 
and to inter-branch organisations (IBO), now extended to all agricultural sectors covered by 
the CMO55. There will be a reorganisation, with some (minor) changes, of the standard public 
(and private) market intervention instruments, and the creation of a crisis reserve of EUR 400m, 
funded by annually reducing direct payments. This reserve could be used by the Commission as 
market support measures in response to market disruption related to animal diseases and/or 
loss of consumer confidence due to animal or plant health issues.  
Source: Olper (2014). 
 
                                                 
55  However, there are specific regulations for contractual negotiations only for olive oil, beef & veal and arable 
crops. 
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The CMO was an important and controversial file which attracted a lot of attention, partly 
for the following reasons.  
Firstly, as has already been alluded to in Chapter 5, the CMO was one of the most 
contested files of the CAP reform package. The position of the EP on the CMO regulation 
was one of the most controversial across the four regulations related to the 2020 CAP 
reform. This emerged clearly from the EP votes taken on 13 March 2013 on the EP’s 
negotiating mandate on the CMO. This regulation was adopted with a narrow majority of 
EPP and S&D MEPs (55 % votes for, 41 % against), largely because many MEPs from 
Germany, also members of the EPP, voted against the text.   
Secondly, the proposals of the EP also attracted the attention of DG COMP, which saw in 
the EP’s ideas and amendments a threat to the completion of Article 39 TFEU, which 
defines the objectives of the CAP.  
Thirdly, the CMO regulation was also the file where most of the EP’s ‘innovative ideas’ were 
identified, although others might call these ideas ‘a return to instruments of the past’, as 
they largely concerned a reinforcement of market regulation mechanisms, whereas the CAP 
reform path of the past 30 years has been one of moving out of market regulation towards 
decoupled support.  
This is also what emerges from the analysis carried out by Olper (2014), who investigated 
in detail the EP position on the CMO and the voting behaviour of MEPs at the EP plenary 
session in March 2013. He finds, for example, that the COMAGRI position on the CMO 
(which was reflected to a very large extent in the EP negotiating mandate adopted in 
March) was influenced by the rapporteur’s defence of ‘agricultural exceptionalism’ and was 
in general more ‘interventionist’ than what the EC originally proposed. The justifications for 
the orientation taken by the EP can be found, for example, in the introduction to the 
explanatory statement of the rapporteur’s draft report:  
‘The ever growing world food demand, the relentless internationalisation of agricultural 
trade, the increasingly more visible effects of climate change, the structural rise in energy 
prices, and the gradual dwindling of water, biodiversity, arable land, and other natural 
resources: these upheavals are all transforming the context in which European agriculture 
now has to operate.’ (COMAGRI, Draft Report, 2011/0281). 
Matthews (2012d) describes the EP’s position as following two general rules: to reinforce 
the state assistance56 to farmers that operate in unstable and volatile markets, and to 
emphasise the legislative role of the EP with respect to both the EC and the Council. 
The interview results are inconclusive as to exactly how much influence the food and 
economic crises have had on the EP’s position on market regulation. One interviewee 
mentioned that these events made it clear that ‘agricultural markets needed stronger 
regulation’ and that they gave a strong justification to some proposals going in that 
direction. Other interviewees simply mentioned the scaling-up of agriculture on the overall 
policy agenda and that this also influenced to some extent the nature of the debate; food 
security concerns were indeed expressed throughout the reform and used by some actors 
to oppose the EFA in the greening component, for example57. Finally, some indicated that 
with respect to the risk management and market regulation tools to deal with food crises 
and the volatility of international commodity markets, there is little novelty, at least with 
respect to what has already been done in the last few years.  
                                                 
56  Understood as public support. 
57  Arguing that land shouldn’t be taken out of production. 
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6.6  Article 43(3) issues 
Amongst experts and interested observers of constitutional issues, the CMO file also 
became a topic for investigation because of Article 43(3) TFEU, which excludes a short list 
of issues from co-decision. According to some of the actors involved in the 2013 CAP 
reform, these issues became a symbol of how much influence the EP really had compared 
to the Council.  
Co-decision applies to all CAP-related issues, except for those enumerated in Article 43(3) 
TFEU: the measures relating to fixing prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations, and on 
the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities are to be legislated upon separately via a 
Regulation of the Council.  
Understanding and interpreting the scope of this exception has been a delicate matter. On 
the one hand, Article 43(3) implies that the acts adopted on this basis are no longer of a 
legislative nature but an executive one, and as such must be regarded as a limitation of the 
EP’s legislative powers. On the other hand, the four points listed in Article 43(3) cover 
many issues regulated by the CMO basic act, including issues at the very core of it, which 
means that they should in fact fall under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision).  
This precise question naturally came to the fore before the CAP reform negotiations started 
and triggered an important interinstitutional battle between the EP and the Council.  
Discussions on the legal basis of the CMO and whether Article 43(3) should apply or not 
were very tense. The issue therefore remained unresolved throughout the CAP reform 
process. This issue was brought up in the trilogue meetings on the CMO (amongst the 
negotiators, but also at technical level), but no common ground could be found and the 
issue was left for the final stages of the negotiations in Luxembourg58. 
In these last negotiations, the EP negotiators were faced with a ‘take it or leave it’ deal and 
were not in a strong position to block the whole agreement based on these issues only, 
given the high pressure to close the deal and the EP’s willingness to show that co-decision 
on the CAP could work. The Council ultimately agreed to keep the sugar quotas in the 
regulation which was negotiated under co-decision59, but the other aforementioned issues 
were left to be decided by the Council only, in a separate text. Annex 6 shows the evolution 
of the different institutional positions on these issues, from the original EC proposal to the 
final outcome agreed upon on 26 June 2013. 
Ultimately, two regulations were adopted which left neither of the institutions satisfied 
(mainly because of the increased complexity linked to the final outcome)60. To express their 
dissatisfaction with the solution that was found, the three institutions signed a declaration 
stating that the way the issue around Article 43(3) was resolved on this occasion does not 
pre-empt any future outcomes:  
‘The outcome of negotiations as concerns recourse to Article 43(3) TFUE is 
without prejudice to each institution’s position on the scope of this provision 
                                                 
58  Our interviews at the EP suggest that no real negotiations took place on the Article 43(3) issues until the last 
trilogue in June, mainly because of the Council’s refusal to negotiate on these points. 
59  To the detriment of Germany, which is said to have been vehemently against giving in on any of these issues. 
60  As explained by one interviewee, the result of this situation is that many articles of the CMO regulation 
(adopted by the EP) cannot be understood alone – they need to be read together with the corresponding 
Council regulation adopted under Article 43(3): Regulation 1308/2013 of the Parliament and the Council 
establishing the CMO, and Council Regulation 1370/2013 determining measures on fixing certain aids and 
refunds related to the CMO in agricultural products.   
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and to any future developments on this question, in particular in any new case 
law from the Court of Justice of the EU.’  
This episode is a clear illustration of the remaining limitations of co-decision on agriculture 
and indicates that the EP still cannot decide on everything on an equal footing with the 
Council.  
6.7 Summary of conclusions 
 The original reform calendar, i.e. the implementation of a new CAP by 1 January 
2014, can be considered as ‘unrealistic’, given the parallel MFF negotiations (and 
the commitment from both institutions to wait for the final budget figures to 
finalise the CAP reform agreement) and the natural duration of interinstitutional 
negotiations on a high-profile dossier such as the CAP. The internal EP process 
could have been slightly shorter (or more efficient) but it also enabled the EP 
negotiators to build a good work environment and trust.  
 The EP’s position on capping was ambiguous and contradictory throughout the 
process, not least because of the limitations imposed by the wording of the 
European Council conclusions of February 2013. The final result is far from the EP’s 
original intentions on capping.The EP influenced the decision on greening on 
specific issues.  Several of its amendments to the EC proposal were included in the 
final legislative agreement. Most of these amendments were supported by the 
Council. Compared to the Commission proposal, the EP wanted an extended list of 
farmers covered by  ‘green by definition’ and less areas to be included in EFAs; 
permanent grassland to be identified at the regional rather than individual level; 
the EP sided with the Commission against double funding; and wanted lower 
penalties for non-compliance with greening.  
 Regarding the impact of the parallel MFF negotiations on the EP’s influence on CAP 
reform: this was undoubtedly recognised as one the main constraints on co-
decision, as it restricted the EP’s room for manoeuvre on a number of key issues 
and set the overall framework within which the EP and the Council could negotiate. 
Given the current centre of gravity in the EU political system, it is ‘political reality’ 
that Heads of State and Government will want to legislate on certain highly 
sensitive issues with strong financial implications. However, the small 
achievements the EP managed to secure in the last trilogue meeting in September 
2013 have set a precedent and are indicative of the EP’s determination to ensure 
that co-decision rules are respected. 
 Regarding the impact of the food and economic crises on the EP’s market 
regulation positions under the CMO: there is evidence that the COMAGRI 
rapporteur used these external factors as justification for a stronger regulation of 
agricultural markets and more support to European farmers. The CMO file was one 
of the most complex and controversial files of the full CAP reform package, 
because of the competition issues it raised and because of the Article 43(3) issues.  
 The EP lost negotiations on most of the issues covered by Article 43(3) and it was 
decided that two regulations would be adopted which left neither of the institutions 
satisfied; they underlined that this episode does not pre-empt how these issues 
should be dealt with in the future.  
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7.  OVERALL ASSESSMENT: LESSONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
As a final phase of the analysis, we attempt to make an overall assessment of the EP’s 
performance in this first CAP reform under co-decision. This section draws on the interviews 
that were carried out for the purpose of this study. 
7.1  Overall performance of the EP 
The first observation which needs to be underlined is that, ultimately, co-decision 
“worked”; an agreement was reached and a new CAP will enter into force in 2015. This is 
one indicator to measure the EP’s success in fulfilling its mandate61, but it is not enough to 
fully assess the EP’s role and influence in the process.  
A second finding here is the average score which was given by the interviewees to the EP. 
At the end of the interviews62, when asked to give a grade (1-7)63, respondents gave 4.85 
on average, a fairly high mark. Not surprisingly, the EP interviewees attributed the highest 
grade to the EP (5.20) but Table 17 illustrates how the EP performance marks were 
relatively similar across the EU institutions, with the stakeholders’ and civil society’s 
response bringing down the average score. This indicates that, despite the constraints, 
problems, shortcomings and difficulties encountered during the process, the general 
appreciation of the EP’s participation in the process was quite positive and that the EP’s 
performance was seen as rather successful 
However, there were particular interviewees who perceived the EP performance as much 
worse.  The latter were expecting a better result on the environmental front of the reform.   
 
Table 17: Overall performance of the EP in its first CAP reform co-decision 
Overall performance of the EP in its first CAP reform 
(Score 1 (lowest) – 7 (highest)) 
(Response rate = 79%) 
Average Grade 
Average score (Response rate = 79%) 4.85 
A. Parliament interviewees (Response rate = 83%) 5.20 
B. Commission interviewees (Response rate = 71%) 4.70 
C. Council interviewees (Response rate = 50%) 5.00 
D. Stakeholders/Civil Society (Response rate = 100%) 2.50 
                                                 
61  Purely from a legislative point of view; the success in policy terms is of course subject to a more subjective 
appreciation 
62  When the interview allowed for this question to be asked at the end. 
63  These grades should not be considered in any way as official positions, just as personal assessments of the 
actors interviewed in the context of this study. 
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A third important element for this final assessment is the interviewees’ perception of the 
main impact of the EP on the overall process. Here, more than 70 % of respondents 
answered that it increased the accountability mechanisms on the CAP (and its democratic 
character), as indicated in Table 18. Apart from the natural increase in democracy linked to 
the participation of directly elected representatives, the main justification put forward to 
support this answer was the increased transparency of the process64 and the increased 
public scrutiny over the reform (co-decision increased the political accountability of 
COMAGRI members, who were therefore automatically subject to more criticism from the 
public).   
However, it should be noted that some interviewees selected this option by default and 
added a number of reservations and additional comments mostly on how much more 
accountable the process had really become. A related comment referred to the limitations 
imposed by the complexity of the reform. Many interviewees expressed concerns about the 
complexity of the legislation which had been adopted and the related difficulty to organise 
real scrutiny over it.  
 
Table 18: Assessing the impact of the EP’s role as co-legislator 
Overall assessment of the EP’s involvement as co-legislator 
(Response rate = 69%) 
Percentage of 
respondents 
A. Strengthened the accountability mechanisms on the CAP 72.5% 
B. Raised obstacles to reform 7.5% 
C. Made the decision-making more efficient 5 % 
D. Other 15 % 
 
Finally, some interviewees argued that, despite the increase in accountability and 
democracy, the EP’s involvement had reduced the chances of policy change, by raising new 
obstacles to reform.  
This was inherently linked to the existing political coalitions and majorities in the EP. The 
outcome might be different in future reform rounds with a different composition and 
membership within the EP (and COMAGRI in particular). This issue was discussed 
particularly in relation to greening, which came up in many interviews as the main symbol 
of the 2013 CAP reform, as a positive or a negative feature to be remembered.  
On the one hand, the novelty of greening and the attempt to further tie the CAP to 
environmental objectives was seen as a positive evolution. On the other hand, the watering 
down of the greening was also mentioned on numerous occasions as a negative feature of 
the reform. In this context, the increased flexibility and the numerous exemptions left for 
MS and farmers were also alluded to as a symbol of the 2013 CAP reform by interviewees 
who feared the ‘loss’ of commonness in the CAP that this reform created.  
                                                 
64  COMAGRI meetings where the proposals were debated and amended were open to the public; the attention of 
civil society actors and the public in general increased, and more documents could be circulated on a formal or 
informal basis. Plenary debates are also webstreamed. 
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7.2  Some lessons  
7.2.1  A decision was reached  
Despite the many constraints, obstacles and difficulties throughout the reform process, 
many interviewees underlined the ultimate achievement of the process, i.e. a deal was 
reached between the Council, the EC and the EP on the future of the CAP. For some 
interviewees, this was enough to argue that the EP faced up to its responsibilities and that, 
as a political actor, it played a key role to balance the more administrative influence of the 
two other institutions. 
The following elements of the decision-making process were put forward as examples of the 
success of this first co-decision experience on the CAP:  
 The increased participation of civil society. 
 A relatively good working environment within the EP negotiating team, but also 
between the respective institutional teams (although of course areas for improvement 
remain). 
 A stronger compromise culture linked to the increased number of amendments. 
 The relative success of the shadow meetings and trilogue meetings. 
 The high-level contacts put in place by the Irish Presidency during the negotiations. 
It is also obvious though that the achievement of reaching a final decision is only a partial 
success. There is certainly room for improvement. Issues for improvements that were often 
mentioned in the interviews were: 
 Changing the internal institutional machine to adapt it to the increase of power is 
much more difficult. 
 The EP is still the weakest of the three institutions, especially in negotiations on 
institutional issues such as Article 43(3), despite the formal increase in power. 
 It is a learning-by-doing process; it is just the beginning of a new way of reforming 
the CAP. 
 The game isn’t over until it is over: the political negotiations do not end with the 
political agreement, they go on until the delegated acts have been drawn up. 
7.2.2  The importance of individual contributions and leadership 
The important role played by individuals and personalities was emphasised in many 
interviews. The deal on CAP reform was only possible because of a particular mix of people, 
skills and capabilities. Simon Coveney was often cited as one of the “2013 CAP reform 
heroes”, for his personal contribution towards the process and the success of the Irish 
Presidency in closing the deal. Other interviewees highlighted the role played by the leading 
negotiators in the trilogue meetings and in particular the COMAGRI Chair and the 
Rapporteurs who, as individuals, engage the responsibility of the entire EP. Aside from the 
institutional level, a lot of credit was given to the staff supporting the respective negotiating 
teams and the parliamentary assistants of the key MEPs negotiating on the CAP. 
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Although the deal seemed impossible at the beginning, it was eventually reached because 
people were willing to work together towards a common objective. The constructive 
working atmosphere in the technical meetings was a point raised on numerous occasions in 
the interviews. Given the important role played by the individual negotiators and their 
respective staff, each institution should clearly ‘put their best people on the job’. 
7.2.3  Preparation, Communication and Compromise 
Another lesson to be learned from this first co-decision experience on the CAP was, 
according to many interviewees, the importance of investing a lot of time and effort in the 
preparatory phases of the reform, whether it be in order to understand the legislative 
proposals, to prepare a coherent position within the EP or, once the negotiations have 
started, to prepare each trilogue meeting.  
Here, the management and exchange of information, based on the trust between the key 
actors (in formal or informal settings), was seen as decisive. A lack of trust regarding the 
information that is being exchanged could flaw the process from the beginning. As 
summarised by one interviewee, ‘if the Parliament feels that the Council is in bed with the 
Commission or vice-versa, it won’t work’. To build confidence and trust, the lines of 
communication between the three institutions need to remain open.  
In this discussion on information-sharing and communication, the issue of resources was 
also alluded to. A lesson on this topic is that many actors involved in the reform recognised 
the lack of resources available to the EP to conduct an appropriate evidence-based scrutiny 
of the legislative proposals and thus to be a fully empowered co-legislator on all technical 
issues. Another lesson is that there was no agreement on the type or level of additional 
resources that would be needed, as many feared the transfer of power from MEPs to 
‘experts’, or simply acknowledged the political nature – as opposed to the administrative or 
technical nature - of the EP. 
7.3.  Recommendations 
The analysis for this study and report was carried out under tight time and resource 
constraints, preventing an extensive round of discussions on the recommendations.  
Another important point is the specific focus of the study, i.e. the evaluation not of the 
overall outcome of the CAP reforms but of the role of the EP in the co-decision process.  
These factors are important to keep in mind when considering our recommendations, which 
should be interpreted in this framework.  They should be considered as preliminary and 
rather as starting points to a broader discussion on the role of the EP and co-decision in 
CAP decision-making. A longer and more comprehensively developed list of 
recommendations would require more in-depth exchanges both within and outside the EP, 
with the actors and observers of the 2013 CAP reform, including stakeholders and civil 
society actors.  
Despite these constraints and with the specific objectives in mind, we have identified three 
points which may be considered as areas for improvement:  
 Adapting the EP’s resources to its new legislative role: remaining political 
while providing solid policy alternatives and not duplicating existing 
resources  
To reach this objective, a first step may be to attempt making better use of the 
already-existing resources and analyses provided by the EC and other bodies 
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(whether institutional or not). This would entail better communication and 
information channels between the EP and the EC and other relevant sources of 
analysis and expertise.  
Additional in-house expertise would be needed to apply this recommendation, 
particularly concerning the EP ability to carry out its own impact assessments, 
although increasing the number of ‘experts’ could lead to other problems, such as a 
technocratic drift in EU decision-making. To avoid this evolution, enhanced expertise 
could be drawn from the work of “project teams” composed of staff members of 
different existing departments in the EP: COMAGRI Secretariat, the Policy 
Department B and the new DG EPRS. These teams would be organised to deal with 
specific issues when major policy reforms take place. This would force the EP to 
make optimal use of its existing resources. Whatever the means of achieving this 
additional technical back-up, it should, in any case, not jeopardise the political 
nature of the EP and its ability to have an overview of the broad political issues at 
stake. This should remain a strong feature of the EP’s negotiation strategy.  
Furthermore, another concrete way to adapt the EP’s resources to its new legislative 
role would be to improve its ability to propose drafting alternatives to the EC 
legislative proposals. This would imply reinforcing the EP’s legal resources.  
Finally, given the role played by outside expertise in the EP’s legislative work, the EP 
may consider a better organisation and structure of its contacts with stakeholders 
and civil society actors. 
 
 Improving the inter-institutional working culture: new formal and informal 
arrangements 
To enhance the understanding and communication between the three institutions, 
the EP could be involved in a more prominent way in the very early stages of the 
CAP legislative proposals.  At this point, the EP could also consider taking a more 
pro-active stance, by adopting a clear and common position before the EC proposals 
are out. The lack of a strong, coherent vision on the EP side makes it easier for the 
two other institutions to impose their own visions. In the negotiating phase, informal 
and formal contacts should be intensified between the respective negotiating teams, 
which would also contribute to an improved inter-institutional working culture. Here 
as well, the EP could invest more time in the preparation of its negotiating priorities 
before entering the trilogues. In the last stages of the process, clear and formal 
arrangements should be foreseen to improve the working culture and negotiations 
on delegated acts. Finally, to embrace its new legislative role, the EP may consider 
using and embodying the “democratic accountability card”, i.e. being the only 
directly elected institution, more prominently on high-level legislative files such as 
the CAP. This may translate for example in its negotiating strategy towards the 
other institutions but also in its communication towards the public. 
 
 Standing firm on the EP’s new legislative prerogatives: lessons learned 
from the MFF-related and Article 43(3) issues 
Two episodes are worth highlighting here as examples of areas where the EP may 
want to improve its negotiating strategy and better defend its new co-decision 
powers. For example, the EP should invest time and energy to better understand 
and anticipate the link between the MFF negotiations and legislative files under co-
decision. The EP needs to make sure it has, from the outset, a strong and clear 
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position on any MFF-related issue, in order not to be forced into a deal at the very 
end of the process. At this stage, the pressure to reach an agreement is too strong 
for the EP to block the process on a handful of issues. The EP should stand firm on 
its prerogatives under co-decision and never allow the European Council to take over 
certain legislative issues over which it is co-legislator. In the same way, the EP 
should better anticipate institutional battles (such as the fight over the Article 43(3) 
issues) which limit its powers as co-legislator, for example by trying to move these 
up the EP’s political and institutional priorities. Finally, the EP could use highly 
contentious topics such as the MFF-related issues and the Article 43(3) issues as 
bargaining chips with the Council, for example by refusing to discuss one before 
achieving progress on the other. This may reinforce the EP’s negotiation strategy in 
future CAP reform rounds involving similar issues.  
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ANNEX I:  CO-DECISION AT A GLANCE – LEGISLATIVE 
PROCEDURE 
Co-decision is a complex procedure which may include several readings by the different 
institutional bodies. Figure 1 provides an overview of the procedure. 
1.  First reading (no time limit) 
The Commission, which takes the initiative in the legislative process, submits its legislative 
proposal simultaneously to the Council and to the EP for the first reading. After examining 
the proposals and having exploratory contacts and negotiations with the Council, the EP 
votes on the proposal in a plenary session. The Council can then: 
(a) Accept the outcome of the European Parliament’s first reading: 
In this case, the Council adopts the legislative act and the act is submitted for the signature 
of the Presidents and Secretaries-General of the European Parliament and the Council and 
published in the Official Journal. 
(b) Refuse to accept the outcome of the European Parliament’s first reading: 
In this case, the Council adopts a common position, which is sent to the EP together with a 
statement of reasons and any statements by the Council and/or the Commission made for 
the Council’s minutes. The Commission then informs Parliament fully of its position. The 
Council’s common position is the subject of the second reading by the EP.  
Besides this formal description of a first-reading agreement, there is now a dominant 
tendency for ‘trilogues’ to take place between the institutions to harmonise their positions 
before they are submitted for first-reading approval. 
2.  Second European Parliament reading (time limit: 3 months (+ a 1-month 
extension)) 
After receiving the Council’s common position, the EP has three (+one) months to complete 
the second reading and vote in a plenary session. It should be noted that if the EP does not 
vote on the common position within the time limit, the Council’s common position will be 
adopted. In order to prepare the vote in plenary session, a parliamentary committee 
(COMAGRI) examines the Council’s common position and formulates a recommendation, 
based on which the EP will vote in the plenary session. The outcome of the vote may lead 
to three different situations. The EP can: 
(a) Accept the Council’s common position: 
In this case, the act is adopted in accordance with the common position. Note that the 
Council no longer needs to adopt the act, and the act is submitted directly for the signature 
of the Presidents and Secretaries-General of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and published in the Official Journal. 
(b) Reject the Council’s common position: 
If the EP rejects the common position with a majority of votes, the procedure ends and the 
proposed act is then deemed not to have been adopted.  
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(c) Propose amendments to the common position: 
The EP can propose amendments to the common position based on a majority of votes in 
plenary. The outcome of the vote is notified to the Council and the Commission. The 
Commission should then provide an opinion on the proposed amendments.  
3.  Second Council reading (time limit: 3 months (+ a 1-month extension)): 
After examining the amendments provided by the EP, the Council can: 
(a) Accept the amendments: In this case, the act is adopted in the form of the common 
position including the amendments, and the act is submitted directly for the signature of 
the Presidents and Secretaries-General of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
published in the Official Journal. However, note that the Council must obtain a qualified 
majority or a unanimous vote (when the Commission provided a negative opinion) in order 
to accept the amendments.   
(b) Accept only certain amendments — convening of the Conciliation Committee: 
In this case, the President of the Council, in agreement with the President of the European 
Parliament, convenes the Conciliation Committee within a time limit of 6 (+ 2) weeks after 
the Council notes the impossibility of accepting all the amendments. 
4.  Conciliation (6 weeks (+ a 2-week extension)): 
The time limit for the work of the Conciliation Committee starts to run from its first 
meeting. Before that date, there are technical and negotiation contacts between the three 
institutions (the ‘trilogues’) to bring the positions closer. In the Conciliation Committee 
there are delegations from Parliament and from the Council, which each consist of 15 
members. In addition, the Commission, represented by the Commissioner responsible for 
the matter (DG AGRI for CAP reform), also takes part in the Conciliation Committee, and its 
main task is to bring the positions of the Council and the EP closer together. However, the 
Commission’s position has no influence on the majority rules for the adoption of the joint 
text by the Conciliation Committee: qualified majority or unanimity for some matters for 
the Council and majority for the EP. Note that if the Committee fails to approve the joint 
text within the time limit, the proposed act is deemed not to have been adopted. 
5.  Third European Parliament and Council reading (time limit: 6 (+ 2) weeks) 
If the Conciliation Committee approves a joint text, both the EP (with majority rule) and 
the Council (with qualified majority or unanimity for some matters) need to adopt the act 
within a time period of 6 (+ 2) weeks. If one of the two institutions fails to do so, the act is 
deemed not to have been adopted. If both institutions adopt the act within the time period, 
the act is adopted and is submitted directly for the signature of the Presidents and 
Secretaries-General of the European Parliament and of the Council and published in the 
Official Journal.  
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ANNEX II: KEY INSTITUTIONAL POSITIONS IN THE NEGOTIATION PHASE65 
Direct Payment 
 Measure Item EC 
position 
EP position Council 
position 
Final 
Regulation 
Coalition* Winner 
1 Financial 
discipline 
Threshold for 
application 
5.000 EUR 5.000 EUR 2.000 EUR 2.000 EUR EC=EP Council 
2 Active farmer Mandatory vs. 
Voluntary 
Mandatory Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory EC=EP EC=EP 
3 Redistributive 
payments 
Mandatory vs. 
Voluntary 
N/a Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary EP=Council EP=Council 
4 Redistributive 
payments 
Threshold for eligible 
ha 
N/a Up to 50 or 
average farm 
size 
Up to 30 or 
average farm 
size 
Up to 30 or 
average farm 
size 
No coalition Council 
5 Redistributive 
payments 
Threshold for funding 
(% of national 
average payment per 
ha) 
N/a N/a Max. 65% max. 65% No coalition Council 
6 Redistributive 
payments 
Maximum for annual 
national ceiling 
N/a Up to 30% Up to 30% up to 30% EP=Council EP=Council 
7 Support for 
young farmers 
Mandatory vs. 
Voluntary 
Mandatory Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory EC=EP EC=EP 
8 Support for 
young farmers 
Threshold for annual 
national ceiling 
Up to 2% 2% Up to 2% Up to 2% EC=Council EC=Council 
9 Support for 
young farmers 
Threshold for eligible 
ha 
Up to 25 or 
average farm 
size 
up to 100 Up to 25 or 
average farm 
size 
between 25-
90 
EC=Council EP 
10 Support for 
small farmers 
The scheme is 
mandatory vs. 
voluntary for MSs 
Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary EP=Council EP=Council 
11 Support for 
small farmers 
The scheme is 
mandatory vs. 
Voluntary for farmers 
Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary EC=Council EC=Council 
12 Support for 
small farmers 
Maximum of annual 
payment 
1.000 EUR 1.500 EUR 1.000 EUR 1.250 EC=Council Compromise, EP 
towards final 
                                                 
65  From Ferto and Kovacs (2014). 
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Direct Payment 
 Measure Item EC 
position 
EP position Council 
position 
Final 
Regulation 
Coalition* Winner 
outcome 
13 Support for 
small farmers 
Amount of annual 
payment as a 
percentage of the 
national average 
payment per 
beneficiary 
Up to 15% Up to 25% Up to 15% up to 25% EC=Council EP 
14 Support for 
small farmers 
Calculation of 
payment based on 
national average 
payment per ha 
Up to 3 ha Up to 5 ha Up to 3 ha Up to 5 ha EC=Council EP 
15 Support for 
small farmers 
Maximum annual 
national ceiling 
10% 15% 10% 10% EC=Council EC=Council 
16 Support for 
small farmers 
Application for SAPS No No Yes Yes EC=EP Council 
17 Greening Equivalence of 
national 
environmental 
certificates 
No No Yes Yes EC=EP Council 
18 Greening - 
Crop 
diversification 
Lower threshold for 
crop rotation 
3 ha 10 ha 10 ha 10 ha EP=Council EP=Council 
19 Greening - 
Crop 
diversification 
2 crops No 10-30 ha 10-30 ha 10-30 ha EP=Council EP=Council 
20 Greening - 
Crop 
diversification 
3 crops above 3 ha 30 ha 30 ha 30 ha EP=Council EP=Council 
21 Greening - 
Crop 
diversification 
Maximum threshold 
for one crop in term 
of arable land 
70% 80% 75% 75% No coalition Compromise, EP 
towards final 
outcome 
22 Greening - 
Permanent 
Grassland 
Level of 
application/calculatio
n of permanent 
grassland ratio 
At farm level national, 
regional or 
sub-regional 
level 
national, 
regional or 
sub-regional 
level 
national, 
regional or 
sub-regional 
level 
EP=Council EP=Council 
23 Greening - 
Permanent 
Permanent pasture 
part of permanent 
No Yes No Yes EC=Council EP 
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Direct Payment 
 Measure Item EC 
position 
EP position Council 
position 
Final 
Regulation 
Coalition* Winner 
Grassland grassland 
24 Greening - 
Ecological 
Focus Areas 
Threshold above 
which EFA applies 
0 ha 10 ha 15 ha 15 ha EP=Council EP=Council 
25 Greening - 
Ecological 
Focus Areas 
Percentage of 
farmland 
7% 3 %, up to 5% 
from 2016, up 
to 7% from 
2018 
5%, up to 7% 
from 2018 
5 %, 7% from 
2018 
No coalition Council, EP 
towards final 
outcome 
26 Internal 
Convergence 
Payment 
entitlements 
Uniform unit 
value have to 
be reached 
by 2019 
 Same as EC 
position but 
with possibility 
to deviate by 
20% from this 
value + 2019 
levels can’t be 
more than 
30% over 
2014 level 
Uniform unit 
value have to 
be reached by 
2019 + 
increase by 
1/3 for 
payments 
whose unit 
value in 2014 
is lower than 
90 % of the 
national or 
regional unit 
value 
All farmers 
below 90% of 
national 
average must 
get a payment 
increase of at 
least 1/3 of 
the difference 
of the current 
payment to 
the 90%. All 
farmers shall 
receive at 
least 60% of 
the national or 
regional 
average. 
Option for 
Member 
States to limit 
farmers’ 
"losses" to 
30%. 
No coalition EP 
 
27 External 
Convergence 
Convergence 
between MSs 
MSs with 
direct 
payments 
below the 
level of 90% 
of the 
average 
No MSs should 
receive less 
than 65% of 
the EU 
average. 
All MSs should 
reach at least 
196 EUR/ha by 
2020 
MSs shall 
attain at least 
a level of 196 
euros per ha 
by 2020 
No coalition Council, EP 
towards final 
outcome 
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Direct Payment 
 Measure Item EC 
position 
EP position Council 
position 
Final 
Regulation 
Coalition* Winner 
should close 
one third of 
the gap 
between 
their current 
level and this 
level by 
2020. 
28 Voluntary 
coupled 
support 
List of sectors Short list Long list Short list Short list EC=Council EC=Council 
29 Voluntary 
coupled 
support 
MSs applying more 
than 5% of their DP 
for coupled 
payments during at 
least one year 
between 2010-2013 
Up to 10% Up to 15% Up to 10% Up to 13% EC=Council Compromise, EP 
towards final 
outcome 
30 Voluntary 
coupled 
support 
MSs applying more 
than 10% of their DP 
for coupled 
payments during at 
least one year 
between 2010-2013 
No position No position more than 
10% 
more than 
13% 
EC=EP Other 
31 Voluntary 
coupled 
support 
MSs applying SAPS Up to 10% Up to 15% Up to 10% up to 13% EC=Council Compromise, EP 
towards final 
outcome 
32 Voluntary 
coupled 
support 
Other MSs Up to 5% Up to 15% Up to 5% up to 8% EC=Council Compromise, EP 
towards final 
outcome 
33 Voluntary 
coupled 
support 
Protein crops 0 Plus 3% Plus 2% Plus 2 % No coalition Council, EP 
towards final 
outcome 
34 Payment 
entitlements 
Reference year for 
BPS 
2011 2009, 2010 or 
2011 
2012, 2013, 
2014 
2014 No coalition Council 
35 Payment 
entitlements 
SAPS expiry 31/12/2013 31/12/2020 31/12/2020 31/12/2020 EP=Council EP=Council 
36 Capping and Mandatory vs. Mandatory Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory EC=EP EC=EP 
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Direct Payment 
 Measure Item EC 
position 
EP position Council 
position 
Final 
Regulation 
Coalition* Winner 
degressivity Voluntary 
37 Capping and 
degressivity 
Maximum (capping) 300.000 EUR 300.000 EUR No maximum No maximum EC=EP Council 
38 Capping and 
degressivity 
Degressivity 20-70% 20-70% Fix percentage 
set by the MSs 
at least 5% EC=EP Council 
39 Capping and 
degressivity 
Exemption No No Yes MSs using at 
least 5% of 
ANC on 
redistributive 
payments 
EC=EP Council 
40 Flexibility 
between pillars 
From P1 to P2 for 
above-average MSs 
(in terms of DP per 
ha) 
Up to 10% Up to 15% Up to 15% Up to 15% EP=Council EP=Council 
41 Flexibility 
between pillars 
From P1 to P2 for 
below-average MSs 
(in terms of DP per 
ha) 
Up to 10% Up to 15% Up to 15% Up to 15% EP=Council EP=Council 
42 Flexibility 
between pillars 
From P2 to P1 for 
above-average MSs 
0 0 Up to 15% Up to 15% EC=EP Council 
43 Flexibility 
between pillars 
From P2 to P1 for 
below-average MSs 
up to 5% up to 10% Up to 25% Up to 25% No coalition Council 
 
*Coalition = institutions with the same position 
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CMO Regulation 
 Measure Item EC 
position 
EP position Council 
position 
Final Regulation Coalition* Winner 
1 Export 
refunds 
Budget available  Not defined 
in the CMO 
EUR 0 Not defined 
in the CMO 
EUR 0 EC=Council EP 
2 Export 
refunds 
Serve as a crisis 
management 
instrument 
Not only Yes only Not only  Yes only  EC=Council EP 
3 Public 
intervention 
Products eligible Common 
wheat, 
barley, 
maize, 
paddy rice, 
beef, veal, 
butter, 
skimmed 
milk powder 
EC proposal + 
durum wheat, 
sorghum 
Common 
wheat, 
barley, 
maize, 
paddy rice, 
beef, veal, 
butter, 
skimmed 
milk powder 
Common wheat, durum 
wheat, barley, maize, 
paddy rice, beef, veal, 
butter, skimmed milk 
powder 
EC=Council Compromise, 
EP towards final 
outcome 
4 Public 
intervention 
Intervention 
period 
Varies by 
product 
Throughout the 
year 
Varies by 
product 
Varies by product EC=Council EC=Council 
5 Buying-in Measures on 
quantitative 
limitations 
part of the 
regulation 
part of the 
regulation 
not part of 
the 
regulation, 
defined later 
by the 
Council 
not part of the 
regulation, defined later 
by the Council 
EC=EP Council 
6 Private 
storage aid 
Products eligible Olive oil Olive oil and 
table olives 
Olive oil Olive oil EC=Council EC=Council 
7 Private 
storage aid 
Products eligible No cheese Cheese No cheese Cheese EC=Council EP 
8 Private 
storage aid 
Conditions for 
granting aid 
include 
Average 
recorded 
Union 
market 
price; 
reference 
prices for 
the products 
Average 
recorded Union 
market price; 
reference prices 
for the products; 
production 
costs; impact of 
market situation 
on producers' 
profit margin 
Average 
recorded 
Union 
market 
price; 
reference 
prices for 
the products 
Average recorded Union 
market price; reference 
thresholds and 
production costs; profit 
margins in the sector; 
EC=Council EP 
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CMO Regulation 
 Measure Item EC 
position 
EP position Council 
position 
Final Regulation Coalition* Winner 
9 School fruit 
Scheme 
Extended to 
vegetables 
No Yes No Yes EC=Council EP 
10 School fruit 
Scheme 
maximum aid per 
school year 
EUR 150 
million 
EUR 150 million No definite 
amount; 
shall be 
defined later 
by the 
Council 
No definite amount; 
shall be defined later by 
the Council 
EC=EP Council 
11 Aid in the 
fruit and 
vegetables 
sector 
Timeframe of 
operational fund 
Not defined 3-5 years Not defined Not defined EC=Council EP 
12 Aid in the 
fruit and 
vegetables 
sector 
Maximum 
expenditure for 
crisis prevention 
and management 
under the 
operational 
programme 
Less than 
one-third 
40% Less than 
one-third 
Less than one-third EC=Council EC=Council 
13 Aid in the 
fruit and 
vegetables 
sector 
Maximum Union 
financial 
assistance for 
associations of 
producer 
organisations in 
terms of the 
value of 
marketed 
products 
4,60% 5,00% 4,60% 4,70% EC=Council Compromise, 
EP towards final 
outcome 
14 Aid in the 
apiculture 
sector 
EU contribution to 
national 
apiculture 
programmes 
Max 50% Max 60% Equivalent to 
50% 
Equivalent to 50% No coalition Council, EP 
towards final 
outcome 
15 Sugar sector End of sugar 
quota system 
30/09/2015 end of the 
2019/2020 
marketing year 
30/09/2017 30/09/2017 No coalition Council, EP 
towards final 
outcome 
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CMO Regulation 
 Measure Item EC 
position 
EP position Council 
position 
Final Regulation Coalition* Winner 
16 Wine sector End of 
transitional wine 
planting right 
rights (WPR) 
 
+ set up of new 
vine authorization 
system 
End of WPR 
by 
31/12/2015 
with 
possibility 
for MSs to 
extend up to  
31/12/2018, 
no new 
system after 
End of WPR by 
the end of 
2029/3030 
marketing year 
End of WPR 
by 
31/12/2018 
+ set up of 
new vine 
authorization 
system from 
1/1/2019 to 
31/12/2024 
End of WPR by 
31/12/2015 + set up of 
new vine authorization 
system from 1/1/2016 
to 31/12/2030 
EP=Council 
 
EP=Council 
 
17 Producer 
Organisations 
Mandatory vs. 
Voluntary 
recognition 
Mandatory Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary EC=EP Council 
18 Producer 
Organisations 
Competition rules POs shall 
not hold a 
dominant 
market 
position 
POs can hold a 
dominant 
market position 
POs can hold 
a dominant 
market 
position 
POs can hold a 
dominant market 
position 
EP=Council EP=Council 
19 Producer 
Organisations 
Pre-requisite for 
the ratio of Non-
Annex I. products 
Not defined Non-Annex I. 
products shall 
not exceed 49% 
of the total 
volume 
marketed 
Not defined Non-Annex I. products 
shall not exceed 49% of 
the total volume 
marketed 
EC=Council EP 
20 Associations 
of producer 
organisations 
Mandatory vs. 
Voluntary 
recognition 
Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary EP=Council EP=Council 
21 Interbranch 
organisations 
Mandatory vs. 
Voluntary 
recognition 
Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary EP=Council EP=Council 
 
*Coalition = institutions with the same position 
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EAFRD Regulation 
 Measure Item EC position EP position Council 
position 
Final 
Regulation 
Coalition* Winner 
1 Ring-fencing 
for 
environmental 
payments 
Share of EAFRD and 
measures covered 
N/a  25% for agri-
environment 
and organic 
farming; 
30% for agri-
environment, 
organic 
farming, LFA, 
Forestry 
measures, 
Natura 2000 
payments, 
WFD 
payments in 
the 
Luxembourg 
compromise 
proposal 
0% initially, 
25% for agri-
environment, 
organic 
farming, LFA, 
Forestry 
measures, 
Natura 2000 
payments, 
WFD 
payments in 
the 
Luxembourg 
compromise 
proposal 
30% for: 
Agri-
environment; 
Organic 
farming; LFA; 
Forestry 
payments; 
Natura 2000 
payments; 
Environment-
related 
investment; 
EC=Council EP 
2 Greening 
under P1 and 
P2 
Double funding No double 
funding 
No double 
funding 
Explicitly 
allowing 
double 
funding 
No double 
funding 
EC=EP EC=EP 
3 Organic 
farming 
Double funding No exclusion 
of double 
funding 
No double 
funding 
No exclusion 
of double 
funding 
No double 
funding 
EC=Council EP 
4 National 
distribution of 
RD resources 
Annual breakdown by 
MSs 
implementing 
act 
Annex to 
EAFRD 
regulation 
Implementing 
act 
Annex to 
EAFRD 
regulation 
EC=Council EP 
5 National 
distribution of 
RD resources 
Adjustments due to 
inter-pillar transfers 
implementing 
act 
Delegated act Implementing 
act 
Delegated act EC=Council EP 
6 Support rates Investments in physical 
assets and investments 
in new forestry 
technologies - Aegean 
islands 
 
65% 75% 65% 75% EC=Council EP 
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EAFRD Regulation 
 Measure Item EC position EP position Council 
position 
Final 
Regulation 
Coalition* Winner 
7 Support rates LFA - mountain areas 300 EUR/ha 450 EUR/ha 300 EUR/ha 450 EUR/ha EC=Council EP 
8 Support rates Possibility to increase 
the support rates by 
20% under the 
‘Investments in physical 
assets, Agricultural 
sector’ measures 
Young 
farmers 
setting up; 
Collective 
investments 
and 
integrated 
projects; 
Areas facing 
natural 
constraints as 
referred to in 
Article 33.; 
Operations 
supported in 
the 
framework of 
the EIP; 
Young 
farmers 
setting up; 
Collective 
investments 
and 
integrated 
projects; 
Areas facing 
natural 
constraints 
as referred to 
in Article 33.; 
Operations 
supported in 
the 
framework of 
the EIP; 
Organic 
farmers, 
Natura 2000 
and WFD, 
Agri-
environment 
Young 
farmers 
setting up; 
Collective 
investments 
and 
integrated 
projects; 
Areas facing 
natural and 
other specific 
constraints as 
referred to in 
Article 33.; 
Operations 
supported in 
the 
framework of 
the EIP; 
Young 
farmers 
setting up; 
Collective 
investments 
and 
integrated 
projects; 
Areas facing 
natural and 
other specific 
constraints as 
referred to in 
Article 33.; 
Operations 
supported in 
the 
framework of 
the EIP; 
Organic 
farming, agri-
environment; 
EC=Council EP 
9 Fund 
contribution 
Percentage of eligible 
expenditure in less 
developed regions, 
outermost regions and 
Aegean islands 
85% 85% 75% 85% EC=EP Solely EP as this was 
the only results that 
differs from the 
European Council 
conclusions of 8 
February 2013 
10 Fund 
contribution 
Percentage of eligible 
expenditure in other 
regions 
 
50% 50% 53-75% 53-75% EC=EP Council 
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EAFRD Regulation 
 Measure Item EC position EP position Council 
position 
Final 
Regulation 
Coalition* Winner 
11 Fund 
contribution 
Agri-environment and 
climate measures 
50-85% 55-90% 75% 75% EC=Council, 
as the EC 
accepted 
the MFF 
conclusions 
of 8 
February 
2013 
 
EC=Council 
12 Fund 
contribution 
Operations receiving 
funding from funds 
transferred to EAFRD 
from P1 
50-85% 95% (MSs 
receiving FA) 
100% 100% EC=Council, 
as the EC 
accepted 
the MFF 
conclusions 
of 8 
February 
2013 
 
EC=Council 
13 Areas facing 
significant 
natural 
constraints 
Eligibility threshold in 
terms of UAA 
66%  EC was 
asked to 
table new 
delimitation 
by 
31/12/2014 
60% 60% EC=Council EC=Council 
14 Areas facing 
significant 
natural 
constraints 
Number of criteria to be 
fulfilled 
at least 1 EC was asked 
to table new 
delimitation 
by 
31/12/2014 
 
At least one at least 1 EC=Council EC=Council 
15 Areas facing 
significant 
natural 
constraints 
Percentage that criteria 
shall be fulfilled 
100% EC was asked 
to table new 
delimitation 
by 
31/12/2014 
 
 
1 for 100% or 
2 for 90% 
100% No coalition EC 
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EAFRD Regulation 
 Measure Item EC position EP position Council 
position 
Final 
Regulation 
Coalition* Winner 
16 Areas facing 
significant 
natural 
constraints 
Deadline for new 
delimitation 
No position 31/12/2014 No position 2018 EC=Council EP, policy outcome 
towards EP’s position 
17 Producer 
groups 
Eligible activity Setting up 
the PG 
Setting up 
and 
development 
of PG 
Setting up 
the PG 
Setting up 
the PG 
EC=Council EC=Council 
18 Young farmers Definition, eligible 
person 
Less than 40 
years of age 
40 years of 
age or less 
Less than 40 
years of age 
No more than 
40 years of 
age 
EC=Council EP 
19 Afforestation 
and creation 
of woodland 
Maximum period of 
support 
10 years 15 years 15 years 12 years EP=Council Compromise, EP 
position towards 
outcome 
20 Establishment 
of 
agroforestry 
systems 
Maximum period to 
cover the costs of 
maintenance 
3 years 5 years 5 years 5 years EP=Council EP=Council 
21 Animal 
welfare 
payments 
Commitment period 1 year 1-7 years 1 year 1-7 years EC=Council EP 
22 Investments 
in irrigation 
Eligibility of new 
irrigation installations 
Only in new 
MSs 
In all MSs In all MSs Compromise 
between the 
three 
institutions 
 
EP=Council Other 
 
*Coalition = institutions with the same position 
 
 
 
Horizontal Regulation 
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*Coalition = institutions with the same position 
  Measure Item EC position EP position 
Council 
position 
Final Regulation Coalition* Winner 
1 
General 
provisions 
No double funding 
for environmental 
obligations both 
under P1 and P2 
No double 
funding 
No double 
funding 
Double funding 
is possible for 
agri-
environment 
and organic 
farming 
No double funding EC=EP EC=EP 
2 
Transparency, 
publication of 
beneficiaries 
Threshold, under 
which beneficiaries 
are exempted 
Yes, equal to 
the amount of 
the SFS 
 
No   
Yes, equal to 
the amount of 
the SFS 
 
Yes, equal to the 
amount of the SFS 
or 1250 Euro if SFS 
not applied in the 
MS 
 
EC=Council 
EC=Council 
 
3 
Paying 
Agencies 
Number of PA 
1 per MS or 1 
per region / 
type of 
support 
(reduction 
relative to 
status quo) 
1 per MS or 1 
per region 
(even 
stronger 
reduction 
relative to 
status quo) 
Restrict to the 
necessary 
minimum 
(allows increase 
relative to 
status quo)  
 
1 per MS or per 
region/type of 
support, with 
derogation to keep 
existing paying 
agencies (confirms 
status quo, but 
limits further 
increase) 
EC=EP 
 
Other, 
compromise close 
to the Council 
position, but no 
absolute victory 
4 
Cross-
compliance 
Water Framework 
Directive 
Yes  No No No EP=Council EP=Council 
5 
Cross-
compliance 
Pesticide Directive Yes No No No EP=Council EP=Council 
6 
Cross-
compliance 
GAEC 7 
 
GAEC 7 
included 
Deletion of 
GAEC 7 
Deletion of 
GAEC 7 
Deletion of GAEC 7 EP=Council EP=Council 
7 Penalties 
Penalty for non-
compliance with 
the greening 
requirements (%, 
additional to the 
30% greening 
payment) 
No limit 
(unlimited 
reduction of 
basic 
payment 
possible) 
 
0%  
(reduction of 
basic 
payment not 
possible at 
all) 
Max. 25% 
(limited 
reduction of 
basic payment 
possible) 
Limited reduction 
of basic payment 
possible: 0% in the 
first two years, 
20% for the third 
year, 25% from 
the 4th year 
No 
coalition 
EP=Council (Both 
positions well 
reflected in the 
final outcome, 
with smooth 
transition over 
time from one to 
the other) 
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ANNEX III:  COMPARISON OF THE NEGOTIATING MANDATES AND FINAL OUTCOME ON 
GREENING66 
Measure EC proposal EP position  
(April 2013) 
Council position  
(April 2013) 
Regulation 1307/2013 
(December 2013) 
Influence 
over outcome 
General 
Requirements 
All farms must 
comply with 
greening 
requirements 
All farms must comply 
with greening 
requirements 
Farms involved in relevant 
Pillar Two agri-environment 
schemes would be exempt 
from one or more of the 
requirements.  
Green practices apply to the 
whole eligible area of the 
holding.  
Exemptions 
moved to 
individual 
measures.  
Green by Definition 
= Organic  
Farms comprising at 
least 75% permanent 
grassland qualify as 
'green by definition' 
Farms with at least 75% of 
land enrolled in a nationally 
or regionally-certified 
environment scheme would 
be exempt from greening.  
Green by Definition - land being 
farmed organically and those 
participating in the small farmers 
scheme (in countries where this 
is offered).   
General 
requirements 
remain similar to 
Commission’s 
original proposal 
Land managers 
farming land within 
Natura 2000 areas 
are only required to 
comply with the 
greening measures 
insofar as these are 
compatible with the 
requirements of 
these areas 
  
Holdings with more than 
75% covered by grassland 
or cultivated with 
leguminous crops also 
exempt.  
Land managers farming land 
within Natura 2000 sites or river 
basins covered by the water 
framework Directive (WFD) are 
only required to comply with the 
greening measures insofar as 
these are compatible with the 
requirements set under the birds, 
habitats or water framework 
Directives. 
  
P2 agri-environment 
conditions must go 
beyond EFA baseline 
P2 agri-environment 
conditions must go 
beyond greening 
measures  
Greening requirements not 
included in P2 baseline.  
Pillar 2 agricultural land 
management payments must go 
beyond the greening 
requirements to avoid double 
funding 
EP 
Member States to have 
‘clearly defined flexibility on 
choice of equivalent 
greening measures’  
                                                 
66  From Hart (2014). 
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Measure EC proposal EP position  
(April 2013) 
Council position  
(April 2013) 
Regulation 1307/2013 
(December 2013) 
Influence 
over outcome 
 
Penalty for non-
compliance = loss of the 
30% greening 
component  
Penalty for non-compliance 
= loss of the 30% greening 
component plus 25% extra 
penalty (i.e. 37.5% of 
overall entitlement lost)  
Penalty for non-compliance = 
loss of the 30% greening 
component plus 25% extra 
penalty but phased in over time. 
Council 
Crop 
diversification 
3 different crops to 
be grown on arable 
land over 3 ha.  
Farms with arable areas 
of 10-30 hectares must 
plant at least two crops a 
year and those over 30 
ha must have at least 3 
crops (except holdings 
north of 62 parallel) 
Farms with arable areas of 
10-30 ha must plant at 
least two different crops 
and those with arable areas 
> 30ha would have to 
cultivate at least three 
crops. 
Farms with 10 - 30 ha of arable 
land are required to have a 
minimum of two crops.   
EP/Council 
Farms with more than 30 ha are 
required to have a minimum of 
three crops 
 
Arable areas < 3 ha 
= exempt 
Arable areas under 10ha 
= exempt 
Arable areas under 10 ha = 
exempt.  
Only applicable on arable areas 
of holdings over 10 ha 
EP/Council  
– thresholds 
Other exemptions are: 
These rules do not apply to 
holdings: 
Council – further 
exemptions 
- Where 75% of eligible 
area is grassland or 
cultivated with crops under 
water 
- Where > 75% of arable land is 
used for the production of 
grasses or other herbaceous 
forage, land laying fallow, or 
subject to a combination of these 
uses, provided the arable area 
not covered by these uses does 
not exceed 30 ha.  
  
- where > 50% arable land 
is interchanged with other 
farmers annually 
- Where > 75% of the eligible 
agricultural area is permanent 
grassland, used for the 
production of grasses or other 
herbaceous forage or crops under 
water or a combination of these 
uses, provided the arable are not 
covered by these uses does not 
exceed 30 ha.  
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Measure EC proposal EP position  
(April 2013) 
Council position  
(April 2013) 
Regulation 1307/2013 
(December 2013) 
Influence 
over outcome 
- Where 75% eligible area 
is under equivalent 
practices under agri-envl 
agreement 
- Where > 50%  areas under 
arable land declared were not 
declared by the farmer in his aid 
application of the previous year 
and , where based on a 
comparison of the geo-spatial aid 
applications, all arable land is 
being cultivated with a different 
crop compared to that of the 
previous calendar year 
 
  
- Where > 75% of arable 
land is used to produce 
grass, is fallow, cultivated 
with leguminous crops or a 
combination of these 
- that are situated in areas north 
of 62nd parallel or certain 
adjacent areas.  In these areas, 
where the arable land is >10 ha, 
2 crops are required to be 
cultivated.  Neither of these can 
cover more than 75% of the 
arable areas with the exception 
of when the main crop is grass or 
other herbaceous forage or land 
laying fallow 
 
  
None of the three 
crops shall cover 
less than 5 % of the 
arable land and the 
main one shall not 
exceed 70 % of the 
arable land 
For arable areas 10-30 
ha: maximum area to be 
sown to a single crop = 
80%.  
For arable areas 10-30 ha: 
maximum area to be sown 
to main crop = 75% 
- Where the arable area is 10-30 
ha (and not entirely cultivated 
with crops under water for a 
significant part of the year, at 
least two different crops must be 
grown and maximum area to be 
sown to main crop = 75% Council 
For arable areas > 30 ha 
- Maximum to be sown to 
a single crop is 75% and 
two crops = 95% 
For arable areas > 30 ha - 
Maximum to be sown to a 
single crop is 75% and two 
crops = 95% 
- Where the arable area > 30ha 
at least three crops must be 
cultivated and Maximum to be 
sown to a single crop is 75% and 
two crops = 95% 
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Measure EC proposal EP position  
(April 2013) 
Council position  
(April 2013) 
Regulation 1307/2013 
(December 2013) 
Influence 
over outcome 
Permanent 
grassland 
Maintain 95 % of 
the area of 
permanent 
grassland on the 
holding as declared 
in 2014  
Ratio of permanent 
grassland/pasture (in 
2014) to total UAA 
(reference area) is 
maintained – to be 
applied at national, 
regional or sub-regional 
level 
Farmers must maintain area 
of permanent grassland as 
declared in 2014 
Two types of obligation apply 
under this measure: 
EP / council  
    
- Farmers must not convert or 
plough permanent grassland in 
areas designated by Member 
States as being environmentally 
sensitive.  Member States are 
required to designate permanent 
grassland, peatlands and 
wetlands deemed to be 
environmentally sensitive within 
Natura 2000 areas and have the 
option of designating further 
areas outside N2K areas, 
including permanent grassland 
on carbon rich soils 
  
5% conversion of the 
reference area is 
permitted except carbon 
rich soils, wetlands and 
semi-natural grasslands 
and pastures 
Member States can choose 
not to apply requirement if 
in 2012 the ratio of 
permanent grass: total UAA 
has not decreased or 
decreased < 5% in relation 
to reference ratio (as set 
under current regulations). 
If so, they must ensure 
ratio is maintained 
- Member States have to ensure 
that the ratio of the land under 
permanent grassland does not 
decrease by more than 5% at 
national, regional or sub-regional 
level (to be decided by member 
states) compared to the situation 
in 2015. 
EP for enabling 
the introduction 
of the voluntary 
protection of 
carbon rich 
grasslands 
  
If monitoring systems are in 
place for PG, an alternative 
system can be 
implemented, with different 
requirements on farmers 
depending on annual 
change in reference ratio. 
If it does, Member States must 
require land to be converted back 
to permanent pasture through 
placing obligations on farmers to 
do so.  
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Measure EC proposal EP position  
(April 2013) 
Council position  
(April 2013) 
Regulation 1307/2013 
(December 2013) 
Influence 
over outcome 
  
The exception to this is where 
the decrease below the threshold 
results from afforestation, 
provided such afforestation is 
compatible with the environment 
and does not include plantations 
of short rotation coppice 
Christmas trees or fast growing 
trees for energy production. 
  
Ecological 
Focus Area 
7 % of the holding 
(excluding 
permanent 
grassland) must be 
managed as 
ecological focus 
areas 
'Ecological Focus Areas' 
(EFAs) to cover 3% 
(excluding permanent 
pasture and permanent 
crops) in 2014, rising to 
5% from 2016 – further 
increases subject to 
review 
'Ecological Focus Areas' 
(EFAs) to cover 5% 
(excluding permanent 
grassland) in 2015, rising to 
7% from 2018 pending 
review 
'Ecological Focus Areas' (EFAs) to 
cover 5% of the arable area from  
2015, rising to 7% from 2018 if 
deemed necessary subject to a  
review in 2017 
Council in 
general 
Only applies to eligible 
areas > 10 ha 
Up to half of EFA 
requirement may be met by 
pooling commitments 
among groups of farmers  
Up to half of EFA requirement 
may be met at the regional level 
by pooling commitments among 
groups of farmers - Member 
States would need to designate 
the areas and the obligations for 
farmers participating.  The aim of 
the designation and obligations 
shall be to underpin the 
implementation of Union policies 
on the environment, climate and 
biodiversity. 
But EP won 
argument to 
remove 
permanent crops 
from eligible 
land. 
  
Only applies to eligible 
areas > 15 ha 
    
    Applies to arable areas > 15 ha   
  
The following farms are 
exempt: 
    
  
- >75% eligible area is 
grassland , cultivated with 
crops under water or a 
combination; 
The obligations do not apply to 
the following: 
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Measure EC proposal EP position  
(April 2013) 
Council position  
(April 2013) 
Regulation 1307/2013 
(December 2013) 
Influence 
over outcome 
  
- > 75% of arable area is 
entirely used for grass or 
other herbaceous forage, 
land laying fallow, 
cultivated with leguminous 
crops, or subject to a 
combination of these uses; 
- holdings where>75% of the 
eligible agricultural area is 
permanent grassland, used for 
the production of grasses or 
other herbaceous forage or 
cultivated with crops either under 
water for a significant part of the 
year or for a significant part of 
the crop cycle or a combination 
of those uses, provided the 
arable area not covered by these 
uses does not exceed 30 ha. 
  
  
- Areas where ratio of forest 
to farmland is at least 3:1.  
- holdings where >75% eligible 
area is entirely used for 
production of grass or other 
herbaceous forage, land laying 
fallow, cultivated with 
leguminous crops, or subject to a 
combination of these uses, 
provided the arable area not 
covered by these uses does not 
exceed 30 ha. 
  
    
In addition, Member States 
where over 50% of the land area 
is covered by forests, may 
choose not to apply the greening 
measures in Areas of Natural 
Constraint as defined under the 
rules set out in rural 
development policy provided 
certain conditions are met in 
relation to the rate of forest land 
to agricultural land in the ANC 
unit. 
 
  
The EFA can be 
made up of different 
elements, including:  
- Land left fallow 
The EFA can comprise: 
- land left fallow 
- terraces 
- landscape features 
The EFA can comprise (NB: 
weighting factors are 
proposed – to be 
developed): 
The EFA can comprise (NB: 
weighting factors to be 
determined in delegated acts): 
-  land laying fallow; 
EP/Council 
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Measure EC proposal EP position  
(April 2013) 
Council position  
(April 2013) 
Regulation 1307/2013 
(December 2013) 
Influence 
over outcome 
- Terraces 
- Landscape 
features, eg 
hedges; ponds; 
ditches; trees in a 
line, in a group or 
isolated; field 
margins; 
- Buffer strips 
– with no production 
on them; 
- Areas afforested 
with funding from 
EAFRD 
including hedgerows, 
ditches, stonewalls, in 
field trees and ponds, 
- land planted with 
nitrogen-fixing crops, 
- buffer strips 
- areas afforested under 
EAFRD 
- land laying fallow 
- terraces 
- landscape features, 
including features situated 
in an area contiguous to an 
eligible parcel; 
- buffer strips without 
fertilisation and pesticides 
including buffer strips 
covered by permanent 
grassland which may be 
grazed and/or cut; 
- agro-forestry as defined 
within EAFRD 
- areas of permanent crops 
with more than 20 but less 
than 250 trees per hectare; 
- strips of eligible hectares 
along forest 
- areas under agri-
environment agreements, 
established as equivalent 
practices 
- areas of permanent crops 
on slopes > 10% gradient 
- areas with short rotation 
coppice 
- areas afforested under 
EAFRD 
- areas with catch crops or 
green cover (subject to the 
application of weighting 
factors) 
- nitrogen fixing crops 
- terraces 
- landscape features, including 
those adjacent to eligible 
agricultural areas covered by 
arable land; 
- buffer strips including those 
covered by permanent grassland; 
- agro-forestry as supported 
under EAFRD; 
- strips of land along forest edges 
without cultivation; 
- short rotation coppice; 
- areas afforested under EAFRD; 
- areas with catch crops or green 
cover established by the planting 
and germination of seeds; 
- nitrogen fixing crops. 
 
 Production is permitted 
but without use of 
fertilisers or pesticides 
  
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 136 
The first CAP reform under the ordinary legislative procedure: a political economy perspective 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 137 
ANNEX IV:  CAP-RELATED ISSUES IN THE MFF67 
Issue EP mandate Council mandate EP proposed landing zone Outcome 
National 
ceilings for 
direct 
payments (DP 
Recital 21 and 
Annex 2) 
100% (rather than 90%) of 
the EU average used as the 
reference point, so that: 
In MS with a current level of 
direct payments per hectare 
that is below 70% of the EU 
average, that shortfall is 
reduced by 30%, 
In MS with a level of direct 
payments between 70% 
and 80% of the average, 
the shortfall should be 
reduced by 25%, 
In those MS where the level 
is more than 
All MS with direct payments per hectare 
below 90% of the EU average close one 
third of the gap between their current 
direct payments level and 90% of the EU 
average, while all MS attain at least the 
level of €196/hectare in current prices 
by 2020. All MS with direct payments 
above the EU average to finance the 
redistribution proportionally to their 
distance from the EU average payment 
level, with the process of convergence 
phased over 6 years up until financial 
year 2020. 
EP prepared to accept 
Council position in return for 
wider flexibility on the other 
EP priority issues 
Council position adopted. 
* Progressive 
reduction and 
capping of 
direct 
payments (DP 
Art. 11) 
Agrees with COM proposal 
(four mandatory tranches: 
20% between €150-200K, 
40% between €200-250K, 
70% between €250-300K 
and absolute cap over 
€300K, with exemption for 
cooperatives and deduction 
for contractors’ charges 
European Council original mandate was 
that capping of direct payments for large 
beneficiaries will be introduced by MS on 
voluntary basis. 
 
(Based on 25 June 2013 mandate) 
Mandatory degressivity reduction of 5% 
on amounts over €150K, with possible 
derogation for those using more than 
5% of national ceiling for redistributive 
payments 
Mandatory degressivity 
reduction of at least 15% on 
amounts over €150K and 
reduction of at least 25% 
over €300K, with possible 
derogation for those using 
more than 15% of national 
ceiling for redistributive 
payments. 
  
Wanted explicit recognition in 
the final text that these 
percentages are minima, 
with the option, on a 
voluntary basis, to apply 
higher percentage 
reductions, or additional 
Direct payments reduced by 
at least 5% for the part of 
the amount exceeding 
€150,000, after subtracting 
salaries if MS wants. Where 
a MS uses more than 5 % 
of its national ceiling for the 
redistributive payment, it 
may decide not to apply this 
reduction.  
                                                 
67  From Matthews (2014). 
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Issue EP mandate Council mandate EP proposed landing zone Outcome 
tranches, up to 100% 
Flexibility 
between Pillars 
(DP Article 
14(2)) 
 
* Transfer from 
P2 to P1 
 
Transfer from 
P1 to P2 
Agreed with Commission 
proposal for  
 
Proposed up to 15% transfer 
possible from direct payment 
ceilings to rural development 
15% transfer possible for those MS with 
lower than average per hectare direct 
payments and 15% for those with above 
average payments 
15% transfer possible for 
those MS with lower than 
average per hectare direct 
payments (with special 
dispensation to go above this 
limit in duly justified cases) 
and 10% for those with 
above average payments. 
MS can transfer up to 15% 
of their direct payments 
ceiling to rural 
development. 
MS can transfer up to 15%, 
or in the case of named MS 
with below average per 
hectare payments, up to 
25%, of their rural 
development money to 
direct payments 
* Cofinancing 
rates (RD Art 
65 (COM) Art 
59 (final) 
85% for less developed 
regions, outermost regions 
and smaller Aegean islands 
75% for less developed regions, 
outermost regions and smaller Aegean 
islands 
85% for less developed 
regions, outermost regions 
and smaller Aegean islands 
85% for less developed 
regions, outermost regions 
and smaller Aegean islands 
  75% for all regions whose GDP per 
capita for the 2007-2013 period was less 
than 75% of the average of the EU-25 
but whose GDP per capita is above 75% 
of the GDP average of the EU-27 
Acceptance of Council 
position (i.e. 75%) 
75% for all regions whose 
GDP per capita for the 
2007-2013 period was less 
than 75% of the average of 
the EU-25 but whose GDP 
per capita is above 75% of 
the GDP average of the EU-
27 
  63% for the other transition regions Acceptance of Council 
position (i.e. 63%) 
63% for the other transition 
regions 
 50% for other regions (as 
COM proposal) 
53% for other regions 50% for other regions 53% for other regions 
 80% for Art 
15/28/36/20(1)a(i) 
80% for Art 15/28/36/20(1)a(i) Joint agreement on 80% 80% for Art 
14/27/35/19(a)(i). May be 
increased to a maximum of 
90 % for the programmes 
of less developed regions, 
outermost regions, the 
smaller Aegean islands and 
transition regions  
 55% for agri-environment-
climate measures under Art 
29 
75% for agri-environment-climate 
actions under Art 
18/23/24/29/30/31(3)/31(4)/32/35 
Acceptance of Council 
position (i.e. 75%) 
75% for agri-environment-
climate actions under Art 
17/ 21(1) 
The first CAP reform under the ordinary legislative procedure: a political economy perspective 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 139 
Issue EP mandate Council mandate EP proposed landing zone Outcome 
a+b/28/29/30/31/34 
 50% (i.e. standard rate) for 
all funds transferred from 
Pillar 1, except for special 
95% provision for MS under 
financial assistance for 
transfers under DP Art 14/1) 
flexibility 
100% for all funds transferred from Pillar 
1 (with other exemptions from national 
cofinancing requirements associated with 
discrete allocations for MS under 
financial assistance) 
Acceptance of Council 
position (i.e. 100%) 
100% for all funds 
transferred from Pillar 1 
(with other exemptions 
from national co-financing 
requirements associated 
with discrete allocations for 
MS under financial 
assistance) 
  Higher co-financing rate (by 10 
percentage points) can be applied when 
MS receives financial assistance, subject 
to reassessment in 2016  
Acceptance of Council 
position (i.e. higher co-
financing rate for MS in 
receipt of financial 
assistance) 
Higher co-financing rate (by 
10 percentage points) can 
be applied when MS 
receives financial 
assistance, subject to 
reassessment in 2016  
* Annual 
breakdown of 
EAFRD budget 
by member 
state (RD COM 
Article 64) (RD 
final Art 58) 
80% for Art 
15/28/36/20(1)a(i) 
2013 allocations used as 
basis for table acting as 
placeholder to demonstrate 
desire to have breakdowns 
included as an annex to 
Basic Act (instead of an 
implementing act) 
Joint agreement on 80%Series of 
discrete allocations made to 16 different 
MS, justified on the basis of them “facing 
particular structural challenges in their 
agricultural sector” or from them having 
“invested heavily in an effective delivery 
framework for Pillar 2 expenditure” 
80% for Art 
14/27/35/19(a)(i). May be 
increased to a maximum of 
90 % for the programmes of 
less developed regions, 
outermost regions, the 
smaller Aegean islands and 
transition regions EP offers to 
accept Council’s allocations 
provided the breakdowns are 
contained in a delegated 
rather than implementing 
act, as well as wider 
commitment to degree of 
flexibility on the other EP 
priority issues 
Resources and their 
distribution included as 
Annex 1 to the basic 
Regulation. 
  75% for agri-environment-
climate actions under Art 
18/23/24/29/30/31(3)/31(4)
/32/35 
 80% of the average it 
should be reduced by 10%. 
The level of the per hectare 
payment received in any MS 
would not be less than 75% 
Acceptance of Council position (i.e. 
75%) 
75% for agri-environment-
climate actions under Art 17/ 
21(1) a+b/28/29/30/31/34 
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Issue EP mandate Council mandate EP proposed landing zone Outcome 
of the EU average in 2019. 
Four-year convergence 
duration (as proposed by 
COM) with a linear reduction 
used to fund redistribution 
Crisis reserve 
and financial 
discipline (HZ 
Art 25 and 26) 
100% for all funds 
transferred from Pillar 1 
(with other exemptions from 
national cofinancing 
requirements associated with 
discrete allocations for MS 
under financial assistance) 
Accepted the original COM 
proposal on the crisis reserve 
being funded outside the MFF 
Acceptance of Council position (i.e. 
100%)Brought the crisis reserve within 
the budget for direct payments using 
financial discipline mechanism (equal 
annual instalments of €400 million (2011 
prices) summing to a potential €2,800 
million for the period 2014-2020 under 
Heading 2 of the MFF 
100% for all funds 
transferred from Pillar 1 
(with other exemptions from 
national co-financing 
requirements associated with 
discrete allocations for MS 
under financial assistance) 
EP prepared to accept 
Council position in return for 
wider flexibility on the other 
EP priority issues 
Council position adopted 
Pre-financing 
arrangements 
(HZ Art 34 
COM, HZ Art 
35 final) 
Higher co-financing rate (by 
10 percentage points) can be 
applied when MS receives 
financial assistance, subject 
to reassessment in 2016 
Initial pre-financing amount 
increased from 4% in 
original COM proposal to 7% 
of the EAFRD contribution to 
the programme concerned. 
Acceptance of Council position (i.e. 
higher co-financing rate for MS in receipt 
of financial assistance) Lower rate of 
pre-financing (1% of the amount of 
EAFRD support for the entire 
programming period to the programme) 
paid in instalments in each of the years 
2014, 2015 and 2016, except where a 
MS has been receiving financial 
assistance since 2010, when the pre-
financing rate is increased to 1.5% for 
the first two years. 
Higher co-financing rate (by 
10 percentage points) can be 
applied when MS receives 
financial assistance, subject 
to reassessment in 2016 
 EP prepared to accept 
Council position in return for 
wider flexibility on the other 
EP priority issues 
Council position adopted 
 Series of discrete allocations 
made to 16 different MS, 
justified on the basis of them 
“facing particular structural 
challenges in their 
agricultural sector” or from 
them having “invested 
heavily in an effective 
delivery framework for Pillar 
2 expenditure” 
EP offers to accept Council’s allocations 
provided the breakdowns are contained 
in a delegated rather than implementing 
act, as well as wider commitment to 
degree of flexibility on the other EP 
priority issues 
Resources and their 
distribution included as 
Annex 1 to the basic 
Regulation. 
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ANNEX V:  EXPERTISE AND RESOURCES PROVIDED BY THE 
POLICY DEPARTMENT B DURING CAP REFORM 
POLICY DEPARTMENT B – Agriculture and Rural Development 
External and internal expertise on the CAP reform 
1) Preparatory legislative phase (2010 to October 2011) 
 
Workshops 
 Workshop 2.6.2010: "Price volatility and risk management tools: building a new 
framework for the globalized markets". 
 Workshop 11.10.2010: "The impact of protein deficiency in Europe: what measures 
to guarantee a supply of feeding stuff within the EU?". 
 Workshop 30.11.2010: "The situation of young farmers in the EU". 
 Workshop 7.2.2011 on the EC Communication of November 2010: "The CAP towards 
2020". 
 Workshop 15.3.2011 on the Quality package of December 2010, complementing 
CAP reform: "The future of the quality policy in the light of the CAP post-2013". 
External studies 
 INEA: The EU fruit and vegetables sector: overview and post-2013 CAP perspective, 
PE 460.043, April 2011 (English). 
 CEIGRAM-UPM: What market measures in the future CAP after 2013?, PE 460.044, 
April 2011 (English (original), German, French and Polish). 
 IEEP et al: What tools for the European agriculture policy to encourage the provision 
of public goods?, PE 460.053, May 2011 (English (original), German, French and 
Polish). 
 INEA:  "The CAP in the EU budget: new objectives and financial principles for the 
review of the agricultural budget after 2013", PE 460.054, May 2011 (English). 
Internal studies PD B 
- Published 
 Policy Department B:  The CAP towards 2020: working paper on the EC 
communication of 18 November 2010, PE 438.618, November 2010 (English) . 
 Policy Department B:  The CAP towards 2020: possible scenarios for the reallocation 
of the budget for direct payments, PE 460.032, March 2011 (English). 
 Policy Department B: The CAP in the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014/2020, 
PE 460.067, October 2011 (English (original), German, French, Spanish, Italian, 
Polish and Portuguese). 
- Not published  
  Briefing note for the COMAGRI Chairman: Commentaires sur les exceptions 
législatives en faveur du Conseil proposées par la Commission dans le cadre du 
processus d'alignement des actes agricoles de base au Traite de Lisbonne, April 
2011  (French) (25 pages).  
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  Briefing note for the COMAGRI Chairman: Towards a budgetary reserve for severe 
agricultural crises, April 2011 (English) (9 pages). 
 
2) Negotiating phase (from publication of legislative proposals - October 
2011 - to the publication of legal text - OJ December 2013) 
Workshops 
 Five  workshops on legislative proposals: "New direct payments scheme: targeting 
and redistribution in the future CAP" (6.2.2012); "Environmental public goods in the 
new CAP - Impact of greening proposals and possible alternatives" (28.2.2012); 
"Addressing market volatility: CMO mechanisms and risk management tools in the 
new CAP" (29.2.202); "EU competition framework: specific rules for the food chain 
in the new CAP" (19.3.2012); "Rural development and territorial cohesion in the 
new CAP" (27.3.2012). Publication of different papers. 
  Workshop 17.9.2012: "Future policy options for the EU sugar regime". 
External studies and briefing notes 
 Guillem Carrau, J.: EU competition framework policy and agricultural agreements: 
collation and comparative analysis of significant decisions at national level, PE 
474.547, May 2012 (English). 
 Butault, Bureau, Witzke and Heckelei: Comparative analysis of agricultural support 
within the major agricultural trading nations, PE 474.544, March 2012 (English). 
 INEA-INRA-CIRVE: The liberalisation of planting rights in the EU wine sector, PE 
474.535, April 2012 (English (original) and French). 
 Regidor, J.G.: EU measures to encourage and support new entrants, PE 495.830, 
September 2012. 
 LEI-Wageningen UR: Comparative analysis of EU standards in food safety, 
environment, animal welfare and other non-trade concerns with some selected 
countries, PE 474.542, May 2012 (English). 
 CCRI, IEEP et al: How to improve the sustainable competitiveness and innovation of 
the EU agricultural sector, PE 474.551, May 2012 (English (original) and French). 
 University of Kent, CCRI et al: Semi-subsistence farming: value and directions of 
development, PE 495.861, April 2013 (English (original), French and Polish). 
 ZALF et al: The environmental role of protein crops in the new Common Agricultural 
Policy, PE 495.856, May 2013 (English (original) and French). 
 Swinnen, J. et al: Possible effects on EU land markets of new CAP direct payments, 
PE 495.866, June 2013 (English (original) and French). 
Internal studies PD B 
- Published 
 Policy Department B: European Council Conclusions on the Multiannual Financial 
Framework 2014/2020 and the CAP, PE 495.846, July 2013 (English). 
- Not published 
 General presentation of legislative proposals to the COMAGRI MEPs (Strasbourg, 
14.12.2011): Legislative proposals for the CAP 2020 - Analysis of critical issues and 
possible options for revising the proposals (63 slides) (English). 
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 Four lists of possible amendments on:  DPR, HZR, RDR and CMO. Presented to 
rapporteurs, shadow-rapporteurs and political coordinators in camera (Strasbourg, 
14.3.2012 - 65 slides - and Brussels, 29.3.2012 - 64 slides) (English). 
 
3) Post-legislative phase (from publication of texts - OJ 20.12.2013 - to 
2015). Selected works published by the PD B (external and internal papers 
by chronological order) 
 Bureau, J-C. and Witzke, H-P.: The single payment scheme after 2013: new 
approach - new targets, PE 431.598, January 2010 (English (original), German and 
French). 
 Munier, B. (MOMAGRI): Commodity price volatility: causes and impact on the EU 
agricultural markets, PE 438.594, Mayo 2010 (English). 
 Capitanio, F. (Naples University): The increase in risk exposure for European 
farmers. A comparison between EU and Nord American tools looking at the CAP post 
2013, PE 438.594, May 2010 (English). 
 Burgaz, F. (ENESA): The Spanish Agricultural Insurance Scheme: national 
experiences and recommendations looking at the CAP post 2013, PE 438.593, May 
2010. 
 Bock, B: Personal and social development of women in rural areas of Europe, PE 
438.608, September 2010 (English). 
 Shortall, S: Women working on the farm: how to promote their contribution to the 
development of agriculture and rural areas in Europe?, PE 438.609, September 
2010. 
 Policy Department B: The CAP towards 2020: working paper on the EC 
communication of 18 November 2010, PE 438.618, November 2010 (English). 
 Shucksmith, M. (Newcastle University): How to promote the role of youth in rural 
areas of Europe?, PE 438.620, November 2010. 
 Chatellier, V. (INRA): Market policy and risk and crisis management instruments in 
the post-2013 CAP, PE 438.627, January 2011 (French (original) and English). 
 Policy Department B: The CAP towards 2020: possible scenarios for the reallocation 
of the budget for direct payments, PE 460.032, March 2011 (English). 
 INEA: The EU fruit and vegetables sector: overview and post-2013 CAP perspective, 
PE 460.043, April 2011 (English). 
 CEIGRAM-UPM: What market measures in the future CAP after 2013?, PE 460.044, 
April 2011 (English (original), German, French and Polish). 
 IEEP et al: What tools for the European agriculture policy to encourage the provision 
of public goods?, PE 460.053, May 2011 (English (original), German, French and 
Polish). 
 INEA:  "The CAP in the EU budget: new objectives and financial principles for the 
review of the agricultural budget after 2013", PE 460.054, May 2011 (English). 
 Policy Department B, The CAP in the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014/2020, 
PE 460.067, October 2011 (English (original), German, French, Spanish, Italian, 
Polish and Portuguese). 
 Swinbank, A. (Reading University), New direct payments scheme: targeting and 
redistribution in the future CAP, PE 474.528, February 2012 (English). 
  Van Der Ploeg, J.D. (Wageningen University), Rural development and territorial 
cohesion in the new CAP, PE 474.529, February 2012 (English). 
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 Matthews, A. (Trinity College), Environmental public goods in the new CAP: impact 
of greening proposals and possible alternatives, PE 474.534, March 2012 (English). 
 Gohin, A. (INRA), The Mechanisms of the Single CMO and Risk Management 
Instruments under the New CAP, PE 474.539, March 2012 (French (original), English 
and German). 
 Butault, Bureau, Witzke and Heckelei: Comparative analysis of agricultural support 
within the major agricultural trading nations, PE 474.544, March 2012 (English). 
 INEA-INRA-CIRVE: The liberalisation of planting rights in the EU wine sector, PE 
474.535, April 2012 (English (original) and French). 
 Del Cont, C., Bodiguel, L. et Iannarelli, A.: EU competition framework: specific rules 
for the food chain in the new CAP, PE 474.541, May 2012 (English). 
 Guillem Carrau, J.: EU competition framework policy and agricultural agreements: 
collation and comparative analysis of significant decisions at national level, PE 
474.547, May 2012 (English). 
 LEI-Wageningen UR: Comparative analysis of EU standards in food safety, 
environment, animal welfare and other non-trade concerns with some selected 
countries, PE 474.542, May 2012 (English). 
 CCRI, IEEP et al: How to improve the sustainable competitiveness and innovation of 
the EU agricultural sector, PE 474.551, May 2012 (English (original) and French). 
 Bureau, J.C.: Latest US Farm Bill developments, PE 495.828, August 2012 (English 
(original) and French). 
 Regidor, J.G.: EU measures to encourage and support new entrants, PE 495.830, 
September 2012. 
 Noble, J.: Policy scenarios for EU sugar market reform, PE 495.823, September 
2012. 
 Smit / Helming: Future policy options for EU beet production: quotas, yes or not?, 
PE 495.824, September 2012.   
 Policy Department B: Research on: 'Biofuels', PE 495.839, January 2013 (English). 
 University of Kent, CCRI et al: Semi-subsistence farming: value and directions of 
development, PE 495.861, April 2013 (English (original), French and Polish). 
 ZALF et al: The environmental role of protein crops in the new Common Agricultural 
Policy, PE 495.856, May 2013 (English (original) and French). 
 Swinnen, J. et al: Possible effects on EU land markets of new CAP direct payments, 
PE 495.866, June 2013 (English (original) and French). 
 Capitanio, F. (Naples University): G20 talks: latest developments on food security, 
PE 513.966, July 2013 (English). 
 Policy Department B: European Council Conclusions on the Multiannual Financial 
Framework 2014/2020 and the CAP, PE 495.846, July 2013 (English). 
 Policy Department B: Research on: 'Forests', PE 495.862, July 2013 (English). 
 Policy Department B: The EU seed and plant reproductive material market in 
perspective: a focus on companies and market shares, PE 513.994, November 2013 
(English). 
 Policy Department B: Research on: 'Regulating agricultural derivatives markets', PE 
513.989, November 2013 (English). 
 Various authors (Workshop): Measures at farm level to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from EU agriculture, PE 513.997, February 2014 (English). 
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 Davidova, S.: Family farming in Europe: challenges and prospects, PE 529.047, April 
2014 (English). 
 Hennessy, T. (TEAGASC): CAP 2014-2020 tools to enhance family farming: 
opportunities and limits, PE 529.051, April 2014 (English). 
 UPV: EU member states in agro food markets: current competitive position and 
perspectives, PE 514.006, May 2014 (English). 
 IFO et al: The market opportunities for the EU agri-food sector in a possible EU - US 
trade agreement, PE 514.007, May 2014 (English).  
 SOMO: Financial instruments and legal frameworks of derivatives markets in EU 
agriculture: current state of play and future perspectives, PE 514.008, June 2014 
(English). 
 CEPS: The first CAP reform under the ordinary legislative procedure: a political 
economy perspective, PE 514.009, January 2015 (English). 
 Cordier, J. (INRA): Comparative analysis of risk management tools supported by the 
2014 US Farm Bill and the CAP 2014-2020,  PE 540.343, January 2015 (English). 
Upcoming:  
 Reforming EU rules concerning the fruit and vegetables sector (Workshop), 22 
January 2015. 
 Implementation of the first pillar of the CAP 2014-2020 in the EU Member States, 
2015. 
 Overview of the agricultural inputs sector in the EU, 2015.  
 Comparison of farmers’ incomes in EU Member States, 2015. 
 Extent of farmland grabbing in the EU, 2015.   
 Policy Department B: Practical Guides to the CAP 2014-2020 (4 volumes), 2015 
(English). 
 
For the full list of the studies and briefing notes produced by Policy Department B, go 
to: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/documents.html?word=&documentType=STU
DIES&id=&body=AGRI&dateStart=&dateEnd=&action=submit 
To access the fact sheets prepared by Policy Department B on the CAP (5.2.1 to 
5.2.11), go to: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=theme5.html
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ANNEX VI:  Article 43(3) TFEU– EVOLUTION OF PROPOSAL COM(2011)626 – SCMO 
(DANTIN REPORT) 
SCMO issue for 
Art 43(3) TFEU 
COM 
proposal  
CY PRES 
proposal 
(14697/12)  
12 /12/2012 
EP mandate COM 
compromise  
Proposal 27 
May 
EP red lines for 
Luxembourg 
trilogue 24-
25/06/2013 
IE Presidency 
landing zone  
26/06/2013 
Trilogue 
outcome 
26/06/2013 
 COM proposals for Article 43(3) TFEU  
Aid for supply of 
school milk - Art 
24(4) 
Art 43(3)  Art 43(3) No 43(3) Keep Article 43(3)  43(3) 43(3) 
Export refund 
fixation – Art 135(2) 
Art 43(3)  Art 43(3)  No 43(3) Keep Article 43(3)  43(3) 43(3) 
Production refund in 
the sugar sector  
Art 43(3) Council deletes 
power  
No 43(3) Keep Article 43(3)  43(3) 43(3) 
 Additional Article 43(3) TFEU requests by Council  
Fixing of reference 
prices – Art 7 
Art 43(2)  Art 43(3)  Art 43(2) Art 43(3) is not 
acceptable 
Art 43(3) is not 
acceptable 
43(2) using the 
term “reference 
threshold” 
43(2) using the 
term “reference 
threshold” 
Fixing of 
intervention prices  
– Art 14 
Art 43(2) Art 43(3)  Art 43(2) Art 43(3) is not 
acceptable 
 43(3) 43(3) 
Fixed price 
intervention 
quantities 
– Art 13 
Art 43(2) Art 43(3)  Art 43(2) Art 43(3) is not 
acceptable 
Art 13(1) : Art 
43(3) is not 
acceptable 
Art 13(2) Art. 
43(3) could be 
accepted 
43(3) 
 
43(3) 
 
Optional PSA aid 
 – Art 17(3). 
DA/IA Art 43(3)  DA/IA Art 43(3) is not 
acceptable 
Art 14(1)(a) : Art 
43(3) is not 
acceptable 
43(3) 43(3) 
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Art 14(1)(b) Art. 
43(3) could be 
accepted for prices 
fixed by tendering 
Intervention price 
increases/reductions  
– Art 14 
DA Art 43(3)  DA Art 43(3) is 
acceptable 
 43(3) 43(3) 
Quantitative limit on 
EU aid for school 
milk 
Art 43(2) Art 43(3) Art 43(2) Art 43(3) is 
acceptable 
 43(3) 43(3) 
Limitation on the aid 
for the school fruit 
scheme and 
minimum allocation 
per MS. 
Art 21(4) = scheme 
budget 
Art 43(2) Art 43(3)  Art 43(2) Art 43(3) is not 
acceptable for total 
budget EU, nor on 
rules of supply 
costs; acceptable 
for all other issues.  
Art 43(3) is not 
acceptable 
 
43(3) 43(3) 
 Sugar (until the end of quotas)  
Minimum price for 
sugar beet  
[Not part of 
COM 
proposal.] 
Art 43(3) Art 43(2) Art 43(3) is 
acceptable 
 43(3) 43(3) 
Beet price 
increases/decreases 
for quality. 
[Not part of 
COM 
proposal.] 
Art 43(3) DA Art 43(3) is 
acceptable 
 43(3) 43(3) 
Sugar production 
charge  
[Not part of 
COM 
proposal.] 
Art 43(3) Art 43(2) Art 43(3) is 
acceptable 
 43(3) 43(3) 
Fixing of sugar 
quotas  
(new Annex IIIb) 
[Not part of 
COMproposal.] 
Art 43(3) Art 43(2) Art 43(3) is not 
acceptable 
Art 43(3) is not 
acceptable 
43(2) 43(2) 
Fixing of sugar 
surplus levy  
[Not part of 
COM 
proposal.] 
Art 43(3) EP proposes 
implementing 
acts for 
surplus levy 
amount. 
Art 43(3) is not 
acceptable 
 43(3) 43(3) 
Source: EP services 
 
 

